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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Fiduciary Disclosure Duty Identified
Two parallel bodies of American law establish the obligations
of corporate directors to disclose information about the corporation to
its existing stockholders: (1) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1994 ed.). See generally Louis Loss and Joel Seligman,
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1995); Thomas Lee Hazen, The
Law of Securities Regulation (West, 3d ed. 1995). Directors are responsible under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for the fulfillment of the Act's disclosure obligations, at least insofar as
they solicit proxies, Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 856, 858 (D.
Del. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Edward Brodsky and M.
Patricia Adamski, Law of Corporate Directors and Officers § 15:14 (1995 Supp.), or actively
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and (2) state common law, including doctrines such as fraud and neg-
ligent misrepresentation. 2 Although these state common law doc-
trines have been applied to transactions in corporate securities, their
significance has been largely eclipsed by comprehensive federal regu-
lation.3
Of growing importance, however, is a state law duty that
courts have created and imposed upon directors based upon their
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. In the last
twenty years, this branch of fiduciary doctrine has blossomed prolifi-
cally, particularly in the Delaware state courts.4 According to the
Delaware Supreme Court in Stroud v. Grace,5 it is now "well-recog-
nized" that fiduciary duty requires directors to disclose all material
supervise the preparation of periodic disclosures by the corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 78(t); Wool v.
Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440-42 (9th Cir. 1987). Compare Hemming v. Afin
Fragrances, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that one's mere status as a
director or officer is an insufficient basis for liability as a "controlling person" under section
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
2. See, for example, Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 472 (Del. 1992) (discussing
equitable fraud as a theory of liability for material omissions in a corporation's offer to purchase
its own outstanding shares); Alfus v. Pyramid Technology Corp., 745 F. Supp. 1511, 1523-24
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (evaluating stock purchasers' claim of negligent misrepresentation against the
issuer's directors); General Inv. Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 230, 127 A. 659,
662 (N.J. Chano. 1925) (invoking both fraud and trust concepts to impose upon directors a duty
of disclosure in solicitation of proxies).
3. Indeed, it was the perceived inability of state law to provide sufficient information to
the securities markets that led to the enactment of comprehensive federal securities legislation.
See, for example, Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities
and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance (Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Manuel F.
Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
119, 125 (1959) ("Common law notions of culpable deceit and the mesh of 'Blue Sky' controls
were not effective deterrents" to "[i]ncreasing recklessness in the flotation of securities... in
the period prior to 1929."). This rationale, however, has been recently criticized. See Frank H.
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure Of Corporate Law 285-300 (Harvard
U., 1991) (suggesting, as an alternative rationale for a national antifraud rule, the elimination
of the necessity for multiple litigation forums for each fraudulent interstate stock issuance and
criticizing customary rationales for mandatory disclosure requirements). In any event, dissatis-
faction with state law also has been identified as the motivation for regulation of proxy solicita-
tion under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Notwithstanding the basic importance of the solicitation of proxies in determining the
destiny of corporate management and affairs, and the temptations and abuses which
almost inevitably accompany unrestricted power, the states did virtually nothing to cope
with the problem. Prior to 1934, the managements of many corporations solicited prox-
ies and perpetuated themselves in office without furnishing to the stockholders the most
elementary facts concerning the corporation and the matters on which the stockholders
were expected to vote. In many cases, the stockholders were not even informed of the
names of the proposed directors or their connection with or stockholdings in the cor-
poration.
Edward Ross Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn, Proxy Regulation" Suggested Improvements, 28
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 306, 306 (1959).
4. See Parts III and IV.
5. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
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information within their control when they seek stockholder action.6
Just thirteen days after the Stroud opinion was issued, moreover, a
Delaware trial court went further, holding that a fiduciary duty to
disclose all material information arises when directors approve any
public statement, such as a press release, regardless of whether any
specific stockholder action is sought.7
As described in the Delaware cases, this fiduciary disclosure
duty is deep, as well as broad. The duty is said to be strict, imposing
liability without regard to director negligence or other culpability; s to
afford stockholders a remedy without regard to whether they relied
upon a statement made in violation of the duty;9 and to afford a
"virtual per se rule" of damages, under which stockholders may obtain
a monetary award on account of a breach of the disclosure duty with-
out having to establish actual loss. °
B. The Breadth of the Doctrine Illustrated
Consider where the foregoing articulation of the fiduciary
disclosure duty would lead in the following hypothetical case:
Directors of a Delaware corporation solicit proxies in support of a
proposed merger in which the stockholders receive cash for their stock
at a substantial premium over the prevailing market price. The
merger is entirely at arm's length. There is no overlap of stock owner-
ship between the acquiror and the target. Only a small minority of
the target's board of directors are officers, and none of those officers
receives either assurances of future employment, or any consulting
contract or other special consideration in the merger. The sale proc-
ess is impeccable, and the stockholders and the financial community
universally accept the sale price as the highest reasonably available.
6. Id. at 84.
7. Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co., 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 330, 336 (Del. Chanc. 1992). See also
Ciro, Inc. v. Gold, 816 F. Supp. 253, 266 (D. Del. 1993) ('It is also well-established Delaware law
that once directors voluntarily undertake to make certain disclosures to the stockholders, they
are obligated, under the so-called duty of complete candor, to disclose all material facts. This
duty arises even when voluntary disclosure is made by the directors and no shareholder action
in reliance thereon is requested or contemplated"); Kahn v. Roberts, 1994 WL 70118, *2 (Del.
Chanc. Feb. 28, 1994) CEven, as here, where stockholder approval was not sought or needed,
directors who decide voluntarily to disclose information relating to a corporate transaction to
stockholders are subject to the duty of full and frank disclosure of all material facts."), affd,
1996 WL 438724 (Del. July 25, 1996).
8. See notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
9. See note 24 and accompanying text.
10. See note 25 and accompanying text.
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In short, there is no plausible claim of breach of any fiduciary duty to
obtain the highest reasonably available price.1
With one possible exception, the process by which proxies are
solicited from the stockholders is likewise impeccable. The directors
take pains to assure that management, aided by experienced securi-
ties counsel, allows ample opportunity for review of the proxy state-
ment. The directors themselves review late drafts of the proxy state-
ment and supply helpful clarifications.12 One disclosure point is re-
viewed in particular in a board meeting. After considerable discus-
sion, counsel advises the directors that the proxy statement need not
disclose year-old internal revenue and earnings projections for a
division which has accounted for about twenty-five percent of sales
and income. Having somehow learned of those projections, however, a
former stockholder brings a class action against the former directors.
The former stockholder seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well
as rescission and damages, on the theory that the directors violated
their fiduciary duty of disclosure by not including the projections in
the proxy statement.
The directors move for summary judgment, and the court's
analysis of applicable fiduciary duty principles begins with the obser-
vation that the directors were soliciting proxies when they presented
the merger proposal to the stockholders for approval. Hence, under
what has become black letter doctrine, the fiduciary duty of disclosure
required the directors to disclose all facts within their control that
were material to the merger proposal.13 The court concludes that the
projections could be material information, since a reasonable investor
11. See generally Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: The Impact
of QVC and Its Progeny, 32 Houston L. Rev. 945 (1995); Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of
Being Earnest: Paramount Rewrites the Rules for Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers,
46 Hastings L. J. 125 (1994); Lawrence A- Cunningham and Charles M. Yablon, Delaware
Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon
Duties?), 49 Bus. Law. 1593 (1994); Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox." The Delaware
Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. Corp. L. 583 (1994); Stephen Fraidin and Jon D.
Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Yale L. J. 1739 (1994); Kenneth J. Nachbar, Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.-The Requirement of a Level Playing Field in
Contested Mergers, and Its Effect on Lock-Ups and Other Bidding Deterrents, 12 Del. J. Corp. L.
473 (1987).
12. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Business Law of the American Bar
Association, Corporate Director's Guidebook 49-50 (2d ed. 1994) ("Directors should be particu-
larly attentive to the procedures followed in preparing the corporation's proxy statements and
should review them carefully before they are disseminated, to corroborate that there are no
material misstatements or omissions.").
13. See, for example, Stroud, 606 A.2d at 85. Whether and to what extent this fiduciary
disclosure duty exists in the absence of proxy solicitation, and why the solicitation of proxies
should alter the substance of the fiduciary duty owed, are matters discussed in Part IV.C.1.
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could have considered their disclosure a significant change in the
"total mix" of available information.14
The defendant directors press their summary judgment mo-
tion, however, on three further points. First, the directors claim
exoneration by reason of lack of evidence of negligence, let alone
scienter, on their part. They point out that even under federal law,
where congressional policy mandates full disclosure in the solicitation
of proxies,1 5 damages liability depends upon proof of negligence. 16
Therefore, they argue, there is no reason why any state common law
policy of disclosure to stockholdersl 7 should be more exacting.
Second, the directors dispute that any stockholder actually
relied on the nondisclosure of the projections, and have offered im-
pressive proof that the merger vote would have been unaffected even
if the projections had been disclosed. Finally, the directors maintain
that no damages can be established. Specifically having failed to
question the sufficiency of the process by which the company was sold,
plaintiff cannot establish that the stockholders received anything less
than full and fair value for their shares.
Adopting statements from the Delaware cases, however, the
court rejects these three contentions summarily. Addressing first the
plea of due care and good faith, the court cites a plethora of Delaware
cases identifying a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts, and notes
that none of those cases indicates that this duty can be breached only
by a culpable failure to disclose.18 The court also notes, quoting
Chancellor William T. Allen in In re Anderson, Clayton Shareholders'
14. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (adopting the materiality
standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
15. See, for example, TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 444; Mills v. Electric Auto.Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 381 (1970); J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
16. Damages liability in a private action under SEC Rule 14a-9 for material omissions in a
proxy statement is generally understood to require a showing of culpability at least amounting
to negligence. Shidler v. All American Life & Financial Corp., 775 F.2d 917, 927 (8th Cir. 1985);
Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976); Brodsky and
Adamski, Law of Corporate Directors § 15:18 (cited in note 1).
17. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 86-87 (stating that Delaware law adopts the same disclosure
standard as federal law).
18. See, for example, Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533 (Del.
Chanc. 1996); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1379 (Del. 1996); In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp.
Shareholder Litigation, 669 A.2d 59, 66 (Del. 1995); Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.,
650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Del. 1993); Stroud, 606
A.2d at 84; Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith, 606 A.2d 112, 114-15 (Del. 1992); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985); Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288
(Del. 1989); Lewis v. Leaseway Transportation Corp., 1990 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 95,275
at 96,268 (Del. Chanc. May 16, 1990); Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659
n.2 (Del. Chanc. 1988); Glassman v. Wometco Cable TV, Inc., 11 Del. J. Corp. L. 649, 656 (Del.
Chanc. 1985).
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Litigation,'9 that "the question whether shareholders have, under the
circumstances, been provided with appropriate information upon
which an informed choice on a matter of fundamental corporate im-
portance may be made, is not a decision concerning the management
of business and affairs of the enterprise"20 and therefore is not a
matter on which the due care and good faith of the directors can, as
under the business judgment rule applicable to management deci-
sions, carry the day for the defendants. 21 Citing scholarly comment, 2
the court disavows any culpability requirement by observing that a
transaction should not be allowed to go forward where stockholder
approval is being obtained on the basis of materially incorrect or
incomplete information simply because the directors reasonably, but
incorrectly, believed in the sufficiency of the information.23
The directors' second and third defenses fall more easily. The
court rebuffs their attempt to disprove reliance, reciting the Delaware
19. 519 A.2d 669 (Del. Chanc. 1986).
20. Id. at 675.
21. Id. See also Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbacher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 150 n. 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (noting that the business judgment rule is inapplicable to allegations of misrepresenta-
tions or omissions in a proxy statement); Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 669 A.2d
79, 88 (Del. 1995) (holding that materiality is "determined from the perspective of the reason-
able shareholder, not that of the directors or other party who undertakes to distribute informa-
tion"); Zirn, 621 A.2d at 779-80 (holding that the materiality of an omission should be deter-
mined by applying a broad objective standard); Lewis, 1990 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. 95,275 at
96,268 (holding that the business judgment rule has no applicability to the question of whether
shareholders have been provided with appropriate information to make an informed choice); In
re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. Litigation, 1990 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 1 95,319, at 96,526, 96,531
(Del. Chanc. June 14, 1990) (holding that the business judgment rule does not apply to
disclosure issues).
22. Commentators have remarked upon the absence of any recitation of a culpability
element of a breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure. See, for example, J. Robert Brown, Jr.,
The Regulation of Corporate Disclosure § 9.03[4] at 9-20 (2d ed. 1995 Supp.) ('elaware cases
have not explicitly imposed a state of mind requirement for violations of the duty of candor.");
Donald E. Pease, Delaware's Disclosure Rule. The "Complete Candor" Standard, Its Application,
and Why Sue in Delaware, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 445, 486-87 (1989) (noting that "under the
Delaware cases ... the plaintiff need not prove that the flawed disclosure was caused by either
scienter or negligence" and concluding that "Delaware has a strict liability standard in the
disclosure area..."). Brown treads with caution on the point, however, noting the
"possibility... that the courts will specifically confront the issues and impose a state of mind
requirement." Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.02 at 9-21 (cited in this note).
23. Anderson Clayton, 519 A.2d at 675. Chancellor Allen observed that there has been no
case in which:
[A] truly important piece of information, within the knowledge of the board, had not
been disclosed, but the court nevertheless denied an application for a preliminary
injunction on the basis that while the Court found the information highly material,
reasonable men could differ on the subject and the board's decision not to disclose,
having been made in good faith, should be deferred to. I doubt that that is the law.
Id.
See also Zirn, 621 A.2d at 779 ("[A] material omission is not rendered immaterial simply
because the party making the omission honestly believes it insignificant.").
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Supreme Court's terse rejection of the argument: "Delaware law is
settled that there is no reliance requirement in a claim for breach of a
fiduciary duty of disclosure."24 With equal dispatch, the court passes
over the absence of proof of actual damages, quoting a Delaware
Supreme Court ruling that "[i]n Delaware existing law and policy
have evolved into a virtual per se rule of damages for breach of the
fiduciary duty of disclosure."'25
In short, by a plausible, and arguably mandatory, reading of
Delaware case law, a court may be obliged to require directors to pay
damages on account of a failure to disclose what is determined in
hindsight to have been a material fact in connection with a transac-
tion in which the directors had no self-interest and acted with the
utmost good faith and due care. Further, no stockholder could
establish either reliance on the nondisclosure or damage resulting
from the merger accomplished by means of the deficient proxy state-
ment.
One may be skeptical that a court would follow the language of
the Delaware cases to this logical end, since monetary liability even
for the negligent action of disinterested directors is rare and disfa-
vored by the law.26 As logically as the result would seem to follow
from the case law, holding the disinterested directors personally liable
in damages for a nondisclosure, regarding which they reasonably
relied on advice of counsel, would seem difficult to reconcile with
statutes which purport to protect reasonable director reliance upon
the advice of experts such as securities counsel.27
Nevertheless, since the broad articulation of fiduciary disclo-
sure duty in the recent Delaware cases potentially implies director
liability in the hypothetical case described above-liability that is
inconsistent with customary notions of the limits of such liability-it
is worthwhile to reassess the evolution of the case law in order to
supply a more logical and predictable framework for future cases.
Such a reassessment of the doctrinal foundations of the fiduciary duty
of disclosure, moreover, clarifies a potentially critical uncertainty
under present case law. So long as the courts characterize the direc-
tor's fiduciary disclosure duty as an ill-defined hybrid of the duties of
24. In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 634 A.2d 319, 327 n.lO (Del. 1993) (citing Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d at 858; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 701 (Del. 1983)).
25. T-Star Pictures, 634 A.2d at 333.
26. See notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
27. See 8 Del. Code Ann. § 141(e) (1994). See also Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.30(b)
(Prentice Hall, 3d ed. 1996 Supp.).
1996] 1095
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1087
care and loyalty,28 directors and corporate counsel will be uncertain as
to whether exculpatory provisions in the certificate of incorporation
can effectively limit or eliminate damages liability for breach of that
fiduciary disclosure duty.29
C. How Did We Get Here, and Where Do We Go From Here?
The evolution of judicial treatment of the director's fiduciary
disclosure duty has received little systematic attention. Scholarly
comment directly addressing this emerging state law concept is not
extensive.30 In two brushes with the matter, the American Law
Institute first avoided altogether an attempt to define the concept, 31
and later dealt with the concept only as a facet of the duty of loyalty.3 2
Much of the sparse scholarly commentary is devoted to cataloguing
how the courts have assessed the materiality of various kinds of in-
formation.3 3 To the limited extent that these commentators have
28. A recent opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court notes, without analysis, that the
"duty of disclosure" is "an obligation that has been characterized as a derivative of the duties of
care and loyalty." Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995).
29. Although the Delaware statute permits elimination, by charter provision, of monetary
liability of directors for breach of fiduciary duty, it does not allow elimination of liability for
breach of the duty of loyalty. 8 Del. Code Ann. § 102(b)(7). In a 1993 opinion, the Delaware
Supreme Court found such an exculpatory provision insufficient to preclude monetary liability
for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure. Zirn, 621 A.2d at 783 (discussed at Part IV.C.2.).
But see Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1287 (holding that the statute expressly protects directors from
liability for breach of the fiduciary disclosure requirements) (discussed at Part IV.C.3).
30. See generally R. Franklin Balotti and Jesse A. Finkelstein, 1 The Delaware Law of
Corporations and Business Organizations § 22.10 (Aspen Law & Business, 2d ed. 1996 Supp.);
Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton, and Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule:
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors 197-215 (Prentice Hall, 4th ed. 1993 and 1995 Supp.);
Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.02 at 39 (cited in note 22); Lewis D. Solomon, Corporations Law
and Policy, Materials and Problems 890-96 (3d ed. 1994); David A. Drexler, Delaware
Corporation Law and Practice 15.07A (1996 Supp.); Ernest L. Folk III, Rodman Ward Jr., and
Edward P. Welch, Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law § 212.4.2 (Little, Brown, 3d
ed. 1992 and 1996 Supp.); Dale A. Oesterle and Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in
Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485, 565-70 (1994); Pease, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. at 445
(cited in note 22); Steven J. Rothschild and Keith R. Sattesahn, "All Germane Facts With
Complete Candor"--Delaware's Disclosure Duty, in Delaware Law for Corporate
Lawyers-Recent Developments 323-52 (Practicing Law Institut, 1985).
31. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 cmt. e (1977) CIt is not within the scope of
this Restatement to state the rules that determine the duty of disclosure which under the law of
business associations the directors of a company owe to its shareholders.").
32. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §§ 5.02, 5.04 (ALI
1994) ("ALI Principles") (defining director disclosure obligations in situations involving self-
dealing and use of material inside information in transactions in the corporation's stock).
33. See, for example, Balotti and Finkelstein, Delaware Law of Corporations §§ 22.10(C),
22.11 (cited in note 30); Block, Business Judgment Rule at 199-208 (cited in note 30); Brown,
Corporate Disclosure §§ 9.03[3], [5] (cited in note 22); Folk, Ward, and Welch, Delaware General
Corporation Law §§ 212:30-:39 (cited in note 30); Pease, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. at 458-476 (cited in
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attempted to identify the source of the directors' fiduciary disclosure
duty, they have tended to describe it as the courts have: in a unitary
fashion, in which the character of the duty-to whom it is owed, when
it is owed, and the remedies for its breach-is the same in whatever
context it arises.3 4 Tracking the broad language of recent Delaware
case law, they have characterized this fiduciary duty, in generalized
terms, as a "duty of candor,"35 or, more recently, as a fiduciary "duty of
disclosure."36
This approach, however, suffers from the same defect that has
characterized the courts' development of the law: an unsurprising but
often uncritical tendency to follow elevated moral rhetoric, which the
courts use to describe the director's fiduciary duties, into contexts in
which such rhetoric was never intended to apply.37 Thus, in the years
note 22); Rothschild and Sattesahn, Delaware's Disclosure Duty in Delaware Law for Corporate
Lawyers at 335-352 (cited in note 30).
34. The tendency to view fiduciary disclosure duty in this unitary fashion finds consider-
able support in the case law. Recent treatment of the duty by the Delaware Supreme Court
identifies a "duty of disclosure" as a distinct legal obligation which is "derivative of the duties of
care and loyalty," but apparently distinct and separate from those duties. Cinerama, 663 A.2d
at 1166; Zirn, 621 A.2d at 778. Moreover, suggestions that the duty should vary according to
the character of the transaction have met with judicial criticism. See, for example, Barkan, 567
A.2d at 1288 (rejecting a test that would define materiality more stringently in cases of director
self-interest). But see Cottle v. Standard Brands Paint, 1990 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (COJH)
95,306 (Del. Chanc. Mar. 22, 1990) (holding that directors' opinions as to adequacy of self-tender
offer are immaterial, particularly since the transaction does not eliminate stockholders' equity
interests).
35. Pease, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. at 447 (cited in note 22) C'elaware's disclosure
standard... [is] known as the rule of 'complete candor.' "); Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.01
at 9-3 n.2 (cited in note 22) (stating that although "court terminology has not been so clear," "the
duty of candor will encompass any affirmative obligation on the part of a company that arises
out of fiduciary obligations to shareholders"); Oesterle and Palmiter, 79 Iowa L. Rev. at 565
(cited in note 30) (discussing the common law duty of "complete candor").
36. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84. The court noted that "the term 'duty of candor' has no well
accepted meaning in the disclosure context. Its use is both confusing and imprecise given the
well-established principles and duties of disclosure that otherwise exist. Thus, it is more
appropriate for our courts to speak of a duty of disclosure based on a materiality standard
rather than the unhelpful terminology that has crept into Delaware court decisions as a 'duty of
candor.'" Picking up the hint, Solomon describes a "state law duty of disclosure" owed by
corporate fiduciaries. Corporations Law at 890 (cited in note 30).
Whether the substitution of the phrase "duty of disclosure" for "duty of complete candor" has
done more for doctrinal clarity than new clothes did for the emperor is unclear. To the extent
that Stroud urges adherence to "well-established principles and duties of disclosure that other-
wise exist' in corporate law, however, it is entirely consistent with the thrust of this article.
Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84.
37. The fervent tone and moral quality of discourse on fiduciary duties have been fre-
quently remarked upon and explained as devices to strengthen the efficacy of rules of fiduciary
behavior where detection of misbehavior and enforcement through litigation are likely to be
erratic.
By obscuring the limits of fiduciary obligations under moralistic rhetoric and by verbally
chastising those who are found to have violated the standard, or come close to doing so,
the courts seek to maintain the standard by discouraging marginal behavior which
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after a leading Delaware Supreme Court opinion, Lynch v. Vickers
Energy Corp.,38 described a fiduciary duty of "complete candor," of
"complete frankness ... [under which c]ompletenesss, not adequacy, is
both the norm and the mandate,"39 the courts naturally latched onto
that language to identify a fiduciary disclosure duty in a variety of
contexts strikingly different from the self-dealing context addressed
in Lynch.40
This Article argues that this progression in the recent
Delaware cases represents an overreaction by the corporate bench
and bar to the force of the fiduciary rhetoric in Lynch and its prog-
eny.41 Hence the title of this article, suggestive of the psychological
phenomenon in which a group, stirred by collective moral fervor and
indignation, attempts, without due deliberation, to mete out sanctions
in circumstances in which such sanctions are truly not deserved or
appropriate. 42
A measured approach to determining the appropriate scope
and character of the director's fiduciary duty of disclosure first re-
quires a recognition that fiduciary relations are too diverse and com-
plex to permit identification of a singular, uniform disclosure duty
having the same content in all contexts. To sharpen the definition of
the fiduciary duty of disclosure, this Article proceeds in three steps.
The first step is to examine two legal sources to which the fiduciary
disclosure duty has sometimes been traced: a repealed Delaware
might or might not violate it. It is the imprecision of the standard and the fact that
there are limitations on its scope which cannot be acknowledged in the judicial formula-
tions that lead the courts to employ excessive rhetorical force in promulgating fiduciary
doctrine. Ambiguity breeds vehemence. Further, the knowledge that fiduciary princi-
ples cannot be precisely and minutely enforced leads to the use of strong language as a
control mechanism.
J. A. C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary
Responsibilities, 22 Wake Forest L. Rev. 9, 11 (1987). See also Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs
Versus Fiduciary Duties, in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and
Agents: The Structure of Business 55, 75-76 (Harvard Bus. School, 1991) (noting that in
enforcing fiduciary duties, judges "try to create feelings of guilt for violation of duty and
rectitude for fulfillment of duty, and even conjure up an aura faintly resembling that which
churches try to put around the duties of ministers to their congregations or of parents to their
children").
38. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
39. Id. at 281.
40. See Part IV.
41. See id.
42. See Harper Lee, To Kill A Mockingbird (Lippincott, 1960); Walter Van Tilburg Clark,
The Ox-Bow Incident (Readers Club, 1942). The analogy between the evolution from Lynch and
the evolution of a lynch mob is obviously imperfect, and it would be foolish to infer that the
fiduciary disclosure duty issue has so inflamed the passion of the Delaware courts as to blind
them to reason. It would be equally foolish, however, not to acknowledge that rhetoric, on the
subject of fiduciary duty or otherwise, may obscure or drive out reasoned analysis.
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statute prescribing director and officer liability for false statements
concerning the corporation; 43 and older case law identifying a state
law obligation to disclose material facts in the solicitation of proxies."
Admittedly this first step fails to advance the analysis. The Article
concludes that neither of the legal areas examined is appropriately
identified as a source of the director's fiduciary duty of disclosure.
The second, and more productive, step is to examine the judi-
cial opinions which directly articulate and apply concepts of fiduciary
duty to require disclosure by corporate directors. This examination
reveals the extent to which the courts have recently extended the
fiduciary disclosure duty beyond the contexts in which such a duty
had traditionally been identified. Before Lynch, the fiduciary disclo-
sure duty of directors had been limited to situations in which the
directors' personal financial interest conflicted with that of the corpo-
ration and the stockholders generally. Thus, a fiduciary duty of dis-
closure was identified in cases where a director relied upon stock-
holder ratification of a self-dealing transaction,45 or, as in Lynch itself,
where the fiduciary's knowledge of favorable but confidential corpo-
rate information permitted the fiduciary to acquire stock from a mi-
nority or outside stockholder at an unfairly low price.46 In Smith v.
Van Gorkom, however, the Delaware Supreme Court established that
failure to disclose material information to stockholders could expose a
director to liability for breach of fiduciary duty even in the entirely
distinct context in which the director is disinterested. 47
This Article concludes that much of the judicial development of
the fiduciary duty of disclosure can be placed on a theoretical and
precedential footing that reinforces the legitimacy of that law. That
firm footing can ultimately be found, however, only by taking a third
analytical step; that is, by identifying the principles that define gen-
erally when a fiduciary relationship arises, ascertaining the
disclosure duties such relationships engender, and determining the
remedies appropriate for breach of each disclosure duty."
43. See Part II.A (discussing 21 Del. Laws 273, § 21 (1899) (repealed in 1967)).
44. See Part II.B.
45. See Part III.A.
46. See Part Ill.B.
47. 488 A.2d at 872-73. That development and the significant Delaware cases following it
are explored in Part IV.
48. See Part V.
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D. Fundamental Fiduciary Principles: A Preview
Because it highlights the very distinct contexts in which fidu-
ciary duties may arise, the exercise of identifying basic principles of
fiduciary duty helps delineate the directors' fiduciary duty of disclo-
sure. For example, one form of fiduciary disclosure duty is a corollary
of the traditional fiduciary duty of loyalty. That traditional fiduciary
principle applies where a person who is empowered to manage the
property of others for their benefit uses such property for personal
benefit.49 In modern corporation law, such self-dealing behavior,
while not flatly forbidden, is subject to the most searching degree of
judicial scrutiny.50 The remedies for breach of the duty of loyalty may
extend not only to compensating the beneficiary for out-of-pocket loss
occasioned by the breach, but also to disgorgement by the fiduciary of
profits gained from the breach. 51
Where the self-dealing fiduciary, in order to avoid strict judi-
cial scrutiny and expansive remedies for breach of the duty of loyalty,
seeks the consent of the persons whose interests the fiduciary is
charged to protect, the law invariably insists that such consent be
fully informed.52 That insistence reflects and buttresses the severity
of the rules limiting fiduciary self-dealing generally. If the law did
not insist that the fiduciary affirmatively demonstrate that the bene-
ficiary's consent was fully informed, the force of restraints against
self-dealing conduct could be readily avoided.53 Therefore, the fiduci-
ary has an affirmative duty to disclose all facts material to the benefi-
49. Austin Wakeman Scott and William Franklin Fratcher, 2A The Law of Trusts § 170 at
311 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1987); J.C. Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries 35 (1981). See also
Part V.A.
50. See, for example, Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (noting that in a self-dealing transac-
tion, the defendant has the burden of establishing the "entire fairness" of the transaction);
Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) (stating that an interested transaction can be
upheld if approved by a neutral decision-making body); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 512 (Del.
1939) ("It was incumbent upon [the director] to show that his every act in dealing with the
opportunity presented was in the exercise of the utmost good faith to the corporation.").
51. Shepherd, Law of Fiduciaries at 37-38 (cited in note 49); Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 503-04 (Del. 1981).
52. See, for example, Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 477 (5th Cir. 1973) (refusing to find that
the uninformed vote of the shareholders of a corporation constituted ratification); Wendt v.
Fischer, 234 N.Y. 439, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (1926) (holding that for disclosure to be effective, it
must "lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance");
Restatement (Second) Of Trusts § 216(2) (1957) C(The consent of the beneficiary does not
preclude him from holding the trustee liable for a breach of trust, if... the beneficiary, when he
gave his consent, did not know of... the material facts which the trustee knew or should have
known and which the trustee did not reasonably believe that the beneficiary knew...."). See
also Part III.A.
53. See note 265.
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ciary's decision whether to consent to the self-dealing conduct of the
fiduciary.54 And indeed, much of the precedent applying a director
fiduciary duty of disclosure has arisen in precisely the context in
which the director relies upon stockholder consent to defend a trans-
action in which the director has a conflicting personal interest.55
To posit and define a fiduciary duty of disclosure in the ab-
sence of conflicting personal interest, however, requires resort to
fiduciary principles very different from those that characterize the
duty of loyalty. That distinct set of fiduciary principles-essentially a
facet of the duty of care-is evoked where directors recommend how
stockholders should vote or otherwise act on matters affecting their
stock.56 In making such recommendations, directors ordinarily have
far greater knowledge, or access to knowledge, than do non-managing
stockholders. 57 Thus, directors who recommend that stockholders
vote a certain way, or sell (or not sell) their shares in response to a
tender offer, place themselves in a position in which stockholders
necessarily and properly rely upon that superior knowledge in deter-
mining how to act on a matter directly affecting their own interests as
stockholders.
In such circumstances, the law has placed some duty, often
characterized as fiduciary, upon the informationally advantaged ad-
vising party to disclose material facts to the informationally disadvan-
taged party who reasonably and foreseeably relies upon the advice
given.58 In the absence of self-interest, the directors' function of man-
aging the disclosure of information to stockholders is similar to the
directors' function of prudent management of the affairs of the corpo-
ration generally. Both involve effort by the directors to manage cor-
porate resources to serve the best interests of the stockholders. 59
Therefore, the directors' duty of disclosure in recommending stock-
holder action should mirror the directors' duty of care, requiring no
more (and no less) than the exercise of due care by the directors in
gathering and presenting to the stockholders the information material
to the decision the stockholders are being called upon to make. Since
directors are not strictly liable as insurers for the outcome of their
disinterested business decisions,60 disinterested directors should
54. Scott and Fratcher, 2A Law of Trusts § 170 at 312 (cited in note 49).
55. See Part III.A.
56. One example is when the directors recommend that stockholders approve a merger
agreement. See Part V.C.
57. See note 260.
58. See note 333.
59. See note 336.
60. See notes 266-69, 338 and accompanying text.
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likewise not be strictly liable as insurers of the completeness of the
information they present to stockholders when they recommend
stockholder action.
Where director self-interest is absent, there is no need for
strict liability or disgorgement-type remedies to discourage fiduciary
opportunism. Fiduciary attention to prudent management has been
thought adequately encouraged by a regime in which director liability
requires proof of negligence or "gross negligence,"1 and remedies are
limited to compensating victims of fiduciary inattention for their
resulting out-of-pocket loss.62 More expansive liability and remedies
have been thought unduly to discourage individuals from serving as
directors. 63  Monetary remedies for breach of the director's duty to
disclose material facts in connection with recommendations of
stockholder action, then, as with breach of the duty of care and the
analytically similar tort of negligent misrepresentation,4 should be
limited to loss sustained by the stockholders as a result of the breach.
E. Applying Fundamental Fiduciary Principles to the Director's Duty
of Disclosure: A Preview and Summary
As more fully developed in the material that follows, the rea-
sons for imposing a fiduciary duty of disclosure upon corporate direc-
tors justify application of such duty in a manner considerably less
dramatic than some commentators have intimated.65  Subject to lay-
ing a more detailed foundation below, the following paragraphs pro-
pose a restatement of the fiduciary duty of disclosure:
61. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. See also note 267 and accompanying text; William M.
Fletcher, 3A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1037 at 44-45 (Callaghan,
perm. ed. 1994) (arguing that excessive director liability increases agency costs).
62. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1148-49, affd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); ALI Principles §
7.18(a) (cited in note 32).
63. R. Franklin Balotti and James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule,
48 Bus. Law. 1337, 1342 (1993); Fletcher, 3A Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §
1037 at 42 (cited in note 61).
64. See text accompanying notes 348-50.
65. For example, in his treatment of the "duty of candor"-probably the most thorough
and thoughtful to date-Brown states that "[t]he doctrine does have the potential to revitalize
state law in the proxy area .... Under the duty of candor, a company may arguably have an af-
firmative obligation to disclose material developments as they occur." Brown, Corporate
Disclosure § 9.02 at 9-28 (cited in note 22). Solomon speculates that "[i]t may be that the duty to
disclose applies to all communications by fiduciaries to shareholders, regardless of whether
shareholder action is required." Corporations Law at 892 (cited in note 30). See also Oesterle
and Palmiter, 79 Iowa L. Rev. at 566 (cited in note 30) ("Shareholders use the 'complete candor'
tool principally to challenge (and effectively rewrite) the terms of mergers, reorganizations, and
charter amendments-a substitute for fiduciary review on the merits").
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1. In the case of a transaction in which directors have a mate-
rial personal interest in conflict with the interests of the corporation
or its stockholders generally, those directors owe a fiduciary duty,
when seeking approval of the transaction by the vote of disinterested
stockholders, to disclose all facts that are material to the stockholders'
consideration of the transaction and that are or can reasonably be
obtained through their position as directors. A failure to fulfill that
duty of disclosure, whether culpable or not, will eliminate any
validating effect that a favorable stockholder vote otherwise might
have on the transaction. Unless the stockholder vote is a prerequisite
to accomplishment of the transaction, however, that failure will not of
itself constitute an independent wrong for which a remedy must be
afforded.
2. Where directors buy stock directly from, or sell stock di-
rectly to, an existing outside stockholder-that is, a stockholder who
is not a director, officer or controlling stockholder-those directors
owe a fiduciary duty to the stockholder to disclose all facts that are
material to the stockholder's consideration of the purchase or sale and
that are or can reasonably be obtained through their position as direc-
tors. A failure to fulfill that duty of disclosure will subject the trans-
action to injunctive relief or rescission in appropriate circumstances,
and will subject the directors to monetary liability measured by the
out-of-pocket damages sustained by the outside stockholder, or, in
appropriate circumstances, by the amount of profit realized by the
director as a result of the transaction.
3. Where directors submit for stockholder approval, or com-
municate to the stockholders a recommendation with regard to, a
transaction or matter in which they have no material personal inter-
est in conflict with the interests of the corporation or its stockholders
generally, but as to which stockholders may reasonably expect to rely
on the recommendation of directors as to what action to take with
regard to their shares-as, for instance, where directors make a rec-
ommendation in a Schedule 14D-966 whether stockholders should
tender their shares in response to a tender offer by a third party-the
directors owe a fiduciary duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose
all facts that are material to the stockholders' consideration of the
transaction or matter and that are or can reasonably be obtained
through their position as directors. A failure to fulfill that duty of
disclosure may warrant an injunction against, or rescission of, the
transaction, but will not be the basis for an award of damages against
66. See SEC Rules 14d-9 and 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-9 and 240.14e-2 (1996).
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the directors in the absence of (i) negligence or bad faith, (ii) reliance
by the stockholders seeking to recover damages on account of that
failure, and (iii) proof of damages proximately caused by that failure.
4. Where directors make a statement to the public generally
which does not on its face solicit or recommend action by the stock-
holders, the directors have no fiduciary duty of disclosure, although
they may be liable to stockholders under common law fraud principles
for actual damages if their statement is false or misleading due to a
knowing misstatement or omission of a material fact, and the stock-
holders rely on such misstatement or omission and sustain injury as a
result.
II. SEARCHING FOR THE SOURCE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF
DISCLOSURE: TWO FALSE STARTS
A. The Statutory Myth
Several commentators have suggested that, at least under
Delaware law, the source of the directors' fiduciary disclosure duty to
stockholders is a statute which was adopted in 1899 and repealed in
1967 as part of the general revision of the Delaware General
Corporation Law ("former section 144").67 Closer analysis, however,
demonstrates that this suggestion is erroneous. The statute did not
create or codify a fiduciary duty to stockholders. Instead, it merely
codified a rule of common law fraud establishing liability to creditors
and investors that was not rooted in, and did not depend upon, a pre-
existing fiduciary relationship.68
67. 21 Del. Laws 273, § 21 (1899), later codified at 8 Del. Code Ann. § 144 (1953) (referred
to herein as "former section 144"). See Solomon, Corporations Law at 890 (cited in note 30)
("The Delaware duty of disclosure can be traced ultimately to a now repealed state statute: 8
Del. C. § 144 (1953)."); Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.02 at 9-4, 9-28 (cited in note 22)
(describing the "duty of candor" as "historically grounded in a state statute," and describing that
statute's disclosure requirement as a "relatively sleepy edifice until the 1970s"); Drexler,
Delaware Corporation Law 15.07A at 15-36 (cited in note 30) (noting that prior to Lynch, "the
duty of a corporation's management to provide information to stockholders had been measured
by a fraud standard... [which flrom 1899 until it was repealed in 1967 ... had been embodied
in the statute itself'); Pease, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. at 448 (cited in note 22) ("Even before any
Delaware case stated requirements on disclosure, the General Corporation Law of Delaware
(GCL) required accurate information in certain communications to shareholders.").
68. The statute in question provided:
If the directors or officers of any corporation organized under the provisions of this
chapter, shall knowingly cause to be published or give out any written statement or re-
port of the condition or business of the corporation that is false in any material respect,
the officers and directors causing such report or statement to be published, or given out,
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From this statute-curiously, even long after its repeal-the
Delaware Court of Chancery in Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co. inferred a
continuing, common law duty on the part of corporate directors "to
honestly disclose all material facts when they undertake to give out
statements" concerning the condition or business of their
corporation. 69 Having described this disclosure duty as one owed to
stockholders, the court on reargument clarified that the duty is not
owed to nonstockholders, not even persons who become stockholders
in reliance on flawed disclosures by corporate directors.
70
Delaware's 1899 statute, however, is devoid of any language
indicating that existing stockholders were the exclusive beneficiaries
of the disclosure obligation that the statute either created or codified.
To the contrary, the history of former section 144 shows that it oper-
ated as an antifraud statute of general commercial application by
codifying the proposition that corporate creditors and purchasers of
the corporation's securities could claim damages for fraudulent writ-
ten statements made by the directors regardless of any lack of privity
or pre-existing fiduciary relationship with those directors.
The predecessor of former section 144, and similar state stat-
utes then existing, demonstrate the creditor and securities purchaser
protection purposes of former section 144. Before 1899, the Delaware
statute (first enacted in 1883) prescribed a monetary remedy that was
quite clearly limited to those who extended credit to the corporation.71
or assenting thereto, shall be jointly and severally, individually liable for any loss or
damage therefrom.
21 Del. Laws 273, § 21 (1899).
69. Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 336 (citing Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 71 (Del. Chanc.
1969), for the proposition that "[t]he legal rule announced in § 144 seems to have survived the
repeal of the statute" in 1967). For that "rule" to have survived the repeal of the statute,
however, it must necessarily have been part of the common law. Ordinarily, "[u]nder common
law principles all rights, liabilities, penalties, forfeitures and offenses which are of purely
statutory derivation and unknown to the common law are eliminated by the repeal of the
statute which granted them, irrespective of the time of their accrual." Norman J. Singer, 1A
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.33 (5th ed. 1993). Yet neither Marhart nor Kelly cites
any authority indicating that directors owed a general fiduciary duty to stockholders under
common law to disclose all material facts when giving out written statements concerning the
business or condition of the corporation.
70. Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co., 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 740, 743 (Del. Chanc. 1992) C(rhere is
nothing in this Coures earlier decision concerning disclosures to nonstockholders and, as
defendants note in their motion for reargument, fiduciary duties run to stockholders, not
prospective stockholders.") (citing Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545
A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988)).
71. The statute provided:
If any certificate made, or any public notice given by the officers of any company in
pursuance of the provisions of this act shall be false in any material representation, all
the officers who shall have signed the same shall be jointly and severally liable for all
the debts of the corporation contracted while they were stockholders or officers thereof.
1106 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 49:1087
Since liability for fraudulent written statements under statutes like
the 1883 Delaware statute was limited to corporate debts, rather than
consequential damages generally, cases interpreting similar statutes
readily recognized the creditor protection purpose of the statutes. 72
The 1899 revision of the Delaware statute, however, expanded
its scope. Like statutes previously adopted in California73 and in
Illinois,7 4 it extended liability for fraudulent written statements be-
yond corporate debts to include damages sustained by any person, not
just corporate creditors, resulting from the fraudulent statements.7 5
Under this revised statute, persons who purchased or sold the corpo-
ration's securities in reliance on knowingly incorrect representations
published by the directors or officers about the condition or business
of the corporation could assert fraud claims against those directors
and officers, even though they did not deal directly with those direc-
tors or officers. 76 Although the revised 1899 Delaware statute may
17 Del. Laws, 147 § 31 (1883). For similar and contemporaneous state statutes, see, for exam-
ple, Steam Engine Co. v. Hubbard, 101 U.S. 188 (1879) (applying Connecticut's statute);
Prescott F. Hall, The Law of Massachusetts Business Corporations 302 (3d ed. 1917) (discussing
Massachusetts's statute); James B. Dill, The Statutory and Case Law Applicable to Private
Companies Under the General Corporation Act of New Jersey and Corporation Precedents 78 (3d
ed. 1901) (discussing New Jersey's statute); Frank Hubbard Twyeffort, Business Corporations
in New York § 352 at 397-98 (1918) (quoting New York's statute prescribing liability to persons
who become stockholders in reliance on false reports)).
72. Steam Engine Co., 101 U.S. at 194 (applying Conn. Rev. Stat. § 404 and stating that
"[s]tatutes of the kind are passed for the benefit of creditors, and their reliance always is upon
the officers who are such when they give the credit...."); Felker v. Standard Yarn Co., 148
Mass. 226, 19 N.E. 220, 221 (1889) ('[No doubt one important reason, perhaps the principal
reason, for the statutory provisions, is to enable persons who may have occasion to deal with
corporations to ascertain their condition, and their title to credit . .
73. The statute provided:
Any officer of a corporation who willfully gives a certificate, or wilfully makes an official
report, public notice, or entry in any of the records or books of the corporation, concern-
ing the corporation or its business, which is false in any material representation, shall
be liable for all the damages resulting therefrom to any person injured thereby; and if
two or more officers unite or participate in the commission of any of the acts herein
designated, they shall be jointly and severally liable.
Cal. Civ. Code § 316 (West, 1874) (in effect July 1, 1874).
74. The statute provided:
If any certified report or statement made, or public notice given by the officers of any
corporation, shall be false in any material representation, all the officers who shall have
signed the same, knowing it to be false, shall be jointly and severally liable for all dam-
ages resulting therefrom.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. xxxii, § 21 (1872).
75. 21 Del. Laws 273, § 21 (1899).
76. Although there appear to be no reported Delaware cases under former section 144
involving claims of liability by allegedly defrauded stock purchasers or sellers, a similar statute
has provided the basis for such claims. See Smeland v. Renwick, 50 Cal. App. 565, 196 P. 283,
285 (1920) (involving a claim against directors by allegedly defrauded purchasers of corporate
bonds and common and preferred stock and invoking Cal. Civ. Code § 316).
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have been superfluous in light of existing case law,77 legislative intent
to afford a remedy to defrauded stock purchasers seems apparent.78
The statute's purpose of protecting investors generally, rather than
just existing stockholders, is also quite plausible since it predated by
thirty-four years the enactment of comprehensive federal regulation
of disclosure in stock issuances.79
After the enactment of federal securities laws governing
fraudulent issues of stock, however, state corporation statutes became
increasingly irrelevant to the protection of creditors.80 Statutes like
former section 144 generally atrophied or disappeared altogether as a
result of disuse. 1 The vestigial successor to such statutes, section
77. Case law in jurisdictions outside of Delaware held that defrauded purchasers of corpo-
rate stock could sue directors and officers directly to recover damages resulting from fraudulent
written representations about the corporation disseminated by the directors or officers to the
public.
[I]t has often been decided that directors are liable for fraudulent representations as to
the financial condition of the company, whereby others are induced to give credit to the
company, or to purchase its obligations or shares of its stock.... It is not necessary that
the misrepresentation be made by the directors directly to the party complaining.
Victor Morawetz, 1 A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations § 573 (Little, Brown, 2d ed.
1886).
It is hardly necessary to say that a director of a company who knowingly issues or sanc-
tions the circulation of a false prospectus, containing untrue statements of material
facts, the natural tendency of which is to mislead and deceive the community, and to in-
duce the public to purchase its stock, is responsible to those who are injured thereby.
Id. § 543 (citing, among other cases, Morgan v. Skiddy, 62 N.Y. 319, 326 (1875) (Andrews, J.)).
78. Indeed, a text written a few years after the 1899 revision annotates the revised
Delaware statute with references to case law imposing liability upon stock promoters for mate-
rial misrepresentations to, or concealment of material facts from, potential subscribers. J.
Ernest Smith, The Law of Business Corporations Organized Under the General Corporation Law
of the State of Delaware 83-84 (2d ed. 1904).
79. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994 ed.).
80. See, for example, Bayless Manning and James J. Hanks, Jr., Legal Capital 91
(Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1990) ("It is a safe generalization.., that the statutory legal capital
machinery provides little or no significant protection to creditors of corporations"); 1 Model Bus.
Corp. Act Ann. at 6-218 (noting that the 1980 elimination of capital concepts from the Model
Business Corporation Act was "based on the premise that the complex structure of rules
established by earlier versions of the Model Act did not provide realistic protection to creditors
or senior securities holders").
81. Thus, as the court noted in Marhart, there is not even any legislative history sur-
rounding the elimination of former section 144 in the 1967 revision of the Delaware General
Corporation Law. Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 335. The extensive volume prepared by the
reporter for the revision committee is silent on the failure to carry forward the provisions of
former section 144. See generally Ernest L. Folk III, Review of the Delaware Corporation Law
(1968).
Only two states retain statutes that make directors or officers liable in damages to persons
who rely to their injury upon knowingly false statements in published corporate documents.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 10-1631 (West, 1995) (prescribing liability "to a person who has become a
creditor or shareholder of the corporation on the faith of the false material
representation.., for all damages resulting"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.93 (Page, 1994).
Interestingly, the Ohio statute has in recent years served as the basis for imposing personal
liability upon corporate officers. See In re Walsh, 143 B.R. 691, 695-96 (N.D. Ohio 1992)
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1.29 of the Model Business Corporation Act, prescribes only criminal
misdemeanor liability, rather than civil damages liability.82 Even that
criminal liability is limited to false statements in filings with the
secretary of state or the equivalent office, and does not extend to
statements in corporate disclosures in general.83
Former section 144 disappeared when the Delaware General
Corporation Law was revised in 1967.84 Cited in only one reported
case while it was still in force, s5 former section 144 has been dusted
off in Marhart and in scholarly comment to sustain and define a doc-
trine of fiduciary duty that the statute was never intended to
encompass during its life, let alone after its death by repeal. The true
source of the fiduciary duty of disclosure of corporate directors must
therefore be found elsewhere.
B. Distinguishing Common Law Proxy Disclosure Obligations From a
Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure
At least one observer has suggested that a fiduciary duty of
directors and officers to disclose material facts to stockholders can be
traced to cases which apply common law principles to evaluate claims
(refusing to declare a default judgment non-dischargeable under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
1701.93); Hinkle v. Sherwood Products, Inc., 13 Ohio App. 3d 414, 469 N.E.2d 869, 870-72 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983) (holding officer liable to employee for medical costs, due to entry on pay stubs
and time cards falsely showing medical insurance coverage).
82. Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 1.29.
83. Id.
84. See note 81.
85. Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 146 A.2d 602, 609-10 (Del. Chanc. 1958).
Hall refers to former section 144, and states the general principle that directors must honestly
disclose all material facts when they undertake to disclose corporate information, but finds no
proof of "false or fraudulent annual reports," and rejects such as a basis for appointment of a
receiver. Id. at 610. Thus, Hall is incorrectly cited as a case under former section 144
"impos[ing] liability for false disclosure." Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.02 at 9-4 (cited in
note 22). To the contrary, Hall's reference to former section 144 and a duty of disclosure on the
part of corporate directors is dictum.
Likewise, the case relied on in Marhart to establish that the disclosure duty described in
Hall persisted after repeal of former section 144-Kelly v. Bell--even less persuasive in
supporting the existence of a fiduciary duty of disclosure to stockholders. True, Kelly does state,
citing Hall, that "directors owe a duty to honestly disclose all material facts when they
undertake to give out statements about the business to stockholders." Kelly, 254 A.2d at 71.
The claim before the court, however, was that the directors should be liable in a derivative suit
for payments made to local governments. The legal issue was whether the protection of the
business judgment rule should be denied because the directors' description of those payments as
"taxes" "constituted fraud or gross abuse of discretion." Id. The statement in Kelly on which the
court in Marhart relied is, like the comparable statement in Hall, pure dictum.
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of false or misleading solicitation of proxies.8 6 There is some truth to
this perception, inasmuch as directors and officers have long been
held to have obligations of disclosure, sometimes characterized as
"fiduciary" in nature, when they solicit proxies.87 Certainly, state law
challenges to proxy solicitation disclosures were quite common,88 at
least until 1964 when federal regulation of proxy solicitation was
extended beyond stock exchange listed issuers.8 9
86. See Pease, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. at 448 (cited in note 22) ("As early as 1946, the court of
chancery discussed disclosure requirements in Empire Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, [46 A.2d 741
(1946)].").
87. Willoughby v. Port, 182 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), modified on other grounds,
277 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (enjoining dissident stockholders from exercising proxies, and
holding that "[tihose who seek the proxies of their fellow corporate shareholders assume a
fiduciary obligation"); Dal-Tran Service Co. v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 220 N.Y.S.2d 549,
554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (following Willoughby but sustaining uncontested election of
management nominees); Skora v. Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd., 205 N.Y.S.2d 98, 104-06 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1960) (finding that while proxies solicited by dissident stockholders of an Ontario
corporation were "invalid under the law of Ontario" because they "were obtained by reason of
fraudulent representations or fraudulent omissions of material facts .... Even if the publicity
here was defective only in that it did not tell the whole truth, the failure to make such a full
disclosure would have been a breach of fiduciary obligation").
88. In addition to the cases cited in note 87, see Bresnick v. Home Title Guaranty Co., 175
F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Empire Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, 46 A.2d 741 (Del. Chanc. 1946);
Goldfield Corp. v. General Host Corp., 327 N.Y.S.2d 330, 277 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1971); Mason v.
Basic Properties, Inc., 230 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962), affd, 232 N.Y.S.2d 391, 17 A.D.2d
769 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962); In re R. Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), affd, 139
N.Y.S.2d 883 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1955), affd, 309 N.Y. 719, 128 N.E.2d 420 (1955); Wyatt v.
Armstrong, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945); In re Scheuer, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1942); Continental Bank & Trust Co. of New York v. 200 Madison Avenue Corp., 43 N.Y.S.2d 402
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943); Western Oil Fields, Inc. v. McKnab, 232 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1964). See
also Comment, Standards of Disclosure in Proxy Solicitation of Unlisted Securities, 1960 Duke
L. J. 623, 637 (apparently chafing at the then inapplicability of federal proxy rules to unlisted
companies, urging that "[t]he state courts should insure protection to the stockholder through
the establishment of minimum standards of disclosure or, in the alternative, consider the proxy
rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission when passing upon the adequacy of disclosure
in solicitation"); Edward Ross Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn, State Court Review of Corporate
Elections, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 155, 160-61, 176 (1956) (discussing state cases involving challenges
to proxy solicitation); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Misrepresentation in Proxy
Solicitation-State Cases, 20 A.L.R.4th 1287 (1983) (listing cases).
89. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, §§ 3(c), 5(a), 78 Stat. 565,
566-67, 569 (1964). Since 1964, cases invoking only state common law disclosure duty on the
part of proxy solicitors have become a rarity. A rare exception-a case involving a Native
American development corporation exempted by federal statute from the reach of the securities
laws-indicates that such state law cases have been displaced by litigation under section 14(a)
of the Exchange Act, and Rule 14a-9 promulgated pursuant to that statute. Brown v. Ward, 593
P.2d 247 (Alaska 1979). Indeed, the Brown case, even while nominally applying state law,
simply followed standards under the federal securities laws as "a useful guide in determining
when a misstatement is material under Alaska common law" Id. at 250. The dissent in that
case, however, cogently disagreed:
Certainly there is no reason, in law or policy, why Alaska must march in lockstep with
the federal government on this subject .... [Courts applying common law proxy
solicitation disclosure duties] have taken a compromise position between the federal
standard and the common law tort of misrepresentation.
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Nevertheless, these older proxy solicitation cases should not be
viewed as the source of a fiduciary disclosure duty of directors. As
these cases make clear, the duty to avoid fraud in the solicitation of
proxies, and not any duty arising from a preexisting fiduciary rela-
tionship, forms the basis for scrutiny of proxy solicitation disclosures
under common law.90 Thus, the disclosure duties articulated in the
Id. at 255 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). See also Washington State Labor Council v. Federated
American Ins. Co., 474 P.2d 98, 101 (Wash. 1970) (holding that a state statute governing
solicitation of proxies of stock of insurers and requiring disclosure of "the material matters in
regard to which the powers so solicited are proposed to be used," did not require advance
disclosure by management of its strategy for cumulating votes at the meeting).
90. Although the cases sometimes characterize the proxy solicitor's disclosure duty as
arising from a fiduciary relationship with the solicitees, see note 87 and accompanying text, the
cases more commonly invoke principles of common law fraud, a doctrine applicable without
regard to any preexisting fiduciary relationship, and therefore applicable not only to traditional
corporate fiduciaries but to dissident proxy solicitors as well. See, for example, Bresnick, 175 F.
Supp. at 725 ("The test is not compliance with the technical rules, but rather whether the proxy
soliciting material was so tainted with fraud that an inequitable result was accomplished.");
Empire Southern Gas Co., 46 A.2d at 743 ("[B]oth precedent and practice support the right of
this court to interfere prior to a stockholders' meeting to prevent fraud in the solicitation of
proxies:'); Continental Bank, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (T'Mhe proof failed to establish any fraud in the
securing [by dissident voting trust certificate holders] of proxies, either by way of untruthful
statements of material facts or the suppression of material facts such as would amount to
fraud .... [This court should limit its consideration solely to the question of whether there
was fraud in soliciting the proxies."); Western Oil Fields, 232 F. Supp. at 164 ("Apparently a
stronger showing of fraud must be made when an injunction is sought under state law than
when it is sought for a violation of SEC Proxy Rule X-14A-9 forbidding false or misleading
statements") (citing Edward Ross Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn, Proxy Contests For
Corporate Control 435 (Columbia U., 1957)).
The fraud basis of the state proxy solicitation cases is consistent with the insistence in some
of those cases that a stockholder vote will be set aside only if the challenger can demonstrate
actual reliance by stockholders upon the allegedly defective disclosure, or that the result of the
vote would have been different but for the defective disclosure. Goldfield, 277 N.E.2d at 392
("The test... is whether.., there is a substantial likelihood that the misstatement... may
have led a stockholder to grant a proxy to the solicitor or to withhold [it] ... whereas in the
absence of this he would have taken a contrary course.") (quoting General Time Corp. v. Talley
Industries, 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968)); Bresnick, 175 F. Supp. at 725 (holding that facts
allegedly omitted from the management proxy statement were "fully disclosed in letters sent to
stockholders by the committee opposing the plan and there is no indication in the papers that
the stockholders were misled by omission to put these particular figures in the Management
proxy soliciting material"); Continental Bank, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 408 ("None of the statements of
facts which are alleged to be untrue would, in the opinion of the court, influence any layman to
give a proxy where he would not otherwise have done so."); R. Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d at 148
(TEven assuming there were misstatements or concealments, the election may not be set aside
unless the court concludes further that the result would have been different had no such
improprieties been injected into the proxy campaign, or that an inequitable result has been
thereby produced"); Mason, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 563 ("I do not find that the alleged misstatements
and concealments in the Proxy Statement were such as to mislead a substantial number of
stockholders as to alter the probable result of the vote on the adoption of the plan."). Compare
Scheuer, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 501 C'[I]t is not necessary to show that stockholders were actually
deceived. It is sufficient to show that they might have been.") (citing American Hide, 127 A. at
661). The more relaxed reliance and causation tests recited without analysis in Scheuer are
probably attributable to the context of the American Hide case on which Scheuer relied. The
challenge to the stockholder vote in American Hide arose not in a contested election, but
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state law proxy solicitation cases unquestionably apply not only to
incumbent directors and officers but to dissident or insurgent proxy
solicitors as well.91
At least with the benefit of hindsight, moreover, it seems inap-
propriate to characterize as "fiduciary" the common law disclosure
duty of proxy solicitors, both management and dissident. The cases
that used that terminology did not explain why a fiduciary relation-
ship should be deemed to govern the actions by which a proxy is ob-
tained, as distinguished from the use and execution of proxy authority
once it is conferred.92 Indeed, the relationship of solicitee to solicitor
does not, in and of itself, involve any of the vulnerability and expecta-
tion of reliance that ordinarily justify application of a fiduciary obliga-
tion.93
Perhaps reflecting that view, most observers have suggested
that the older state law proxy solicitation cases are not a viable source
of the more recently articulated director's "duty of candor," or the
because defendants had invoked stockholder ratification in defense of a self-dealing contract
between a director and the corporation-a context in which fiduciary disclosure duties have
traditionally been applied. American Hide, 127 A. at 660. See Part III.A.
91. Western Oil Fields, 232 F. Supp. at 166; Willoughby, 182 F. Supp. at 499; Empire
Southern Gas Co., 46 A.2d at 746; Skora, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 104; R. Hoe & Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d at
147-48; Wyatt, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 506; Continental Bank & Trust, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07.
92. See Hauth v. Giant Portland Cement Co., 96 A.2d 233, 235 (Del. Chanc. 1953) C'The
person designated in a proxy has a fiduciary obligation to carry out the wishes of the stockhold-
ers to the best of his ability."); Abbey Properties Co. v. Presidential Insurance Co., 119 So.2d 74,
78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (holding that the proxy relationship is one of agent and principal);
Fletcher, 5 Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 2060 at 291 (cited in note 61) ('The
person to whom the proxy runs is the shareholder's agent, and must vote in accordance with the
instructions given him or her, either openly or tacitly, by the latter, and as a fiduciary.").
State v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 36 N.J. 577, 178 A.2d 329 (1962), illustrates the wide
scope of the courts' willingness to employ fiduciary doctrine to sustain a disclosure obligation.
The court held that management, as custodian of unclaimed dividend funds attributable to lost
stockholders, had a fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts when seeking the approval of
stockholders (presumably those stockholders who were not lost) for a charter amendment
cutting off rights to dividends unclaimed for a defined time period, in order to avoid escheat. Id.
at 332-34. The court stated:
Even assuming that the charter change under review was not ultra vires, in a situation
where a corporation seeks to influence its stockholders to 'escheat' their property to it
rather than have it pass to the State, the fiduciary status which the corporation occupies
with respect to the unclaimed dividends calls for full and fair disclosure of all the rele-
vant facts upon which the stockholders' decision should be formulated. Obviously the
obligation was not adequately discharged by the proxy statement and that reason alone
is sufficient warrant for invalidating the amendment.
Id. at 333. As discussed in Part V.C below, the rationale for this decision could have been better
articulated as a duty to disclose all material facts to stockholders to whom a recommendation is
being made, rather than as a duty to an unclaimed pot of cash, or to those who have claims to
that cash but who were not even aware of, let alone voting upon, the proposed charter provision.
93. See Part V.C.
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fiduciary disclosure obligation of directors and officers.94 This Article
therefore turns in the following sections to cases in which the courts
have articulated a duty of disclosure explicitly attributed to the fidu-
ciary status of the director.
III. THE TRADITIONAL CONTEXTS OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF
DISCLOSURE
A. Ratification Disclosure Duty
The first and oldest instance in which the courts have invoked
fiduciary duties as a basis for a director disclosure duty is the unwav-
ering requirement of disclosure of material facts where corporate
fiduciaries solicit and rely upon stockholder consent to a transaction
between the fiduciary and the corporation.95 In Cahall v. Lofland,96
the Delaware Chancellor stated the requirement concisely: "The
burden is on him who relies on a ratification to show that it was made
with a full knowledge of all material facts."97
The reasons why corporate managers seek stockholder ratifica-
tion are varied. In some cases, stockholder ratification is intended to
supply retroactive corporate authority for action taken by directors or
others whose authority to take the action has been questioned.98 In
others, corporate fiduciaries seek ratification in order to secure favor-
able judicial treatment of transactions alleged to involve self-dealing
or waste that might otherwise be reviewed under a more stringent
94. Brown thus notes that the Empire Southern Gas Co. v. Gray case, in which proxies
were challenged because certain officers misleadingly claimed endorsement by the Board, was
not "a true duty of candor case" Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.02 at 9-4 n.8 (cited in note 22).
Similarly, Solomon discusses the state law cases governing proxy solicitation entirely separately
from the analysis of the "Delaware duty of disclosure." Solomon, Corporations Law at 841-43,
890-96 (cited in note 30).
95. See, for example, Wolf, 477 F.2d at 477; Gaynor v. Buckley, 318 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir.
1963); Ramacciotti v. Joe Simpkins, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 425, 432 (Mo. 1968); Barclay v. Dublin
Lake Club, 89 N.H. 500, 1 A.2d 633, 636 (1938); Iback v. Elevator Supplies Co., Inc., 177 A. 458,
459 (N.J. Chanc. 1935). See also Fletcher, 2A Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 764 at
549 (perm. ed. 1992) (cited in note 61) ("Shareholders must have knowledge before they will be
deemed to have barred their rights by ratification.").
96. 114 A. 224 (Del. Chanc. 1921), affd, 118 A. 1 (Del. 1922).
97. Id. at 234.
98. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 219-20 (Del. 1979); Hannigan v. Italo Petroleum
Corp., 47 A.2d 169, 172 (Del. 1945); Peters v. Waverly Water-Front Improvement & Development
Co., 113 Va. 318, 74 S.E. 168, 170 (1912). See also Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Ballantine on
Corporations § 60 at 151-52 (Callaghan, rev. ed. 1946).
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standard, such as "entire fairness."99 Even in cases in which stock-
holder approval is a statutory prerequisite to accomplishing the chal-
lenged transaction, and thus where the term "ratification" may be
inapt,100 corporate fiduciaries invoke the stockholder vote in a simi-
larly defensive way, to reduce the intensity of judicial scrutiny, or
avoid such scrutiny altogether. 10 1 In all of these contexts, however,
the effectiveness of the ratification defense depends upon proof that
the stockholders were fully informed about what they were approving
when they approved it. If such proof is not forthcoming, the chal-
lenged transaction is examined without the curative or burden-shift-
ing effect of stockholder approval. 0 2
Many of the Delaware cases which describe a fiduciary duty of
disclosure or of complete candor do so merely in an effort to determine
whether stockholder approval may be invoked defensively. In fact,
the Delaware courts first used the term "complete candor" in such a
case, nearly twenty years before Lynch elevated the term to common
99. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58-59 (Del. 1952); Fidanque v.
American Maracaibo Co., 92 A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Chanc. 1952). The entire fairness doctrine is a
device by which the courts impose upon self-dealing corporate directors the burden of estab-
lishing that their transactions with the corporation are fair both substantively, that is, as to
price, and procedurally. See, for example., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11; Block, Barton, and
Radin, Business Judgment Rule at 131-32 (cited in note 30); Lawrence A. Mitchell, Fairness and
Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L. J. 425, 443-45 (1993); ALI Principles § 5.02(b) (cited in note
32). The Delaware Supreme Court has said that the entire fairness test requires "careful
scrutiny" by the courts, Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710, and that determining whether to apply
that test "frequently is determinative of the outcome" of litigation challenging a self-dealing
transaction. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988)). In recent years, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court has upheld several transactions despite applying that ostensibly demanding
test. Kahn, 669 A.2d at 79; Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1156; Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1366.
100. Stockholder ratification, in traditional form, has been described as "the voluntary
addition of an independent layer of shareholder approval in circumstances where such approval
is not legally required." In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 663 A.2d
1194, 1202 n.4 (Del. Chanc. 1995). The term "stockholder ratification" thus does not, at least in
classic form, describe stockholder approval of actions, such as a merger, that by statute cannot
occur without stockholder approval. Id. Compare Geier, 671 A.2d at 1379 n.24 (distinguishing
actions which by statute must be approved by stockholders from actions for which stockholder
approval is sought but not required by statute).
101. Where directors approve a merger agreement without the requisite care, stockholder
approval of the transaction has been held to extinguish the claim of breach of the fiduciary duty
of care. See Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 67; Wheelabrator, 663 A.2d at 1203; Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
889. Even where director action implicates the duty of loyalty due to conflicts of interest,
stockholder approval of the transaction at issue, even where required by statute, has been held
"either to change the standard of review to the business judgment rule, with the burden of proof
resting upon the plaintiff, or to leave 'entire fairness' as the review standard, but shift the
burden of proof to the plaintiff." Wheelabrator, 663 A.2d at 1203; Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 501 (Del. Chanc. 1990); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 890;
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
102. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703; Gerlach v. Gillam, 139
A.2d 591, 595 (Del. Chanc. 1958).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
parlance in corporate law.'0 3 In Gerlach v. Gillam, the defendant
director, who by management contract exercised substantial influence
over the affairs of the corporation, invoked stockholder approval
10 4 of
agreements providing for the issuance of stock to corporations which
he controlled. These issuances would give him "control of the corpora-
tion as a practical matter."105 Defendant urged, and the court agreed,
that fully informed stockholder ratification ordinarily validates even a
self-dealing transaction. 0 6
The ratification defense failed, however, because of a failure to
satisfy the disclosure duty identified by the court-the defendant's
"obligation to exhibit complete candor in dealings involving a conflict
between his personal interests and those of [the corporation's] stock-
holders" generally.107 This disclosure duty is merely the universally
recognized duty of a fiduciary to establish that the trust beneficiary's
consent was fully informed when the fiduciary relies on that consent
to sustain a transaction approved by the fiduciary and challenged on
the basis of self-dealing or waste. 08
It was thus quite natural that after Lynch, the courts would
invoke the "complete candor" language in defining the disclosure duty
of a fiduciary relying on stockholder ratification of a transaction chal-
lenged as a breach of fiduciary duty. For instance, less than four
months after Lynch, the Delaware Court of Chancery read Lynch
broadly to require that "any contention that a proxy solicitation failed
to completely inform stockholders must be given careful scrutiny."0 9
The court recited this broad legal proposition, however, merely to
determine whether the stockholders had effectively ratified stock
option plan amendments challenged as a waste of corporate assets.
Finding "complete candor" in the defendants' proxy statement, the
103. Gerlach, 139 A.2d at 593 ("I have no doubt concerning Mr. Gillam's [the "Comptroller,"
or dominant manager's] obligation to exhibit complete candor in dealings involving a conflict
between his personal interests and those of United's stockholders."). Pease correctly identified
Gerlach as the source of the "complete candor" terminology. 14 Del. J. Corp. L. at 449 (cited in
note 22).
104. The stockholder approval was quite narrow: of the 520,200 shares outstanding, fewer
than half (246,609 shares) were voted in favor of the challenged agreements, and 204,670 shares
were voted against. Gerlach, 139 A.2d at 592.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 593 ("[W]here a majority of fully informed stockholders ratify action of even
interested directors, an attack on the ratified transaction normally must fail.").
107. Id.
108. See, for example, Scott and Fratcher, 2A Law of Trusts § 170.1 at 317-18 (cited in note
49); George Gleason Bogert and George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 941 at
389 (Vernon Law Books, 2d ed. 1960). See Part V.B.
109. Michelson v. Duncan, 386 A.2d 1144, 1154 (Del. Chanc. 1978), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
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court concluded that the stockholders' ratification of the option plan
amendments cured any lack of authority for the amendments. 10 As in
Lynch, however, the court's language defining the fiduciary duty of
disclosure was not limited to the context of the case.'" This kind of
language paved the way for later application of the fiduciary disclo-
sure doctrine in entirely novel contexts, removed from the ratification
setting in which the court appropriately insisted upon full disclosure
as a condition to favorable judicial treatment resulting from stock-
holder approval."'
B. The Fiduciary Disclosure Duty of Directors Purchasing Stock on
the Basis of Inside Information: The Proper Context of
Lynch v. Vickers
Lynch has been described variously as "the genesis of
Delaware law regarding disclosure obligations;"" 3 "the modern impe-
tus for the rule" of fiduciary disclosure;"1 the beginning of "[tjhe prin-
cipal evolution of the state law duty of disclosure;""5 and "the seminal
Delaware case" defining the fiduciary duty of "complete candor.""6
These characterizations of Lynch are undoubtedly correct if the reac-
tion of the bench and bar to a case is what defines it as "seminal."
Lynch's broad language elicited a spate of claims of breach of fiduciary
disclosure duty, including some which had foundation at most in the
language, but certainly not the rationale, of the case."7 To character-
110. Id. at 1154-55.
111. See also Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 957 (Del. Chanc. 1980) (noting that
stockholder ratification of an allegedly wasteful transaction shifts to plaintiff the burden of
persuasion, and relieves defendants of the "heavy burden of proving the intrinsic fairness of the
transaction" The court explained further that in evaluating the efficacy of stockholder
ratification, "[t]he only remaining question on the allocation of the burden of persuasion ... is
whether [the] stockholders were fully informed with complete candor of all the germane facts
surrounding the disputed transaction." (citing Lynch, 383 A.2d at 278)).
112. See Part IV.
113. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1276.
114. Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.02 at 9-4 (cited in note 22).
115. Solomon, Corporations Law at 890 (cited in note 30).
116. Oesterle and Palmiter, 79 Iowa L. Rev. at 565 (cited in note 30).
117. In one case, a corporation resisting a hostile tender offer argued that Lynch imposed
upon the bidder "the duty of full and candid disclosure required of corporate management under
Delaware law." Servonzation Corp. v. City Investing Co., 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 599, 604 (Del. Chanc.
1979). The court's rejection of that argument reflected a particularly thoughtful recognition of
Lynch as evolutionary, not revolutionary, legal doctrine:
[While Lynch was] a decision which spoke to the duty of candor imposed on an offeror in
a tender offer context, I feel it significant to note that there the offeror was a majority
shareholder tendering for shares in its subsidiary corporation. There are unquestion-
ably fiduciary duties imposed on a parent in dealing with the minority shareholders of
its subsidiary as our cases have held for years. However, the decision there was prem-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ize Lynch as seminal, however, may be misleading insofar as it sug-
gests that Lynch announced some novel legal doctrine. To the con-
trary, that case is best understood not as the tap root of the fiduciary
disclosure doctrine, but as merely a growth point, albeit a significant
one.
The branch to which Lynch can fairly be traced is venerable.
As almost anyone who has opened a corporation law casebook or trea-
tise knows, there has been for over a century a conflict of authority as
to whether in connection with a purchase of stock a director owes a
fiduciary duty to disclose to the selling stockholder material facts
which are not known or available to the selling stockholder but are
known or available to the director by virtue of his position as a direc-
tor.18 The rationale for such a duty in this context is not hard to per-
ceive. The presumptively superior knowledge and control of the
corporate insider affords the insider such an advantage in buying the
corporation's shares from, or selling them to, an outside or minority
stockholder that fairness and fiduciary principles demand more thor-
ough disclosure from the insider than the mere avoidance of inten-
tionally false statements required by common law fraud doctrine."9
The precedents in this area, however, are at least superficially
quite divergent in their evaluation of what disclosure fiduciary duty
requires in the director stock purchase context. A supposedly
"majority" rule disavows the existence of any general fiduciary duty in
this context, and holds that directors have no special disclosure duties
in the purchase and sale of the corporation's stock, and need only
refrain from misrepresentation and intentional concealment of
ised on the fiduciary duties deriving from that relationship and not upon the require-
ments of the tender offer statute. That rationale does not fit here since [the bidder] has
no such relationship with [the target].
Id. at 605.
118. Norman D. Lattin, The Law Of Corporations § 81 at 295 (Foundation Press, 2d ed.
1971). See also William L. Cary and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on
Corporations 814-16 (Foundation Press, 7th ed. 1995); Robert W. Hamilton, Cases and Materials
on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Partnerships 900-02 (West, 5th ed. 1994);
R. E. Heinselman, Annotation, Duty of Officer or Director of Corporation Toward One From
Whom He Purchases Stock, 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
119. See, for example, Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Van Schaack, 867 P.2d 892, 898
(Colo. 1994) (holding that directors, especially in closed corporations, have a duty of disclosure
in order to "provide some degree of equalization of bargaining position.. ."); Bailey v. Vaughan,
359 S.E.2d 599, 604 (W. Va. 1987) ("[I]t must be shown that he [the director] possessed some
special knowledge not available to the shareholder which enabled him to purchase the stock at a
price that was lower than its actual value."); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 ("[O]ne possessing
superior knowledge may not mislead any stockholder by use of corporate information to which
the latter is not privy.").
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material facts. 20 The ostensibly opposing "minority" view broadly
requires directors to disclose all material information bearing on the
value of the stock when they buy it from or sell it to another
stockholder. 2' Some courts have adopted a middle approach, known
as the "special facts doctrine," that rejects any comprehensive
fiduciary duty but allows that in some circumstances directors owe a
duty to disclose material information to persons from whom they
purchase the corporation's stock. 22  Such circumstances are
identified, not altogether helpfully, as "special circumstances" or
"special facts" that make the fiduciary's failure to disclose material
information particularly unfair in connection with the purchase or
sale of stock.23
Although the split of authority in this area is surely more se-
mantic than real, 24 the progress of the Delaware courts in the area is
the key to understanding the development of the fiduciary duty of
disclosure. Properly understood, Lynch did not create a fiduciary duty
of disclosure of universal application, requiring directors to disclose
material corporate information in any and all contexts in which such
disclosure might affect stockholder action. At most, Lynch repre-
sented the adoption in Delaware of the so-called "minority" view that
a fiduciary who purchases the corporation's stock must disclose to the
selling stockholder inside information that is material to the sale
decision.
Before Lynch, the Delaware courts were said to have espoused
the so-called "majority rule," under which directors are obliged, when
they purchase their corporation's stock from an outside stockholder,
only to avoid fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment. They
are not broadly obliged to disclose material facts known to them
120. See Fletcher, 3A Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1168.10 at 397 (cited
in note 61).
121. Id. § 1168.20 at 404.
122. Id. § 1171 at 409.
123. See, for example, Van Schaack, 867 P.2d at 896-97 (listing special circumstances that
could give rise to a duty to disclose).
124. See Bailey, 359 S.E.2d at 603-605 (questioning the clarity of the traditional division of
authority, and holding that "a director, who solicits a shareholder to purchase his stock and fails
to disclose information not known to the shareholder that bears upon the potential increase in
value of the shares, shall be liable to the shareholder either to have the sale rescinded or to
respond in damages"). See generally Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities
Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1093-1102 (1985); Sherwood E.
Sterling, Note, 'Wherefore Art Thou, Fiduciary?" The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Common Law Fiduciary Duty of the Director, 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. 410 (1963); A.A. Berle, Jr.,
Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 833-34 (1927)
(discussing the the origins of the "special circumstances" rule of fiduciary duty requiring disclo-
sure by director/officer of material facts when a fiduciary relation with the buyer/seller exists).
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through their corporate office. 125  Close review of the pre-Lynch
Delaware cases, however, makes their nominal adherence to the
"majority rule" appear less rigid, and the rule of law announced in
Lynch something less than a wrenching departure from Delaware
precedent.
In Kors v. Carey,126 the opinion identified as adopting the
"majority rule," the Court of Chancery addressed and rejected a claim
by a regretful greenmailer whose shares had been purchased by the
issuing corporation following a threat to the incumbents' control but
had dramatically increased in market value following the
repurchase. 127  Accused in a derivative suit of aiding and abetting
greenmail, 128 United Whelan responded with a cross-claim against the
issuer seeking to rescind the repurchase of the subsequently
appreciated shares, on the grounds that the stock had been
repurchased through "over-reaching" on the part of the directors.
129
In this context, in which the alleged greenmailer sought to
undo a sale of stock that had dramatically increased in value follow-
ing the repurchase, the court explained its views about the fiduciary
disclosure duty, or lack thereof, of directors purchasing stock from a
stockholder. The court ruled that directors generally do not owe a
fiduciary disclosure duty to individual stockholders from whom they
purchase stock, and it limited any such duty to what it described as
special cases. 130
125. Sterling, 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 417 (cited in note 124) (citing Kors v. Carey, 39 Del.
Chanc. 47, 158 A.2d 136, 143 (1960), for the proposition that "Delaware follows the majority
rule"). See also Lank v. Steiner, 43 Del. Chanc. 262, 224 A.2d 242, 244 (1966) (noting that the
"special circumstances rule applies only when a director is possessed of special knowledge of
future plans or secret resources and deliberately misleads a stockholder who is ignorant of
them," and expressly approving the ruling in Kors).
126. 39 Del. Chanc. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960).
127. In the two years following the repurchase, the aggregate market value of the stock in
question increased from $1,685,600 to over $2,700,000. Kors v. United Whelan Corp., Fed.
Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 90,970 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1960). In contrast, United Whelan's profit on
the repurchase was only $50,000. Id. Adding insult to injury, United Whelan, after failing in its
effort to undo the repurchase in the Delaware Court of Chancery litigation, was forced to pay
almost $10,000 of its profits back to the issuer in settlement of a short-swing trading claim
under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). Id.
128. As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court, "[tihe term 'greenmail' refers to the
practice of buying out a takeover bidder's stock at a premium that is not available to other
shareholders in order to prevent the takeover." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 956 n.13 (Del. 1985).
129. Kors, 158 A.2d at 142.
130. As the court explains:
[I]t is only in special cases where advantage is taken of inside information and the like
that the selling stockholder is afforded relief and then on the basis of fraud .... This
case is clearly not one in which a buyer possessed with special knowledge of future plans
or of secret and untapped resources deliberately misleads an ignorant stockholder ....
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These pronouncements of law, however, were significantly
broader than was necessary to arrive at the result reached. It is
hardly stunning that United Whelan, a substantial business entity
whose president was "skilled in the art of evaluating securities, a skill
which he applied" to the acquisition of the "greenmailed" stock,
131
should not be favored with the protection of a fiduciary duty of disclo-
sure designed for the protection of the informationally disadvan-
taged.132 In any event, the only basis of United Whelan's nondisclo-
sure claim had nothing to do with a failure to reveal information
about the issuer's business. To the contrary, United Whelan appar-
ently relied only on a claim, which it failed to establish at trial, that
the issuer's broker misled United Whelan into believing that the
purchaser was someone other than the issuer. 33 On its facts, there-
fore, Kors could not be considered a major defeat for advocates of
fiduciary obligations more demanding than the "majority rule."
The approval of the "majority rule" in Kors was embraced by
the Delaware Supreme Court six years later in Lank v. Steiner.
3 4
That case, however, was likewise not one that should have unduly
alarmed critics of the "majority rule," at least in light of the facts as
found by the trial court. Lank involved a close corporation in which
the selling stockholder was also an officer of the corporation and was
actually aware of the allegedly "special circumstance"-a third party's
offer to purchase all of the corporation's stock at $600 per
share-when he entered into the transaction subsequently challenged
by his heirs. 35 The trial court had found as a fact, moreover, that the
Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
Of course, the repurchase at issue in Kors did not involve acquisition of stock by the
directors individually. Had the directors been purchasing stock for their own account and
personally benefiting from the use of inside information, the court might well have drawn an
analogy to Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Chanc. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949), a case not cited in
Kors. Brophy held that a fiduciary such as a director or officer must account to the corporation
for all profits derived from use of "secret" information learned through his position as a
fiduciary. Id. at 7-8. It would not have been an implausible leap to extend that duty to a case
where the fiduciary's profit from "secret" information comes at the expense of an outside
stockholder from whom he acquires stock. See Sterling, 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 417 (cited in note
124).
131. Kors, 158 A.2d at 143.
132. The rationale for protecting informationally disadvantaged stockholders is noted at
note 119. A similar unwillingness to apply fiduciary disclosure duties in favor of a sophisticated
institutional investor negotiating directly with management is reflected in Trustees of General
Electric Pension Trust v. Levenson, 1992 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 43, *10-11 (Mar. 3, 1992)
(dismissing a "duty of candor" claim absent "special circumstances that would state a claim for
willful concealment under Kors").
133. Kors, 158 A.2d at 143.
134. 224 A.2d 242 (Del. 1966).
135. The transaction granted of an option to acquire the stock at book value, then $270 per
share, after his death. Id. at 244.
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seller had placed no confidence in or reliance upon his fellow officer,
the purchaser. 136 Although the facts clearly could have been inter-
preted differently, it should not have been controversial to apply the
"majority rule" in a case in which the selling stockholder was found
not to have been informationally or procedurally disadvantaged rela-
tive to the purchasing fiduciary.
At any rate, even if the leaning of the Delaware courts toward
the "majority rule" had been more than semantic, the legal atmos-
phere surrounding the Lynch litigation, less than ten years after
Lank, foretold vigorous scrutiny of the responsibilities of majority
stockholders to minority stockholders, and the likely demise of any
doctrinl adherence to the "majority rule." Treatment of minority
stockholders by majority stockholders, particularly in the area of
going private transactions, was the subject of extensive litigation. 137
At the same time, the supposed reticence of the Delaware courts in
enforcing corporate fiduciary duties was being vigorously criticized,
particularly with regard to treatment of the fiduciary duty to disclose
material facts in connection with a majority stockholder's purchase of
corporate stock. 138 Moreover, any rigid adherence in the Lynch litiga-
tion to a "majority rule" rejecting such a duty would have faced an-
other significant obstacle. By the time Lynch was decided in 1977,
the composition of the Delaware Supreme Court had changed-Chief
Justice Daniel F. Wolcott, the author of the majority opinion in Lank,
had retired. He was replaced by Justice Daniel L. Herrmann, who
had dissented vigorously in Lank. Justice William Duffy, who ulti-
mately wrote the opinion in Lynch, had joined the Court.139
Perhaps recognizing the direction of prevailing discourse on
the subject of majority stockholder fiduciary duties, the defendants in
Lynch-the majority stockholder, Vickers Energy Corporation, and
136. Id. at 245. Justice Daniel L. Herrmann dissented vigorously, urging his colleagues to
reject this finding and determine that the purchaser's greater business experience and close
personal relationship with the grantor of the option gave rise to "a relation of trust and confi-
dence" and "a fiduciary relation.., such as gives rise to a presumption of the invalidity of the
stock options." Id. at 247 (Herrmenn, J., dissenting).
137. See, for example, Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974); Albright
v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974); Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA00028, slip op. (Cal.
App. Dept. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342
A.2d 566 (1975).
138. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 320-22 (5th Cir. 1959)
(remarking that "[a]pparently Delaware imposes no fiduciary duty on the part of officers or
directors or majority stockholders in buying stock from the minority or individual stockholders,"
and characterizing such a rule as "inequitable"). See also William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L. J. 663, 672-73 (1974); Arthur M. Borden,
Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 987 (1974).
139. See 306 A.2d at V nn.2b, 2c.
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the directors of the subsidiary, TransOcean Oil, Inc.-did not dispute
that they owed the minority stockholders of TransOcean a "duty of
complete frankness" in connection with a tender offer by Vickers for
the minority shares."0 The trial judge in Lynch-Chancellor William
Marvel, who had decided Kors-likewise acknowledged that the
majority stockholder owed a fiduciary duty of "complete candor" and
that such a duty paralleled the duty owed by corporate directors."'
Not surprisingly, the Delaware Supreme Court readily agreed
with this articulation of a fiduciary duty of disclosure.142 In identify-
ing a "fiduciary duty... which required 'complete candor' in disclos-
ing fully 'all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the tender
offer,"'43 the Delaware Supreme Court did not truly break new legal
ground. Lynch thus aligned Delaware with jurisdictions rejecting the
"majority rule" in favor of a rule recognizing a fiduciary duty on the
part of directors, officers and controlling stockholders to disclose
material facts, learned through their position with the corporation, to
outside stockholders when buying stock from them.'4
After Lynch, then, Delaware law at a minimum imposed a
fiduciary disclosure duty on majority stockholders acquiring stock
from minority stockholders. Just as clearly, Delaware law required
fiduciaries to disclose all material facts to stockholders where they
rely on stockholder consent to a self-dealing transaction.145 Naturally,
then, a most emphatic articulation of fiduciary disclosure duty ap-
peared in a case combining both of these elements. That is, a case in
which a majority stockholder relied upon a favorable vote of the mi-
140. Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281.
141. As Chancellor Marvel explains:
[I]n situations in which the holder of a majority of the voting shares of a corporation, as
here, seeks to impose its will upon minority stockholders, the conduct of such majority
must be tested by those same standards of fiduciary duty which directors must observe
in their relations with all their stockholders.... IThe majority stockholder here,
namely Vickers, had a duty to exercise complete candor in its approach to the minority
stockholders of TransOcean for a tender of their shares, namely a duty to make a full
disclosure of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the offer for tenders,
including the consequence of acceptance and that of refusal ....
Lynch, 351 A.2d at 573.
142. To be sure, the court's citation of Lank as "applying the 'special circumstance rule,'"
see Lynch, 383 A.2d at 279, seems revisionistic since Lank limited that rule to cases of
deliberate deception. Lank, 224 A.2d at 244.
143. Lynch, 383 A.2d at 279.
144. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 268 F.2d at 319; Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App.
153, 63 N.E.2d 630, 632 (1945); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1967);
Shermer v. Baker, 472 P.2d 589, 593-94 (Wash. App. 1970). But see Trustees of General Electric
Pension Trust, 1992 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 43 at *11 (applying Kors's requirement of "willful
concealment" to a claim that management failed to disclose an allegedly planned restructuring
during arm's length settlement negotiations with a sophisticated institutional investor).
145. See Part III.A.
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nority stockholders to obtain approval of a merger in which the minor-
ity's shares were converted into cash and were thereby effectively
acquired by the majority stockholder.
This case was Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.146 It involved a merger
in which the 50.5% majority stockholder acquired the shares of the
49.5% minority in a cash out merger conditioned upon the approval by
a majority of the minority shares voting on the merger, 147 and defen-
dants' reliance on that vote to establish the validity of the transac-
tion.148 Applying what it described as "the obvious duty of candor
required by Lynch," the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in sweeping
language that "one possessing superior knowledge may not mislead
any stockholder by use of corporate information to which the latter is
not privy."149 Having found-the disclosures to the minority stockhold-
ers inadequate, the court found the approval meaningless.50
Notwithstanding the breadth of the language in Lynch and
Weinberger, those cases should not have been understood to require
directors to disclose to stockholders all material facts in any and all
contexts in which those facts might be significant to stockholders and
regardless of the directors' self-interest or lack thereof. Rather, the
disclosure requirements articulated in Lynch and Weinberger should
be applied only to transactions in which directors, officers, or control-
ling stockholders acquire or sell stock of the corporation and profit, to
the detriment of the outside stockholders, while in possession of
material non-public information about the business of the corporation
derived from their positions with the corporation. As discussed fur-
146. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). See also Fisher v. United Technologies Corp., 6 Del. J. Corp.
L. 380 (Del. Chanc. 1981), a case which invoked Lynch but, finding the proxy statement
disclosures adequate, granted summary judgment against a minority stockholder challenging a
cash out merger by an acquiror which was a 49% "controlling stockholder," at the time of the
merger. The merger was structured to require approval of a majority of the public minority
stockholders. Id. at 383.
147. The architects of the merger attempted to strengthen the force of this "majority of the
minority" vote requirement by insisting that two-thirds of the outstanding shares (including the
50.5% stockholder's shares), rather than the bare majority required by statute, be voted in favor
of the merger. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 707. Thus, approval by at least 32% of the outstanding
minority shares was a precondition to effectiveness of the merger.
148. Id. at 703 ("[Wihere corporate action has been approved by an informed vote of a
majority of the minority shareholders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts to the
plaintiff to show that the transaction was unfair to the minority.").
149. Id. at 711 (citing Lank, 224 A.2d at 244). The fact that Weinberger followed Lynch in
misreading Lank to have established the broad proposition that "one possessing superior knowl-
edge may not mislead any stockholder by use of corporate information to which the latter is not
privy" illustrates the influential force of the Lynch opinion. See text accompanying note 147.
150. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 (citing Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Chanc. 299, 114 A. 224
(Del. Chanc. 1921)).
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ther below,151 this reading of Lynch amply explains the basis of many
subsequent opinions, including Weinberger itself, which purport to
stand for a broader fiduciary duty of disclosure.
IV. FROM RATIFICATION TO REIFICATION: SMITH V. VAN GORKOMAND
ITS PROGENY
A. Smith v. Van Gorkom as a Disclosure Case
Through and including Weinberger, the decisions of the
Delaware Supreme Court can be traced to one or more traditional
strands of fiduciary disclosure doctrine. In its next major pronounce-
ment on the subject after Weinberger, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court extended the logic and lilt of the language in Lynch to
announce a fiduciary disclosure duty in a context outside of any of
those traditional strands. The broadly worded but abstract language
of the earlier opinions finally found embodiment in what was, to the
directors of a large publicly held corporation, a painfully concrete,
although novel, form.
This reification occurred in the controversial opinion in Smith
v. Van Gorkom.'52 That opinion is best known for its finding that the
151. See PartV.B.
152. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In fairness, one should observe that the Delaware Court of
Chancery, even before Smith v. Van Gorkom, carried the broad "duty of candor" language of
Lynch into uncharted legal territory. While most of the pre-Van Gorkom court of chancery cases
can be viewed as stock purchase/freeze-out cases (like Lynch) or ratification cases (like Gerlach
and Michelson), four court of chancery opinions invoke the Lynch duty of candor language to
evaluate proxy disclosures in other contexts. Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 584 (Del.
Chanc. 1984) (denying a preliminary injunction against a proposed merger, but reciting a
(satisfied) "requirement of a full and complete disclosure, with complete candor, of all the
material information which is needed by a shareholder of Enstar to make an informed
decision"); Cavalcade Oil Corp. v. Texas American Energy Corp., 9 Del. J. Corp. L. 417, 418-19
(Del. Chanc. 1984) (enjoining implementation of charter amendment providing for a staggered
board, where proxy statement incorrectly, but inadvertently, exaggerated stockholders' ability
to undo the amendment later); Weinberger v. United Financial Corp. of California, C.A. No.
5915, slip op. (Del. Chanc. Oct. 13, 1983) (addressing claims that the proxy statement was false
and misleading due to misstatements and omissions of material fact); American Pacific Corp. v.
Super Food Services, Inc., 8 Del. J. Corp. L. 320, 325-26 (Del. Chanc. 1983) (relying on
stockholder confusion concerning the nature and vote required for adoption of certain defensive
charter provisions as a basis for a finding of irreparable injury justifying a preliminary
injunction). See also Edelman v. Salomon, 559 F. Supp. 1178, 1184-85 (D. Del. 1983) (invoking
Lynch as a grounds for nullifying a charter amendment eliminating cumulative voting, based on
material omissions in the proxy statement). As discussed below in Part V.C, the three cases in
which a preliminary injunction was granted, Cavalcade and American Pacific, or sought, Enstar,
fit logically into the analytical framework suggested in this Article, as does the Edelman case
involving rescission.
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directors of Trans Union Corporation, all concededly disinterested and
independent, breached their fiduciary duty of care in approving an
arm's length merger in which Trans Union would be acquired at a
cash price forty-five percent higher than the prevailing price of the
stock on the New York Stock Exchange. 153 The fiduciary duty of dis-
closure figured importantly in the case, however. The court devoted
considerable effort to evaluating whether the disclosures to the Trans
Union stockholders were adequate.154
It would be intellectually convenient to attribute that effort
solely to the court's evaluation of the directors' defense of stockholder
ratification. As previously discussed, the invocation of stockholder
ratification as a defense is a conventional occasion for judicial review
of the sufficiency of disclosure. 155 Indeed, it is possible to view Van
Gorkom through the lens of ratification doctrine. The court indicated
that informed stockholder approval of the merger would have extin-
guished altogether any claim of breach of the directors' duty of care in
approving the merger agreement and submitting it to the stockhold-
ers for approval. 156  Necessarily, then, the court examined the suffi-
153. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-84. The comments elicited by this aspect of the opinion
were formidable in volume and tone. See, for example, Daniel R. Fischel, The Business
Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. Law. 1437, 1455 (1985) (stating that Van
Gorkom was "surely one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law"); William T.
Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral Principles, 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 465, 470
(1985) (arguing that the Trans Union opinion "is burdened by overkill and by needless, and
often erroneous, legal and factual excess"); Arthur M. Borden, First Thoughts on Decision in
Delaware on Trans Union, N.Y. L. J. 1 (Feb. 25, 1985); Bayless Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. Law. 1, 1 (1985) (noting that
commentators viewed the decision as "atrocious"); Leo Herzel and Leo Katz, Smith v. Van
Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. Law. 1187, 1189 (1986) (arguing
that Van Gorkom "rests on widespread fallacy").
Even several years after it was decided, Van Gorkom prompted scholars to reexamine the
case to divine some rationale more satisfactory than the "ill-fitting" duty of care theory invoked
by the court. Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of
Independence, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1354-55 (1989) (suggesting a director "duty of independ-
ence" as a superior rationale); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union
Reconsidered, 98 Yale L. J. 127, 128 (1988) (viewing Van Gorkom as a takeover case enhancing
director authority to resist hostile tender offers).
154. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889-93.
155. Part III.A.
156. As the court notes:
The parties tacitly agree that a discovered failure of the Board to reach an informed
business judgment in approving the merger constitutes a voidable, rather than a void,
act. Hence, the merger can be sustained, notwithstanding the infirmity of the Board's
action, if its approval by majority vote of the shareholders is found to have been based
on an informed electorate.
Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d at 889. In more recent challenges to mergers, the courts and the
litigants accepted this conclusion, agreeing that "if the... shareholder vote was fully informed,
the effect of that informed vote would be to extinguish the claim that the.., board failed to
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ciency of the disclosures, citing conventional ratification law.157 When
the court described the directors' disclosure obligation as "their origi-
nal duty of knowing, sharing, and disclosing information that was
material and reasonably available for discovery," it was still possible
to view that "original duty" of disclosure as not really "original" or
free-standing but merely ancillary to the holding that immediately
ensued: that the directors' defense of stockholder ratification failed
because the Board failed to meet its burden "to establish that the
shareholder approval resulted from a fully informed electorate."'158
It is unfortunate, then, if only for reasons of analytical clarity,
that in a facet of the opinion much less heralded than its duty of care
ruling, Van Gorkom took one further, significant step to enunciate an
independent duty on the part of directors to disclose material infor-
mation when submitting a merger proposal to stockholders and to
authorize a post hoc damages remedy against directors who fail to
fulfill that duty.15 9 That further step came when the court, summariz-
ing its holdings, ruled that the Trans Union directors breached their
fiduciary duty not only by their failure to be adequately informed, but
also "by their failure to disclose all material information such as a
reasonable stockholder would consider important" in voting on the
merger proposal. 160
Thus, the majority found a breach of fiduciary duty, and
endorsed a damages remedy against the directors, not only in regard
to their lack of care, but also separately in regard to their failure to
disclose material facts to the stockholders. Any doubt that Van
Gorkom took this additional step was eliminated by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.161 The court
noted that in Van Gorkom the Trans Union directors had violated not
only their duty of care, but also their duty of disclosure.162
From where did this independent, reified duty of disclosure,
and its concomitant damages remedy, emerge? The few cases Van
Gorkom cites in this context are all either plain ratification cases or
cases where a majority stockholder acquires stock from minority
exercise due care in negotiating and approving the merger." Wheelabrator, 663 A.2d at 1200.
See also Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 67.
157. Van Gorkarn, 488 A.2d at 889-90 (citing Michelson, 407 A.2d at 211, Gerlach, 139 A.2d
at 591, and Schreiber, 419 A.2d at 591, as well as Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 91 A.2d 59
(Del. 1952), all conventional ratification cases).
158. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
162. Id. at 1166.
1996] 1125
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
stockholders.163 Those cases, however, do not even establish the exis-
tence of a comprehensive duty on the part of directors to disclose all
material facts whenever they seek stockholder action, much less a
money damages remedy against directors who are found to have failed
to discharge that duty. This is not to say that such a duty does not
exist.164 The point here is simply that Van Gorkom failed to supply
any precedent or rationale to support the existence of such a duty.
B. The Fiduciary Disclosure Concept Broadens: Further
Repercussions From Lynch and Van Gorkom
Given the breadth of Van Gorkom's duty of disclosure,
stockholder plaintiffs would inevitably seek to apply that abstract
fiduciary disclosure obligation in unprecedented settings. And just as
inevitably, trial judges dealing with expansive appellate court
language would find it more comfortably appeal-proof to interpret
fiduciary disclosure obligations broadly, especially if they were
satisfied that there was in fact no material nondisclosure.165
Van Gorkom's extension of fiduciary disclosure duty to the
solicitation of proxies in a proposed arm's length merger -was duly
followed by the court of chancery.166 Indeed, the sweeping rhetoric of
Van Gorkom and Lynch was cited in other settings in which a fiduci-
ary disclosure duty was applied as a basis for relief where it had not
previously been recognized to exist. If a fiduciary duty required direc-
tors to disclose all material facts when presenting a merger proposal
to stockholders for a vote, inevitably this duty would also require such
disclosure when directors present any other matter for a stockholder
vote. Hard on the heels of Van Gorkom, the court of chancery so held,
163. 488 A.2d at 889-93 (citing Lynch, Weinberger, Michelson, Schreiber, Gerlach, and
Gottlieb).
164. Indeed, as developed below, this Article argues that such a duty does exist. See Part
V.C.
165. The history of the Delaware cases enunciating a fiduciary "duty of candor" or duty of
disclosure is replete with broad statements of the duty followed by findings that the duty was
not violated, or could not in any event result in director liability. See, for example, Kahn v.
Roberts, 1996 Del. LEXIS 275, *1 (July 25, 1996); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d at 1379; Santa Fe,
669 A.2d at 66-67; Kahn, 669 A.2d at 88-89; Cineraina, 663 A.2d at 1176; Arnold, 650 A.2d at
1270; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 372 (Del. 1993); Stroud, 606 A.2d at 88;
Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 945; Michelson, 407 A.2d at 222; Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
1996 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 12, *1 (Feb. 20, 1996); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 1995 Del. Chanc.
LEXIS 128 at *1 (Sep. 22, 1995); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 1995 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 74, *1 (June 12,
1995), affd, 1996 Del. LEXIS 320 (Del. Aug. 23, 1996); Lewis v. Leaseway Transportation Co.,
1990 Fed. Secur. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,268; In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation,
542 A.2d 770, 784 (Del. Chanc. 1988); Schreiber, 419 A.2d at 957-58.
166. See, for example, In re Anderson, Clayton, 519 A.2d at 689-90 (applying Van Gorkom
standard to enjoin merger with subsidiary of employer stock ownership plan).
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in Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc.167 In Lacos Land, the court
relied on a breach of the "duty of candor" as an alternative basis for a
preliminary injunction against implementation of a charter
amendment proposal that would have established a dual class equity
structure designed to buttress the control of the corporation's chief
executive officer, who held twenty-one percent of the outstanding
stock. 68 Citing Van Gorkom and Lynch and carrying the language of
those cases to their logical end, the court reaffirmed the extensive
sweep of the "duty of candor."'169
The court in Lacos Land did not, and was not called upon to,
evaluate the entire range of remedies for breach of this fiduciary duty.
For purposes of granting a preliminary injunction, however, the court
found the likelihood of such a breach, without regard to whether the
omitted material fact was omitted from the proxy statement out of
neglect, malice, or on good faith deliberation including advice of coun-
sel.170
Soon after Lacos Land, the wave from Lynch and Van Gorkom
traveled still further, into an area in which the directors were not
literally seeking stockholder action: management recommendations
in a Schedule 14D-9 submitted to stockholders in connection with a
third-party tender offer. 17 In Weinberger v. Rio Grande Industries,
Inc.,172 suit was brought against Rio Grande and its directors by a
class of stockholders as of the date on which a third party bidder,
acting under an acquisition agreement approved by the board of Rio
Grande, commenced a cash tender offer. 173  The court of chancery
denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that
information about the risks associated with a pending Interstate
Commerce Commission proceeding might have been material, and the
failure to include that information in the Schedule 14D-9 thus may
have violated what it characterized as a well-settled fiduciary duty of
167. 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Chanc. 1986).
168. Id. at 276.
169. As the Lacos Land court explains
It is, of course, well established in our law that an element of the fiduciary duty that
directors owe to shareholders is the duty, arising when the board is required or elects to
seek shareholder action, to disclose fully and fairly pertinent information within the
board's control.
Id. at 279.
170. The omitted fact was a significant but quite technical elaboration of whether the
CEO/21% stockholder would be a "Restricted Person" for purposes of a business combination
supermajority vote requirement in the certificate of incorporation. Id. at 279-81.
171. Id. at 279.
172. 519 A.2d 116 (Del. Chanc. 1986).
173. Id. at 119.
19961 1127
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1087
the directors to disclose all facts germane to a transaction in which
stockholder action is contemplated. 174
The Rio Grande court cited no authority for applying this
"well-settled rule" to a damages action against directors who lacked
any personal interest in the transaction and were not even taking
action under state law to place a matter before the stockholders for
their consideration or action. 175 The directors were merely providing
information, as required by federal law, in response to an initiative by
a third party. 76 Again, as in Lacos Land, the court's opinion did not
examine-and presumably considered irrelevant-whether the direc-
tors' omission of the potentially material information about the ICC
proceeding was negligent, malicious or the result of good faith delib-
eration, including reliance on counsel.
From Rio Grande, it was not an implausible leap across the
border to extend the fiduciary duty of disclosure to any situation in
which a public statement approved by directors might affect the
stockholders' decision whether to sell their shares, or buy more
shares, even in the absence of a pending tender offer. That leap oc-
curred, albeit with some notable restraint, in the court of chancery's
opinion in Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co.' 77 In Marhart the court con-
cluded that corporate directors, as fiduciaries, owed the stockholders
a duty, not owed to nonstockholders, as it turned out,178 "to disclose all
174. Id. at 121 (stating that it is "the now well-settled rule of Delaware law that corporate
directors owe the corporation's stockholders a fiduciary duty to disclose all facts germane to a
transaction involving stockholder action, in an atmosphere of complete candor"). See also Zirn
v. VLI Corp., 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 803, 813-14 (Del. Chanc. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 621 A.2d
773 (Del. 1993) (holding that proof of a mischaracterization in a Schedule 14D-9 of the disinter-
ested directors' reason for approving a revised merger agreement "might have established a
breach of the... directors' fiduciary duty of disclosure").
Despite the broad language in Rio Grande mandating that directors assure that all facts
material to pending stockholder action be disclosed, directors have not been found obliged to
correct the misstatements or omissions of a third party tender offeror. See Citron v. Fairchild
Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989); Solash v. Telex Corp., 1987-1988
Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 93,608 at 97,729 (Del. Chanc. Jan. 19, 1988).
175. The only authorities the court did cite in this regard were Lynch, which the court
viewed as "the appropriate analytic starting poine' for any "claim of material nondisclosure,"
Van Gorkom, and Rosenblatt, a case addressing a cash-out merger with a majority stockholder
and, thus, analytically parallel to Weinberger. Rio Grande, 519 A.2d at 121.
176. See note 66. To be sure, one could argue that the directors in Rio Grande were
directly involved in presenting the tender offer to the stockholders because that offer proceeded
pursuant to a merger agreement which the directors had approved. There is nothing in the Rio
Grande opinion, however, to limit the fiduciary disclosure duty to this context, or to suggest that
such a duty would not apply equally to a Schedule 14D-9 filed in relation to a tender offer not
agreed to in advance by the directors.
177. Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 330. Marhart was a class action seeking damages
based on a press release misleadingly exaggerating the benefits of a proposed defensive restruc-
turing in response to a takeover bid. Id. at 333-35.
178. Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 740.
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material facts when they undertake to give out statements about the
business to stockholders." 179
Curiously, as previously discussed, 8 0 the court relied on a
statute repealed twenty-five years earlier as the source of this duty.
By virtue of that reliance, however, the court sharply limited the
scope of any damages claim. By invoking the repealed statute, the
court simultaneously adopted the elements of the cause of action
embodied in that statute, namely (1) an affirmative
misrepresentation, (2) "knowingly made" by the directors, (3) as a
result of which (4) plaintiff suffered damages. 181 In this context, at
least, the fiduciary duty of disclosure had taken on the falsity,
scienter, reliance/causation and damages requirements that were
notably absent in earlier cases discussing the doctrine. 182
C. Attempts to Limit and Further Define the Fiduciary Duty of
Disclosure: From Stroud to Arnold
Even before Marhart, the Delaware courts had begun to recog-
nize that the fiduciary duty of disclosure was not unlimited, and to
cut back on the theoretical scope of the duty. In Raskin v.
Birmingham Steel Corp., 83 for instance, the court of chancery ad-
dressed a claim that the directors' fiduciary duty required them, in
the absence of any public statement or filing, to disclose adverse fi-
nancial developments that might reduce the likelihood that a previ-
ously announced merger agreement would be consummated. The
court summarily rejected the notion that such a fiduciary disclosure
duty existed, articulating the view that such a disclosure duty is lim-
ited to cases where the directors seek stockholder action in the form of
a vote, purchase or sale of stock, or "otherwise."84 Paralleling the
179. Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 336 (citing Kelly, 254 A.2d at 71).
180. See note 72.
181. Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 336.
182. In a not entirely dissimilar case decided just a few months before Marhart, the court of
chancery declined to dismiss claims of breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure brought on behalf of
a class of stockholders who purchased stock in a dividend reinvestment plan following allegedly
material misstatements or omissions in SEC periodic reports. Wiener v. Southern Co., 18 Del. J.
Corp. L. 372, 381-82 (1993). As the court described the matter, however, the denial of the
motion to dismiss may have resulted from defendants' failure to articulate and define a basis for
dismissal under Delaware law, rather than from the court's conviction that a fiduciary duty
claim had been established. Id. at 382.
183. 1990-1991 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 95,668 (Del. Chanc. Dec. 4, 1990).
184. As the court explains:
[S]ince the company did not seek the vote of the shareholders, offer them an exchange,
or otherwise seek any action from them, the only possible breach of candor claim would
necessarily rest upon the existence of a duty to inform the market accurately of material
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federal securities laws doctrine, the court reasoned that under state
law, "business reasons" of confidentiality might well permit the corpo-
ration to refrain from disclosing even information that would be
highly material to a stockholder's decision to sell stock or buy addi-
tional shares. 18 5
The articulation of the fiduciary disclosure duty in
Raskin-limiting it to situations in which directors seek stockholder
action-was a reasonably fair distillation of the Delaware case law,
although not entirely consonant with the cases establishing a "duty of
candor" where directors, although not placing a matter before stock-
holders for their action, make Schedule 14D-9 disclosures in response
to an arm's length tender offer. 8 6 Even though lack of precedent may
be a healthy reason for rejecting a proposed common law rule, how-
ever, the court in Raskin offered no affirmative authority or rationale,
other than the interest in preserving the confidentiality of sensitive
information, to justify the limitation it articulated. 87 In fact, a fiduci-
ary duty to disclose material information to stockholders when the
directors realize that the stockholders are buying, or refraining from
selling, stock despite still undisclosed highly adverse corporate infor-
mation is an entirely plausible corollary of the general duty of trus-
tees to disclose material facts which the trustee knows may affect the
actions and interests of the cestui que trust. 88
developments. No Delaware case establishes such a duty to my knowledge and, in my
opinion, no such duty exists. The state law duty of candor arises when the board elects
to or has a duty to seek shareholder action; in that setting the board is under a duty to
make shareholder action meaningful by supplying information relevant to the question
presented. If the board does not seek shareholder action at a meeting, through consent,
in a tender or exchange offer, or otherwise, it has, in my opinion, no distinctive state law
duty to disclose material developments with respect to the company's business.
Id. at 98,131-32.
185. Id. at 98,132 ('CThere are good business reasons to permit the company to treat mate-
rial information confidentially."). Similar logic has persuaded courts that issuers are under no
federal law duty to disclose material information in the absence of an explicit affirmative disclo-
sure obligation, or when necessary to make a disclosure not materially misleading. See
generally Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 3.01 at 3-3 (cited in note 22); Marc I. Steinberg and
Robin M. Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure Obligations-An Analytical Framework for
Merger Negotiations, Soft Information and Bad News, 46 Md. L. Rev. 923 (1987).
186. See text accompanying notes 172-76.
187. One could, alternatively, accommodate a legitimate business need for preserving the
confidentiality of material information by requiring disclosure of all material information,
subject to the right of directors, in their business judgment, to refrain from disclosure when
they make a considered determination that disclosure would be contrary to the best interests of
the corporation and its stockholders. See Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.03[7] at 9.26 and §
9.04 at 9-28 (cited in note 22).
188. Rettinger v. Pierpoint, 145 Neb. 161, 15 N.W.2d 393, 412 (1944) C' 'It is the duty of a
trustee to fully inform the cestui que trust of all facts relating to the subject-matter of the trust
which come to the knowledge of the trustee and which are material for the cestui que trust to
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Soon after Raskin, in any event, the Delaware Supreme Court
had several occasions to evaluate and limit the reach of the fiduciary
duty of disclosure that its earlier opinions in Lynch and Van Gorkom
had so stirringly articulated.
1. Stroud v. Grace
Ultimately decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1992,
Stroud v. Grace'89 involved a closely held corporation controlled by
family members owning over 50% of the outstanding stock.190
Dissident stockholders owning 17% of the stock brought suit challeng-
ing various charter amendments relating to corporate governance. 19'
Plaintiffs advanced several theories in support of their challenge to
the amendments, including a claim that the directors owed, but failed
to fulfill, a duty of complete candor in connection with the stockholder
vote on the amendments. 192 Plaintiffs advanced this theory despite
the facts that (1) no proxies were solicited by management, (2)
directors controlling a majority of the stock supported the
amendments and could provide the necessary stockholder vote
without the support of any other stockholders, and (3) the dissenting
stockholders had no investment decision to make in connection with
approval of the challenged amendments.193 In short, the directors
know for the protection of his interests.'") (quoting First Trust Co. v. Carlsen, 261 N.W. 333
(Neb. 1935)). Moreover, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173 cmt. a (1959) provides:
Even if the trustee is not dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account, he is
under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts affecting the interest of
the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know and which the beneficiary
needs to know for his protection in dealing with a third person with respect to his inter-
est. Thus, if the beneficiary is about to sell his interest under the trust to a third person
and the trustee knows that the beneficiary is ignorant of facts known to the trustee
which make the interest of the beneficiary much more valuable than the beneficiary be-
lieves it to be the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to inform him of such facts.
See also Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by Securities Professionals, 61 Tex. L. Rev.
1247, 1250 n.15 (1983) ('Among a fiduciary's standard 'form' duties are the duties to... give
information needed by the principal."); Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.04 at 9-29 (cited in note
22) (noting that since "the duty of candor arises out of a fiduciary's obligation to shareholders,"
limiting the obligation to avoiding false or misleading statements and omissions, rather than
extending it to require affirmative disclosures of material facts, "does not follow analytically").
189. 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).
190. Id. at 79.
191. These amendments included provisions defining qualifications for service on the
board, and imposing a 75% stockholder vote requirement for new issuances of common stock.
Stroud v. Grace, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 1588, 1593-94 (Del. Chanc. 1991).
192. Id. at 1597.
193. Unlike the Model Business Corporation Act and the corporate statutes of several
states, the Delaware General Corporation Law does not provide an appraisal remedy in respect
of amendments to the certificate of incorporation. Compare, 8 Del. Code Ann., §§ 242 and 262(b)
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were charged with having breached a fiduciary duty of candor by
failing to disclose information to stockholders in a context in which
the only conceivable purpose of disclosure would have been to provide
a basis for evaluating the merits of a motion for a preliminary
injunction against implementation of the charter amendments.
In an early phase of the controversy, the Delaware Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal as unripe. 94 In analyzing the ripeness
issue, however, the court announced a ringing endorsement of the
concept, previously expressed in Lacos Land and Raskin, that direc-
tors seeking stockholder action have a fiduciary duty to disclose to
stockholders all facts material to that action that the directors know
or can reasonably obtain through their control of the corporation. 195
This duty applies to stockholder actions modifying rules of corporate
governance, as well as to business transactions. 96
Not unreasonably, the court of chancery on remand accepted
these admonitions at face value, and found that the directors could
not avoid their disclosure duty by determining not to solicit proxies in
with 3 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 13.02(4) (noting that thirty-six states allow appraisal rights
in connection with at least certain charter amendments).
In the charter amendment context, the basic relevant facts-namely, what the proposed
amendment says-are ordinarily available to stockholders. This context is distinguishable from
the context of a cash-out merger, where the minority stockholders, usually lacking access to
internal corporate performance and projection data, are at an informational disadvantage in
evaluating whether the merger price is fair, and whether to seek statutory appraisal or other
post-merger relief. See In re USA Cafes, L.P. Litigation, 600 A.2d 43, 54 (Del. Chanc. 1991)
C'Because the Prospectus itself discloses that a shareholder vote was neither necessary nor
sought on the reorganization of the Nevada corporation, I will dismiss the state law breach of
duty of candor claims made with respect to it. Neither plaintiffs nor any class member could
have been injured by the alleged defect as they had neither a right to vote nor a right to dissent
and seek appraisal."). But see Shell Petroleum, 606 A.2d at 114 (holding that a majority stock-
holder effecting a short-form merger "bears the burden of showing complete disclosure of all
material facts relevant to a minority shareholderrs] decision whether to accept the short-form
merger consideration or seek an appraisal"); Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d
166, 171 (Del. 1991) (holding that under Alaska law, an 88.4% stockholder acquiring minority
shares in a merger owes a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts, despite ability to satisfy
stockholder vote requirement unilaterally); Seagraves v. Urstadt Property Co., Inc., 1996 Del.
Chanc. LEXIS 36, *18 (Apr. 1, 1996) ("Delaware law imposes a fiduciary obligation to disclose all
material information that would affect a minority stockholder's decision whether to accept the
merger consideration or to seek an appraisal or other available litigation remedy."); In re
Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation, 1990 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 58, *34 (May 16, 1990)
C'Shareholders... rely on directors meeting their duty of candor in electing to accept the
merger consideration, seek appraisal or seek an individual post-merger action."); Glassman v.
Wometco Cable TV, Inc., 1989 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 1, *1 (Jan. 6, 1989).
194. Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 479-80 (Del. 1989).
195. Id. at 480 ("[W]hen a board of directors 'is required or elects to seek shareholder
action,' it is under a duty 'to disclose fully and fairly pertinent information within the board's
control.' ") (quoting Lacos Land, 517 A.2d at 279).
196. Id.
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connection with adoption of the questioned charter amendments. 197
Moreover, the court continued, the "duty of candor" requires that the
necessary material information be disclosed sufficiently in advance of
the stockholder meeting so that stockholders can adequately evaluate
the significance of that information to the matters to be voted upon. 198
Interestingly, however, the court appeared to disavow any
affirmative duty to disclose. Rather, the court merely examined what
limited disclosures were made, in the notice of meeting and at the
meeting itself, to determine whether they contained any material
misstatements or omissions. 199
On appeal, the directors maintained that their disclosures to
stockholders in connection with the proposed charter amendments
were sufficient under any standard of fiduciary disclosure duties, and
that those duties did not require them to disclose in advance of the
stockholder meeting any more than the minimal information pre-
scribed by statute.200 "It is the meeting of stockholders," defendants
continued, "that is the medium for providing any additional informa-
tion contemplated by the Corporation Law (e.g., §§ 211, 242 and
251)."201
The Delaware Supreme Court could have easily resolved the
matter the way the lower court did by reciting the now familiar man-
tra, that directors owe a fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts
when they seek stockholder action, and determining that all material
facts had been disclosed. Instead, in apparent disregard of its own
recitation of that mantra in Stroud,22 the court repeatedly took the
197. Stroud, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1608 ("[The] duty of complete candor cannot be avoided
by the directors by a decision not to solicit proxies and to merely comply with the statutory
notice provisions of 8 Del. C. §§ 222 and 242.").
198. Id. at 1611.
199. Id. at 1610. This approach may have stemmed from the court's acceptance of the cor-
poration's proprietary view that preserving the confidentiality of its internal information af-
forded it a competitive advantage. The court explained that "[c]onfidential information.. . is
generally not disclosed in proxy materials." Id. at 1610-11. A similar justification for rejecting
an affirmative duty of disclosure had previously been articulated by the court of chancery in
Raskin, 1990-1991 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 95,668. See note 185 and accompanying text.
200. Defendants Below-Appellees/Cross-Appellants' Answering Brief on the Appeal and
Opening Brief on Their Cross-Appeal at 28-29, Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992) (on file
with the Author).
201. Id. at 29. It is unclear what "additional information," if any, was required to be dis-
closed at the stockholder meeting under defendants' exposition. In all events, defendants
acknowledged-perhaps overbroadly, and certainly without citation to any authority-that
"when management undertakes to communicate with stockholders, through proxy statements or
otherwise, then usual fiduciary duties of candor attach requiring communications that are
sufficiently accurate and full not to be misleading." Id.
202. 552 A.2d at 479. In its subsequent opinion, the court explained that this earlier pro-
nouncement, however emphatic it might have seemed, could not have established a "new
substantive principle of law" because, in light of the basis for the earlier dismissal for lack of
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trial court to task for adopting "a novel legal framework" and a "novel
legal analysis" for evaluating plaintiffs fiduciary disclosure claims. 03
The court then proceeded to articulate a theory that imposed
significant, although poorly defined, limits on the, reach of the
fiduciary duty of disclosure.
After uttering the mantra, the court explained that the duty of
disclosure must be evaluated not "in a vacuum" but in the context of
statutes requiring and defining the content of notice to stockholders of
meetings to act on charter amendments and the like.204 The court
then found that those statutes supply the exclusive definition of the
directors' disclosure obligations under state law, "in the absence of a
proxy solicitation."20 5 It is that circumstance which the court identi-
fied as the source of the fiduciary duty of disclosuie. "In the absence
of that circumstance," the court explained, "questions of disclosure
beyond those mandated by statute become less compelling."26 "Thus,"
the court explained further, "what we say here is limited to non-pub-
lic, privately-held corporations."20 7
The court's emphasis on proxy solicitation as the source of the
duty of disclosure, and its truncation of that duty in the case of pri-
vately-held companies, were both literally incorrect and analytically
flawed. The court's limitation was literally incorrect because several
of the court's prior opinions invoking and applying a fiduciary disclo-
sure duty did not involve proxy solicitation at all.208 Indeed, in
Cahall, which Stroud described as the source of a "materiality stan-
ripeness, it "would have amounted to the issuance of an impermissible advisory opinion."
Stroud, 606 A.2d at 86.
203. Id. at 84-85. What the court characterized as "novel" in one breath, however, was
repeated, in another breath, as "the well-recognized proposition that directors of Delaware
corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information
within the board's control when it seeks shareholder action" Id. at 84.
The coures opinion subsequently recharacterized the duty as requiring that the board of
directors "disclose fully and fairly all material facts within its control that would have a
significant effect upon a stockholder vote." Id. at 85 (emphasis added). If anything was novel, it
was the probably unintended adoption in this latter formulation of a reliance/causation
requirement, under which the stockholder who is complaining of a breach of disclosure duty
must establish that the omitted fact would have had "a significant effect upon a stockholder
vote." That is hardly a faithful reading of TSC Industries, which the Delaware Supreme Court
ostensibly embraces, but which rejected such a stringent reliance/causation requirement.
Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84-85.
204. Id. at 85 (citing 8 Del. Code Ann. §§ 222(a), 242(b)(1)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 86.
207. Id.
208. See, for example, Shell Petroleum, 606 A-2d at 112 (involving a tender offer by a
majority stockholder); Kirby Lumber, 413 A.2d at 137 (regarding an information statement used
in a short-form merger); Lynch, 383 A-2d at 278 (involving a tender offer by a majority
stockholder); Lank, 224 A.2d at 242 (involving a purchase of stock).
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dard [that] has been a mainstay of Delaware law for decades,"2 09
stockholders were never even asked to vote or otherwise take action
upon the challenged transactions, let alone execute proxies. 210 Cahall,
moreover, involved a company whose issued stock was no more, and
probably less, widely held than the corporation involved in Stroud.211
Stroud's limitation of the full-blown fiduciary disclosure duty
to cases involving proxy solicitation in publicly held companies was
analytically flawed as well. The facts on which the court relied in this
regard-that large companies depend on proxy solicitation when
seeking a stockholder vote and that proxy voters generally do not
attend stockholder meetings 212-do not demonstrate that fiduciary
duty does not require disclosure of information beyond statutory
notice requirements in contexts not involving public company proxy
solicitations. If fiduciary principles require directors of public compa-
nies to provide material information to proxy voters in advance of a
stockholder meeting, is there any good reason why those same princi-
ples would not require directors of less widely held firms to provide
material information to proxy voters?213 Similarly, is there anything
in the rationale of those fiduciary principles that would moderate or
eliminate the need for directors to provide material information to
stockholders in advance of the meeting, even if their proxies are not
solicited, as long as they are invited by notice to attend the meeting
and vote, and their votes are necessary to the accomplishment of the
action proposed to be taken at the meeting?214 And if stockholder
209. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84.
210. Cahall, 114 A. at 234. To be sure, the case did involve a stockholder meeting in which
shares were represented by proxy, id. at 238-39, but that meeting related to a transaction-a
proposed sale of assets--distinct from the transactions to which the court's holdings regarding
disclosure duties in ratification were directed. See notes 272 and 276.
211. The Lewes Fisheries Company involved in the Cahall case had only 2,855 outstanding
voting shares, Cahall, 114 A. at 236, as compared to the over 3,500,000 outstanding shares of
Milliken & Company. See Defendants Below-Appellees/Cross-Appellants' Answering Brief on
the Appeal and Opening Brief on Their Cross-Appeal at 4, Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del.
1992) (on file with the Author).
212. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 86-87.
213. There is nothing that limits the use of proxies, or their solicitation, to public compa-
nies. Indeed, the directors of Milliken & Company had begun to solicit proxies in support of a
set of proposed charter and by-law amendments that were subsequently withdrawn. Id. at 79-
80.
Before Stroud was decided, one scholar had concluded that "[uinder Delaware's duty of
candor standard, the stockholders of both public and close corporations should be subject to the
same duty of disclosure." Pease, 14 Del. J. Corp. L. at 479-80 (cited in note 22). Stroud was at
best imprecise in its rejection of that conclusion.
214. The only conceivable rationale is that stockholders who attend the meeting in person
will be able to hear from or question management about the proposal before the vote is taken.
As the lower court in Stroud recognized, however, that option is a poor substitute for the
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ratification of a self-dealing transaction by directors is effective only if
the proponents of the transaction disclose all material facts to stock-
holders in connection with their ratification vote, as is clearly the
law,215 is there any reason to limit or eliminate that disclosure duty in
a privately held company and/or where no proxies are solicited in
connection with the ratification vote? Certainly the opinion in Stroud
offered no answer to these questions.2 16
Having concluded, however, that the directors had no duty to
disclose anything beyond the minimal information prescribed by stat-
ute,217 the court in Stroud then proceeded to blunt the force of that
very holding, by (1) suggesting that the absence of proxy solicitation
opportunity to review and consider written information about a proposal in advance of the
meeting. 16 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1611.
215. See Part III.A.
216. The disclosure duty discussion in Stroud has another puzzling aspect. That entire
discussion occurred in the context of determining whether the stockholders of Milliken &
Company effectively ratified the challenged charter amendments and "place[ld] the burden of
proof on the challenger." Stroud, 606 A.2d at 83. See also id. at 90 (after finding "no breach of
any fiduciary duty in connection with the shareholder vote at the 1989 annual meeting," holding
that the stockholders "effectively ratified the board's action" and "shift[ed] the burden of proof to
the [plaintiffs] to prove that the transaction was unfair"). One might fairly ask why it was ap-
propriate to evaluate stockholder ratification initially. If the directors and controlling stock-
holders had no conflict of interest regarding the proposed amendments-and the court specifi-
cally found that no entrenchment motive existed, id. at 83-those proponents of the transaction
had no need for a ratification vote to shift the burden of proof, and there was no cause to
examine the directors' actions under any unfavorable burden of proof. See, for example, Cede &
Co., 634 A.2d at 361. Alternatively, if the controlling stockholders and directors were to have
been deemed personally interested in the amendments-not a frivolous claim, since the
proposed 75% vote requirement to issue stock effectively prevented the board from making any
attempt to dilute the holdings of the controlling stockholders against their will-it seems
unlikely at best that the stockholder vote could have resulted in a shift in the burden of proof,
for two related reasons. First, the votes of self-interested stockholders-such as the Milliken
majority stockholder group, as presumed in this discussion-are ordinarily not counted toward
effective ratification. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A-2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976); Drexler, Delaware
Corporation Law 15.05[4] at 15-24 (cited in note 30); ALIPrinciples §§ 1.16, 5.10 (cited in note
32). Second, it is highly unlikely that the amendments were approved by a "majority of the
minority" ratification vote, which arguably could have shifted the burden of proof. See
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703. If the proponents owned over 56% of the outstanding shares (their
precise percentage of ownership is not a matter of public record), less than a majority of the
minority shares would have voted for the challenged amendments, since only 78% of the
outstanding shares were voted in favor of the amendments. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 80-81.
Therefore, the only analytically supportable explanation for the court's extended inquiry
into the fiduciary duty of disclosure is an implicit holding that if a material fact had not been
disclosed to the stockholders, the charter amendments could have been invalidated, notwith-
standing any presumption of validity attaching to the board's action in approving their submis-
sion to a stockholder vote, simply and solely because of the breach of the disclosure duty.
The court's 1996 decision in Williams v. Geier reinforces this view. After affirming that a
disinterested board's recommendation of a "tenure voting' recapitalization plan was "protected
by the business judgment rule," 671 A.2d at 1378, the court, closely tracking its analysis in
Stroud, nonetheless went on to examine whether "all material facts relevant to the transaction
were disclosed." Geier, 671 A.2d at 1378, 1379.
217. Stroud, 606 A.2d at 87.
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"does not lessen a board's fiduciary duty of disclosure" but results in
"[the emphasis of such disclosure ... [being] shifted to that which
occurred at the annual meeting,"218 and (2) proceeding to consider
separately whether the directors "violated their duty of disclosure by
their alleged misstatements and omissions at the annual meeting."219
Does this mean that the difference, as concerns the fiduciary duty of
disclosure, between public company proxy solicitations and private
company stockholder meetings without proxy solicitation is merely a
question of timing? Does the fiduciary duty of disclosure require the
same disclosures in the latter case, but only at the time of the stock-
holder meeting and not in conjunction with the statutory written
notice of the meeting? Such questions are analyzed in Part V, along
with the suggestion that Stroud reached the correct result but should
have been decided on the entirely different basis that no fiduciary
disclosure duty should or could have attached under the circum-
stances where the minority stockholders were powerless to adopt or
stop the proposed charter amendments and had no appraisal election
to make and no state law basis for enjoining implementation of the
amendments.2o
2. Zirn v. VLI Corp.
Although it pointedly rejected any fiduciary or statutory obli-
gation of directors to disclose material facts in or with a notice of
stockholders meeting where proxies are not solicited, Stroud re-en-
dorsed the notion that directors could be held liable in damages for
having issued a public statement to stockholders that misrepresented
or omitted a material fact, even in connection with a transaction in
218. Id. That "shift' of disclosure to the stockholder meeting is puzzling, as a matter of
timing, in view of the court's treatment elsewhere in the opinion of the handling of material but
confidential information. According to that treatment, the board has a burden of proving (1)
"complete disclosure of material facts," and (2) if such facts include confidential information,
that the stockholders have been "given notice and opportunity ... to execute a reasonable
confidentiality agreement' and thereby gain access to information. Id. at 89. How all of this is
supposed to happen if the disclosure obligation does not require that information be provided
until the stockholder meeting is unclear. Perhaps the directors, anticipating a duty to disclose
confidential information at the meeting itself, must alert stockholders to that possibility before
the meeting in sufficient time to permit them to sign confidentiality agreements and be given
the confidential information at the meeting. It is also unclear from Stroud, however, whether
stockholders who decline or fail to sign such confidentiality agreements may or must be ex-
cluded from the stockholder meeting so that the material confidential information can be
presented in a sort of executive session, to the stockholders who do execute such agreements.
219. Id. at 87-88.
220. See note 360 (discussing Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991)).
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which they had no personal interest. The validity of this notion was
squarely presented in Zirn v. VLI Corp.21
In Zirn, the individual defendants had been directors of VLI
Corporation, which had been acquired in a tender offer in December
1987 in which 94.8% of the stock was acquired, and then a short-form
merger in January 1988.22 The directors were charged with having
failed to disclose material facts not in a proxy solicitation but in the
Schedule 14D-9 filed on behalf of the directors in response to the first-
step tender offer.223 In defense, the directors urged that the Schedule
14D-9 had disclosed all material facts and that VLI's certificate of
incorporation eliminated their monetary liability for any breach of
fiduciary duty occasioned by any failure to disclose material facts.224
Strikingly, the defendants never questioned the legal proposition that,
despite the absence of self-interest, bad faith, or lack of care,225 the
directors could, but for the exculpatory charter provision, be found
personally liable for damages for failure to disclose a material fact in
the Schedule 14D-9.226 Perhaps as a result, neither did the Delaware
Supreme Court. The court's opinion found the exculpatory charter
provision inapplicable 227 and remanded the damages case against the
directors for a determination of materiality of the undisclosed
information at issue.22s
221. 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993).
222. Id. at 777.
223. Id. at 778.
224. Id. at 779, 783.
225. Id. at 779 (holding irrelevant "the sincerity of [the directors'] subjective beliefs" and
noting that materiality, not motive, is dispositive: "a material omission is not rendered imma-
terial simply because the party making the omission honestly believes it insignificant").
226. See Joint Answering Brief of Defendants Below-Appellees, Zirn v. VLI Corp. 621 A.2d
773 (Del. 1993) (on file with the Author).
227. After concluding in broad abstraction that a director's duty "to disclose to shareholders
all material facts bearing upon a merger vote arises under the duties of care and loyalty," Zirn,
621 A.2d at 778, the court concluded-despite the absence of any evidence of self-dealing on the
part of the VLI directors-that any breach of fiduciary disclosure duty necessarily arose under
the duty of loyalty, and the exculpatory charter provision therefore could not, under the
authorizing statute (8 Del. Code Ann. § 102(b)(7)), permissibly preclude liability for damages on
account of such a breach. Id. at 783.
This aspect of the courts opinion was questionable, and was in fact pointedly questioned.
Bradford D. Bimson, Comment, Zirn v. VLI Corp.: The Far-Reaching Implications of Loquacity,
19 Del. J. Corp. L. 1067, 1116 (1994). In any event, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Arnold dispels any notion that a failure to disclose necessarily precludes director reliance upon
an exculpatory charter provision adopted pursuant to statute.
228. Zirn, 621 A.2d at 780. On remand, the court of chancery found that the undisclosed
information at issue was not material, under applicable legal standards. Zirn v. VLI Corp.,
1995 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 74, *12-14 (June 12, 1995). The threat of damages liability may not
have been a great concern to the individual directors, who may well have had a right to require
the continuing corporation to indemnify them with respect to any money damages that might
have been assessed against them. See 8 Del. Code Ann. § 145(a), (f); Drexler, Delaware
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3. Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc.
The underlying issue of whether disinterested directors can be
held personally liable in damages for a breach of the fiduciary duty of
disclosure was presented yet again in Arnold v. Society for Savings
Bancorp, Inc.2 9 In Arnold, the plaintiff brought a class action on be-
half of stockholders of Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc. ("Society")
whose shares were converted, in a merger with an acquisition sub-
sidiary of Bank of Boston Corporation, into shares of Bank of Boston
common stock. After the transaction was consummated following
denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff sought dam-
ages, on a variety of theories, from the directors of Society who ap-
proved the merger but were not affiliated with Bank of Boston and
had no other distinct personal interest in the merger.
The plaintiffs theory that elicited the greatest attention was
the claim that the directors had breached a fiduciary duty of disclo-
sure by omitting or misrepresenting material facts in the proxy
statement submitted to stockholders in connection with the merger.
Judgment for defendants, premised on a finding that no material
facts had been omitted in the proxy statement, was appealed and
argument was held in the Delaware Supreme Court on April 5, 1994.
In the ensuing months, however, the composition of the court
changed, with Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey replacing Justice
Andrew G.T. Moore on the panel, and the court resolved to determine
and rehear the case en banc. Perhaps as a result of that change, the
court requested supplemental briefing on a number of issues and, at
last, asked counsel to explain the nature of the fiduciary duty of dis-
closure that had been taken for granted in Zirn and, until that point,
in Arnold as well. 230 In particular, the court asked for supplemental
briefing on the following question: "Is the duty of disclosure a sepa-
rate, free-standing fiduciary duty, or does it arise under, and always
subsumed within, the duty of care and/or duty of loyalty?"
231
In understandably truncated briefing,2 32 counsel ably high-
lighted their competing views. Plaintiffs counsel emphasized the
broad language of Lynch, 233 the separate identification of a fiduciary
Corporation Law 16.02[2] at 16-6 (cited in note 30); Balotti and Finkelstein, Delaware Law of
Corporations § 4.16 at 4-348 (cited in note 30).
229. 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994).
230. Letter from Cathy L. Howard, Assistant Clerk, to counsel in Arnold v. Society for
Savings Bancorp, Inc. (Aug. 5, 1994) (on file with the Author).
231. Id.
232. Counsel were allowed just 15 pages to argue four separate issues. Id.
233. See text accompanying note 39.
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disclosure duty in Van Gorkom, 2 4 and cases granting preliminary
injunctions based on nondisclosure despite findings of inadvertence
and good faith on the part of disinterested directors.2 35 Defendants'
counsel noted the foundation of Lynch in the duty of loyalty236 and
stressed, without citing any authority, that to impose monetary liabil-
ity on directors for good faith disclosure errors not resulting from
negligence would contravene what they characterized as the
"generally respected proposition" that directors cannot be held per-
sonally responsible for good faith judgments made with due care. 23 7
Unfortunately, the court did not use the opportunity to clarify
the fundamental character of the fiduciary duty of disclosure. The
court merely quoted Lynch's "complete candor" language, 238 noted
blandly that "[a] number of subsequent decisions have recognized the
existence of fiduciary disclosure obligations,"239 and cited Stroud for
the proposition that the disclosure "obligation attaches to proxy
statements and any other disclosures in contemplation of stockholder
action."240 The court concluded that the proxy statement contained an
omission of material fact but that the directors were immune from
monetary damages liability due to the exculpatory provision in
Society's certificate of incorporation. 241
The implications of Arnold regarding the basic nature of the
fiduciary duty of disclosure are unclear. One could contend that the
court would not have reached the issues surrounding the exculpatory
charter provision unless it had concluded that the fiduciary disclosure
obligation carried with it the possibility of monetary damages even for
what the court found was an innocent, unselfish breach of the obliga-
234. See text accompanying notes 160-62.
235. See cases cited in note 152. Opening Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Below/Appellant
at 3-8, Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994) (on file with the
Author).
236. See note 117.
237. Supplemental Brief of Defendants/Appellees at 4, Arnold v. Society for Savings
Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994) (on file with the Author).
238. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1276.
239. Id. at 1276-77 (citing, in addition to Weinberger, Van Gorkom, Stroud and Zirn, Tri-
Star, 634 A.2d at 331-32, 334; Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 373; Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535
A-2d 840, 846 (Del. 1987); Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 936, 944-45).
240. Id. at 1277.
241. Id. at 1286-88. The court read section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law as unambiguously permitting elimination by charter provision of monetary damages
liability for all breaches of fiduciary duty, including any fiduciary duty of disclosure, except for
breaches of duty identified in the statutory exceptions--"(i)... any breach of the director's duty
of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; [and] (ii)... acts or omissions not in good faith
or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law... "-which the court
found inapplicable. See 8 Del. Code Ann. § 102(b)(7).
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tion.242 Alternatively, because it exonerated the directors based on the
exculpatory charter provision, the opinion may have merely assumed,
without deciding, that such damages liability could exist in the ab-
sence of an exculpatory provision.
The Arnold opinion also begged another important question
about the scope of the fiduciary duty of disclosure-whether the duty
is merely a rule against avoiding false or misleading statements or
omissions, or whether it imposes an affirmative duty to disclose facts
material to a pending stockholder decision. Clearly, the court found
the undisclosed fact at issue, a pre-merger bid for a key division, to
have been material solely because the directors had made partial
disclosure about the related pre-merger efforts to sell the company
which became materially misleading by omission of the undisclosed
bid.243 Just as clearly, the court disavowed any decision regarding
whether the undisclosed fact "was material as a matter of law,"244 and
to what extent, if any, the fiduciary duty of disclosure extends beyond
a requirement of avoiding false or misleading statements to an
affirmative duty to disclose. 245
Thus, the Arnold opinion still leaves to commentators the task
of defining the full scope and content of the fiduciary duty of disclo-
sure.2 46 With the history of the Delaware case law on that subject now
behind us, we turn next to how general concepts of fiduciary obliga-
tion can assist in that task.
V. THE APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY THEORY
242. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1288 n.36 ('We agree with defendants that, on this record, the
single disclosure violation which we have found was consistent only with a good faith
omission.").
243. Id. at 1277-80.
244. Id. at 1282.
245. To be sure, the court's allowance of the possibility that the bid might have been mate-
rial, id. at 1277, indicates a receptivity to the argument that some facts are material and must
be disclosed, as a matter of fiduciary duty, without regard to the content or existence of any
related disclosure.
246. Indeed, it was only on remand in the Arnold case that the courts first considered head-
on whether the directors' duty of disclosure inheres in and derives to any extent from the
statutes requiring notice of meetings to consider fundamental transactions. On remand, the
Chancery Court ruled that plaintiffs case arose under a "separate fiduciary duty of disclosure,"
and that the merger statute "does not require the directors of a corporation to inform the
stockholders of all material facts prior to the vote on the merger." Arnold v. Society for Savings
Bancorp, Inc., 1995 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 1 98,827, at 92,989 (Del. Chanc. June 15, 1995),
affd, 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996). The Delaware Supreme Court has affirmed that ruling, holding
that "[tlhe duty of disclosure is a judicially imposed fiduciary duty which applies as a corollary
to the statutory requirements." Arnold, 678 A.2d at 537. That ruling flows logically from the
narrow reading of the notice statutes in Stroud, 606 A.2d at 85.
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A. Conceptual Introduction
Defining the proper scope and content of the director's fiduci-
ary duty of disclosure requires more than the expression by an indi-
vidual judge of a personal preference or notion about the matter. The
legitimacy of a legal doctrine under which judges may, in the absence
of any statute, sanction private behavior through injunctive relief or
an award of damages depends upon a rooting in what is perceived by
the relevant community as traditional principle.247  If a court is to
require a corporate director to pay damages or to enjoin or rescind a
corporate transaction because of a failure to disclose material infor-
mation to stockholders, it may exercise such coercive power, in the
absence of statute, only by invocation of such traditional principle.
What, then, are the traditional principles of the law of fiduci-
ary duty that define the obligation of a corporate director to disclose
material information to stockholders? To pose this question is much
easier than to answer it. As "the legal system's attempt to recognize
the more blatant abuses of the trust we place in each other, '248 the law
of fiduciaries has been described as "the most human area of the legal
system, and as such the most undefinable."2 49 Attempts to identify
the essential general principles of fiduciary relationships are still
relatively rare. 250  Even a fairly recent attempt laments that "the
precise nature of the fiduciary relationship remains a source of confu-
sion and dispute," and that "[1]egal theorists and practitioners have
failed to define precisely when such a relationship exists, exactly what
247. See, for example, Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 97 (Harvard
U., 1982) CEach judicial decision, at its best, is meant to represent a reasoned attempt to adapt
a past set of decisions to a current problem."); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial
Process 141 (Yale U., 1921); Charles D. Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 773
(1965).
248. Shepherd, Law of Fiduciaries at v (cited in note 49).
249. Id.
250. See, for example, id.; P.D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Carswell, 1977); Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Relationships in the United States Today, in Donovan W. M. Waters, ed.,
Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 173 (Carswell, 1993); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L. J. 625 (1995); Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Freedman,
The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1045 (1991); Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 285 (1989);
P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in T.G. Youdan, ed., Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 1
(Carswell, 1989); Deborah DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 Duke L. J. 879; Hetherington, 22 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 9 (cited in note 37); Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795 (1983); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary
Obligation, 25 U. Toronto L. J. 1 (1975); L. S. Sealy, Some Principles of Fiduciary Obligation,
1963 Cambridge L. J. 119; L. S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 Cambridge L. J. 69; Austin
W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 539 (1949).
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constitutes a violation of this relationship, and the legal consequences
generated by such a violation.."2
51
Nonetheless, and acknowledging that the exercise necessarily
lacks scientific precision,252 defining the director's duty of disclosure
can proceed by first identifying the basic features of the direc-
tor/stockholder relationship, and then examining what fiduciary re-
sponsibilities traditionally attach by reason of those basic features.
1. The Structure of the Director/Stockholder Relationship
The principal feature of the director/stockholder relationship is
the allocation of managerial power. Directors are endowed by law
with the power to exercise authority over the management of re-
sources that are understood to belong, in terms of residual ownership
interest, to others, namely the stockholders. 25 3 That managerial re-
sponsibility is most commonly discussed in relation to business deci-
251. Cooter and Freedman, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1045-46 (cited in note 250). See also
Flannigan, 9 Oxford J. Legal Stud. at 286 (cited in note 250) C'Judicial and academic conclu-
sions, however, have been tentative. There is much that remains obscure."). See also Clark,
Agency Costs in Pratt and Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and Agents at 71 (cited in note 37)
C'Perhaps because the subject matter is so sprawling and elusive, there has been little legal
analysis of the fiduciary concept that is simultaneously general, sustained, and astute.").
252. It cannot be accepted that Darwinian market forces inexorably lead the courts to
articulate comprehensive fiduciary disclosure principles that minimize agency costs and thereby
best serve the needs and expectations of the parties to commercial relationships. Clark, Agency
Costs in Pratt and Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and Agents at 63-64 (cited in note 37)
(acknowledging that "the more elementary features of the corporate form.., result from (fairly
slow, crude) processes of legal evolution that favor rules that reduce transaction costs," but
questioning whether market forces meaningfully shape the finer issues of fiduciary doctrine).
The normative value of such a market-oriented view is at best questionable, where the empirical
effects of nuances of state fiduciary law rules on stock prices, firms' cost of capital, and incorpo-
ration decisions are so very difficult to isolate. The baffling intricacy of the problems posed by
this approach is painstakingly and, ultimately, frustratingly explored in Elliott J. Weiss and
Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to
"Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 551 (1987). They conclude that "investors' well-
documented failure to react to announcements of reincorporation decisions, like their failure to
react to the judicial decisions we studied, may well reflect little more than their judgments
about the indeterminacy of corporate law." Id. at 602. They urge us, in evaluating corporate
law issues, to explore instead "the normative, historical, and institutional factors involved." Id.
at 603.
253. The directors' power to manage the corporation's assets is explicit under many corpo-
rate statutes. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 141(a); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.01(b).
Less explicit under statute, but just as clear as a matter of law, is the stockholders' residual
interest in the assets of the corporation. Hetherington, 22 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 15 (cited in
note 37). It is thus commonplace that directors serve as fiduciaries, accountable to the stock-
holders, in respect of the management of the corporation's assets. Mitchell, 43 Duke L. J. at 430
(cited in note 99); Flannigan, 9 Oxford J. Legal Stud. at 317 (cited in note 250); DeMott, 1988
Duke L. J. at 908 (cited in note 250); Sealy, 1963 Cambridge L. J. at 74-75 (cited in note 250).
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sions as conventionally defined: building a factory, issuing stock, or
approving a fundamental corporate change such as a merger. 254
Directors' managerial responsibilities, however, also include an
advisory function. Directors must in certain circumstances make
recommendations to stockholders regarding proposed actions that
fundamentally affect the interests of the stockholders, such as merg-
ers,255 charter amendments, 256 sales of all or substantially all of the
corporation's assets, 257 dissolution,258 or tender offers to acquire stock
of the corporation. 259 The allocation to directors of that advisory re-
sponsibility has an obvious rationale. As the ultimate repository and
source of information about the corporation and its affairs, directors
are most efficiently situated to provide information to stockholders
when the stockholders are called upon to act on mergers, tender
offers, and the like.260
2. Concomitant Fiduciary Principles
Managerial power and influence over another's assets inevita-
bly involve potential for abuse by the manager. Fiduciary duty is the
brake applied by the law to the exercise of such power or influence. 261
The law of fiduciary duty imposes upon persons-such as corporate
directors-who exercise such power or influence a responsibility to
manage the resources of the common enterprise so as to maximize the
profit derivable from those resources. 262
254. See, for example, ALI Principles § 4.01(e) cmt. b at 173-74 (cited in note 32).
255. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 251(c); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 11.03.
256. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 242(b); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 10.03(b).
257. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 271(a); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 12.02(b).
258. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 275(b); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 14.02(b).
259. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2.
260. In corporate decision-making, isolated stockholders cannot efficiently gather the
pertinent information, so "some sort of collective information-generating agency is necessary.
In a firm, the managers serve this function, and consequently it is unlikely that voters would
think themselves able to decide with greater insight than the managers do. No wonder voters
delegate extensively to managers and almost always endorse their decisions." Easterbrook and
Fischel, Economic Structure at 66-67 (cited in note 3). See also Michael P. Dooley, Two Models
of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. Law. 461, 467-68 (1992) (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits
of Organization 68-69 (Norton, 1974)).
261. Finn, Fiduciary Principle at 3 (cited in note 250).
262. As to corporate directors, see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668,
684 (Mich. 1919); ALI Principles § 2.01(a) at 70 (cited in note 32); Hetherington, 22 Wake Forest
L. Rev. at 15 (cited in note 37). One cannot articulate the widely accepted view that directors'
overriding responsibility is to maximize stockholder value, however, without acknowledging the
depth of the debate on the subject. See, for example, Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and
Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579 (1992);
David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 223 (1991).
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Such fiduciary responsibility, however, varies in its applica-
tion. It is a brake applied most forcefully where those who exercise
managerial powers do so in ways in which their own personal inter-
ests are served.263 The moral disapproval and stringent sanctions
meted out by the courts in this context are fitting. In a setting in
which the directors' potential for gain from abuse of the relationship
is great, the rules and tone of fiduciary law contribute to the confi-
dence of stockholders that their investment will be managed faith-
fully. Thereby, fiduciary law helps preserve the socially efficient
relationship of specialization that exists when directors are entrusted
with authority to manage the resources of others.264 By punishing
directors who abuse their position by diverting corporate assets to
themselves, deterring such behavior as well as compensating its vic-
tims, the fiduciary duty of loyalty reduces the risk associated with
investment in corporate equity and the costs of monitoring the behav-
ior of corporate managers and thereby reduces the cost of equity capi-
tal.265
In the absence of self-dealing, however, the brake of fiduciary
duty upon managerial action is less forceful. True, the law insists
that directors and officers exercise reasonable care in managing the
affairs of the corporation.266 Judicial sanctions for disinterested but
harmful decisions are limited, however, to cases of "gross negligence"
or irrationality suggesting bad faith or recklessness. 267 The fiduciary
duty of care, as thus refined by the "business judgment rule,"268 re-
flects a balance of regulation that reduces the costs of monitoring the
behavior of corporate managers, avoids undue discouragement of
263. See, for example, Langbein, 105 Yale L. J. at 655-56 (cited in note 250).
264. Cooter and Freedman, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1074 (cited in note 250); Hetherington, 22
Wake Forest L. Rev. at 11 (cited in note 37); Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest:
Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 738, 740 (1978); Weinrib, 25 U.
Toronto L. J. at 15 (cited in note 250).
265. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1047, 1090 (1995); Cooter and Freedman, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1052-56, 1074 (cited in
note 250); Frankel, 71 Cal. L. Rev. at 831-32 (cited in note 250); Anderson, 25 UCLA L. Rev. at
740 (cited in note 264).
266. See, for example, Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d
at 367-68; Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.30(a); ALI Principles § 4.01(a) (cited in note 32).
267. See, for example, Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873; Dooley, 47 Bus. Law. at 471-72 (cited
in note 260); Joseph Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Yale L. J. 1078, 1099-1100 (1968).
268. See, for example, Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982); Cede & Co., 634
A.2d at 360-61.
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entrepreneurial risk-taking, and thereby enhances stockholder
wealth.269
3. Four Paradigm Contexts for Articulating the Director's Fiduciary
Duty of Disclosure
Ordinarily, directors are not called upon by state law to com-
municate with stockholders in regard to exercising their managerial
powers, inasmuch as stockholder consent to corporate action is gener-
ally not required. 27 There are occasions, however, when directors do
communicate with stockholders, either voluntarily or out of regulatory
obligation. Those occasions can be summarized in the following four
paradigm contexts: (1) An effort by a director to obtain and invoke
stockholder consent to a transaction between the director and the
corporation; (2) Acquisition by a director of stock from an outside,
public stockholder; (3) Recommendation by directors of stockholder
action on a transaction in which the directors have no personal
interest; and (4) Public statements by the directors not directed
specifically to stockholders but potentially influencing stockholder
investment decisions.
As will be seen, the fiduciary considerations applicable to these
four paradigm contexts vary considerably. With the fiduciary
principles previously discussed in mind, it is necessary to analyze
each situation individually to determine whether a fiduciary duty of
disclosure exists, who owes the duty, what disclosure such a duty
requires, and what remedies are appropriate for a breach of the duty.
B. Ratification Disclosure and the Duty of Loyalty
As previously noted,271 the courts reserve the harshest moral
indignation for the actions of self-interested fiduciaries who use their
position of authority to obtain benefits at the expense of those they
are charged with protecting.272 Corporation law, of course, does not
269. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886; Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure at 94-100 (cited in
note 3); Cooter and Freedman, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1075 (cited in note 250).
270. This proposition is a corollary of the fundamental division of corporate managerial
power as between directors and stockholders. See note 253.
271. See note 37 and text accompanying note 263.
272. See, for example, Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del.
1939). In Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224 (Del. Chane. 1921), the president/director, while acting
as an agent for a purchaser of corporate assets, failed to inform stockholders, in connection with
their vote to approve the asset sale, that the buyer had already contracted to resell the assets at
a substantial profit. The court observed:
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forbid self-dealing by directors. Frequently by statute, but by case
law precedent as well, it tolerates self-dealing accompanied by
assurances of fairness. 273  Where that assurance derives from the
consent of the stockholders, however, fiduciary law is unsurprisingly
demanding of proof that the consent is fully informed and otherwise
fairly procured.274 Because reliance on such consent is intended to
deflect what would otherwise be the most severe judicial scrutiny, the
fiduciary duty of disclosure in this context takes on its most stringent
form, in what can be labeled a ratification duty of disclosure. The
following questions and answers define more fully this venerable and
robust subspecies of the director's fiduciary duty of disclosure.
1. Upon Whom Does the Fiduciary Disclosure Duty Rest?
The duty of disclosure rests upon the directors who invoke
stockholder consent to a transaction in which their interest is in con-
flict with the interests of stockholders generally.275 That duty may
likewise rest, at least indirectly, upon those who actively participate
From this one is reluctantly driven to the conclusion that such an advantage was taken
of the ignorance of the stockholders of facts above referred to, which were concealed
from them by one whose duty it was to inform them of these facts, that they did not then
have before them data from which to make an intelligent choice, or protect themselves
from the effect of the duplicity of their trusted representative.
Id. at 239. See also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); Hetherington, 22 Wake
Forest L. Rev. at 10-11 (cited in note 37); Frankel, 71 Cal. L. Rev. at 829-32 (cited in note 250).
273. Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.61(b); 8 Del. Code Ann. § 144; Oberly, 592 A.2d at 467;
Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 505 A.2d 757, 763-64 (Del. Chanc. 1986); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are
Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. Law. 35, 36-38 (1966).
274. See notes 95-97, 108 and accompanying text.
275. The level of director interest in a transaction sufficient to trigger application of the
traditional duty of loyalty, and concomitant duty of disclosure, is not precisely definable. The
Delaware Supreme Court has identified defensive actions tending to perpetuate directors'
control as giving rise to an "omnipresent specter" of director self-interest. The drafters of the
Model Business Corporation Act, however, have excluded defensive conduct not involving a
direct personal financial benefit to the director from the definition of director conflict of interest
transactions. Compare Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954, with Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann., Official
Comment to § 8.60 ("Director's Conflicting Interest Transaction"). The recent opinion in
Williams v. Geier somewhat clarifies Delaware law on this point, holding that the enhanced
judicial scrutiny required by Unocal applies "only where a board unilaterally (i.e., without
stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat." Williams,
671 A.2d at 1376. Accordingly, where directors do not adopt defensive measures unilater-
ally-as where director action is limited to recommending defensive charter provisions for
approval by stockholders-Delaware law appears to reject the claim that the directors are
acting out of self-interest and must therefore bear some burden, as prescribed by Unocal, of
presenting evidence of the reasonableness of their investigation of and response to a threat to
corporate interests. Yet in Santa Fe the court found that stockholder approval of a merger did
not constitute approval of unilateral director actions taken to promote the merger, and did not
relieve directors of their burden under Unocal to establish the reasonableness of their percep-
tion of a threat to corporate policy and the reasonableness of their unilateral actions in relation
to that threat. Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 68.
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with such directors in the transaction.2 76 The duty of disclosure, as it
exists in this self-dealing context, does not rest upon other directors
who have no personal interest in the transaction at issue and do not
rely upon stockholder consent to avoid liability in connection with the
transaction.2 77
2. Is the Duty One of Affirmative Disclosure, or Merely Avoidance of
Misrepresentation or Misleading Incompleteness?
Since the ratification duty of disclosure by definition exists
only where self-dealing managers initiate communication with stock-
holders in order to obtain their consent to self-dealing conduct, it
makes little practical difference whether the disclosure duty is
defined as an affirmative duty to speak or merely a duty to avoid
misleading incompleteness once some disclosure is made.278 The
ratification context presupposes that self-interested directors provide
to stockholders at least some description of the transaction as a
means of establishing effective stockholder consent. By virtue of a
duty of completeness alone, then, all material facts relating to that
description must be disclosed.2 79 Moreover, stockholder consent can-
276. See Roberts v. General Instrument Corp., 1990 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 95,465, at
97,405-07 (Del. Chanc. Aug. 13, 1990) (evaluating sufficiency of disclosure in tender offer by
buyout firm affiliated with management); In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 1990
Del. Chanc. LEXIS 14, *27 (Feb. 12, 1990); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation,
1988 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 110, *45-46 (Aug. 8, 1988); Cahall, 114 A. at 237 (finding a buyer of
corporate assets liable for aiding and abetting president/director's concealment of material fact
in securing stockholder approval of asset sale).
277. See Shoe-Town, 1990 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 14 at *26. A disinterested director may be
charged with breach of a fiduciary duty if she approves, with the requisite lack of care, a trans-
action between the corporation and another director. Although not personally interested in the
transaction, such a director could invoke stockholder ratification as a defense, and would have
to establish the same full disclosure, as a predicate to effectiveness of the ratification, that the
interested director would have to establish to defend the transaction.
278. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(b) & cmt. g (1977) (discussing the common
law disclosure duty of completeness); Issen v. GSC Enterprises, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 745, 751 (N.D.
Ill. 1982): "The common law of torts also provides that when a party makes a materially
incomplete disclosure, that party has the duty to disclose whatever additional material
information is necessary to prevent the partial disclosure from misleading the recipient." Id. at
751. See also First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1313 (5th Cir. 1977).
Compare In re General Motors Class E Buyout Securities Litigation, 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1129 (D.
Del. 1988) (criticizing Issen but acknowledging a duty of completeness under SEC Rule 10b.5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
279. See, for example, Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1280-81 (applying a duty of completeness as part
of fiduciary disclosure duty in recommending a merger); Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281. At least one
court has suggested, however, that the fiduciary duty of disclosure does not require self-dealing
managers to disclose their "consideration of the price at which [they] will buy or sell and how
[they] would finance a purchase or invest the proceeds of a sale." Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 196
Del. Chanc. LEXIS 40, *55 (Mar. 21, 1996, revised Mar. 27, 1996).
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not be considered effective unless the nature of the directors' conflict
of interest is explained.2 80 Thus, to the extent that the transaction
and its effect on the corporation can be described, consistent with a
duty of completeness, without revealing that conflicting interest, it
could be said that the duty to disclose that interest is affirmative in
nature, and not merely a duty of completeness. 281
It should not be inferred, however, that directors have an abso-
lute, affirmative duty to disclose self-dealing to stockholders. A self-
dealing transaction could be valid even if it is never revealed to stock-
holders, if it can be shown to have been intrinsically fair.212 The ab-
sence of any absolute state law duty to disclose self-dealing points out
the importance, in the public company context, of federal law requir-
ing disclosure of management conflicts of interest.283 Without such
affirmative disclosure requirements, the widely acclaimed benefits of
state fiduciary law restricting self-dealing could be substantially
280. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. § 144(a)(1), (2); ALI Principles § 5.02(a)(1) (cited in
note 32).
281. The directors' conflict frequently is revealed in a complete description of the transac-
tion, as, for example, where stock or a stock option is issued to directors individually. See, for
example, Michelson, 407 A.2d at 211; Cahall, 114 A. at 224. In that setting, it is difficult to
imagine that the transaction could be described completely without identifying the party to
whom the stock or option is being issued. Where the directors' conflict is more attenuated,
however-as in the case where stock is issued to a corporation of which the directors are officers
or significant stockholders-the transaction (including the identity of stock purchaser) could
perhaps be described, consistent with a duty of completeness, without revealing the directors'
conflict. Such completeness, however, would not satisfy the demands of fiduciary law.
282. See Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 195 (6th Cir. 1974) C'[W]hen a
cloak of secrecy is raised concealing the self-dealing transaction, the directors must prove that
nothing is amiss behind the shield."); Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268,
166 N.E.2d 793, 812 (Ill. 1960); Balotti and Finkelstein, 1 Delaware Law of Corporations § 4.9 at
4-225 n.745 (cited in note 30): "[I]f the price is fair, inadequate disclosure may not necessarily
establish an independent basis for invalidating an interested transaction. As long as the
transaction is fair within the meaning of Weinberger, the transaction should be upheld." Id. at
4-225 n.745. Compare State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375,
391 P.2d 979, 984 (1964) (nondisclosure of self-dealing may per se render the transaction
voidable); ALI Principles § 5.02(a)(1) at 241-42, n.6 (cited in note 32); Mitchell, 43 Duke L. J. at
438-39 (cited in note 99); George D. Hornstein, 1 Corporation Law and Practice § 439 at 544
(West, 1959) ("Nondisclosure by an interested director may itself constitute unfairness."). Even
if some disclosure of self-dealing were required to avoid voidability per se, however, there is no
reason to mandate that such disclosure necessarily be made to the stockholders, as opposed to
disinterested directors.
In any event, secrecy would surely not enhance proof of entire fairness. Disclosure is a
significant part of what has been described as the "fair dealing" element of entire fairness.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. Moreover, even if fiduciary law does not mandate disclosure to
stockholders of self-dealing, it encourages such disclosure by endowing informed stockholder
consent to self-dealing with curative power. See note 101.
283. See Form 10-K, Item 13, as prescribed under 17 C.F.R. § 249.310, requiring annual
reporting of transactions with management in accordance with Item 404 of Regulation S-K
under the Securities Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404. See also Mahoney, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
1091-93 (cited in note 265).
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reduced due to the understandable unlikelihood that widely dispersed
individual stockholders, each with relatively little at stake, would
expend the money and effort necessary to monitor managers' actions
and thereby identify instances of self-dealing.2 84
3. What Remedies are Appropriate for Failure to Fulfill the Duty of
Disclosure in the Ratification Context?
This question is somewhat misleading since the ratification
disclosure duty exists only as a prerequisite to defensive reliance on
stockholder consent. Thus, nondisclosure is not the underlying wrong
to be remedied in the context of ratification. The underlying wrong is
the self-dealing transaction itself, and a disclosure shortcoming is
relevant only in determining whether the transaction is supported by
effective stockholder consent.28 5 It is beyond the scope of this article
to review extensively the range of potentially appropriate remedies for
a breach of the duty of loyalty, but they clearly include rescission,
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and disgorgement of fiduci-
ary profit.286 Of course, an extensive, good faith effort to disclose
material information in an effort to secure stockholder approval, even
if flawed in some material respect, may serve as an indicium of fair-
ness. In other words, in evaluating whether a self-dealing transaction
unaccompanied by effective stockholder approval is nonetheless en-
tirely fair, disclosure that is flawed for reasons other than bad faith or
intent to deceive should be more favored by the law than none at all.287
284. State corporation statutes do not universally require disclosure of self-dealing trans-
actions or, indeed, any financial or operating information. See 3 Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. §
16.20 at 16-77 to 16-82. For example, unlike the Model Business Corporation Act (§§ 16.20-.21),
the Delaware statute is devoid of any requirement of regular reporting of corporate business.
Id. at 16-82. Discovery by outside stockholders of management self-dealing must be initiated
and pursued by the stockholder under statutory rights of inspection. See, for example, 8 Del.
Code Ann. § 220(b); Roles v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993). In light of the costs
of monitoring, "it is likely that in a public corporation there will be less shareholder monitoring
expenditures than would be optimum from the point of the shareholders as a collectivity." Bird
v. Lida, Inc., 1996 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 41, *9 (Apr. 4, 1996). Thus, Professor Mahoney argues for
a mandatory disclosure policy applicable to public companies, albeit a policy limited to
"disclosure of executive compensation and self-dealing on an ongoing basis." Mahoney, 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 1091-92 (cited in note 265). Mahoney contends that such disclosure would
ultimately be the norm in any event in a privately ordered system because of its efficiency in
reducing agency costs. Id.
285. See text accompanying note 102.
286. Weinberger, 457 A-2d at 714; ALI Principles § 7.18(a) (cited in note 32). See also notes
318-22 and accompanying text.
287. See Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 1995 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 44, *5
(Apr. 17, 1995), affd, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) (holding that despite coercion of special committee
by controlling stockholder, merger was entirely fair in part because the special committee was
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C. Insider Stock Purchases and the Duty of Loyalty
The next context in which a fiduciary duty of disclosure has
been identified is the purchase by a director of the corporation's stock
from an outside stockholder.28 8 This is a highly variable setting, as
discussed below, in which the concerns of fiduciary law are not mono-
lithic. It is a setting, however, which involves one significant differ-
ence from the ratification context discussed in the preceding section.
Specifically, the conflict of economic interests is no longer between the
director and the corporate entity, but rather arises between the direc-
tor/stock purchaser and the outside stockholder/seller. 2 9 Thus, one
significant aspect of fiduciary relations associated with corporate
directors is missing in the stock purchase context. At least where the
director purchases stock for her own account, she is not acting in a
role in which the stockholder and the law have entrusted her with
responsibility for managing corporate assets.290
Perhaps because of the absence of the asset-management un-
derpinning of fiduciary responsibility, older case law adopted the view
that directors purchasing stock from outside stockholders for their
own account were under no fiduciary duty at all to disclose facts ma-
able to engage advisors who provided assistance in negotiating and evaluating alternative
transactions).
288. See Part IH.B. Stock purchases by corporate fiduciaries, at least where the purchaser
(and his fiduciary status) are known to the selling stockholder, are the prevailing context in
which the case law addresses fiduciary issues. While much of what is said here could apply to
the case in which a director sells her stock directly to an outside stockholder on the basis of
inside information in order to avoid a loss, that factual context is at best unusual. Hence, the
discussion here speaks of purchases of stock by the fiduciary from the outside stockholder,
rather than sales of stock by the fiduciary to the outside stockholder.
289. See Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Chanc. 1987)
(holding that in the context of a self-tender offer approved by directors owning a controlling
block of stock, "It]he interest of the corporate offeror (qua buyer) is to pay the lowest price
possible; the interest of the stockholders (qua sellers) is to receive as high a price as possible").
290. See, for example, Michael Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who
Purchase Shares, 46 Cornell L. Q. 53, 55 (1960). Such a role is implicated, of course, where the
corporation is the purchaser of stock and corporate assets are used to fund the purchase. With
this additional underpinning of fiduciary responsibility in place, courts have not hesitated to
impose fiduciary duties of disclosure on managers who bring about such stock repurchases. See,
for example, Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill. App. 134, 108 N.E.2d 493
(1952). Northern Trust distinguishes cases where the director purchases stock for his own
account, and observes that: "[D]irectors occupy the position of trustees for the stockholders as a
body and cannot have or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as
such trustees. That is to say, when they act on behalf of the corporation, they occupy the
position of trustee to each individual stockholder." Id. at 498. See also Adams v. Mid-West
Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147, 156 (Okla. 1946). One court has suggested,
however, that this distinction between corporate repurchases and purchases by a director for
her own account is "illogical." Guy v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
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terial to the transaction.291  This view, however, misconceives the
fiduciary rationale of the disclosure duty. The force animating the
cases imposing such a duty is the fact that it is the stockholders who
retain and compensate managers, and it is the managers' use of cor-
porate resources that enables them to gather material information.
To permit the managers to use that information for their own per-
sonal benefit and to the disadvantage of those who have effectively
funded its acquisition runs counter to fundamental agency principles
of unjust enrichment.292 Some commentators have also argued that
permitting managers to profit from stock purchases made using mate-
rial inside information tends to increase the risk perceived by inves-
tors in providing equity capital, and thereby increases the cost of such
capital. 293
One could respond that outside stockholders, aware that they
are dealing with a director, could simply negotiate to obtain a war-
ranty that they have been provided with all material information.
Failing to obtain such a warranty, the stockholder could either refrain
from selling stock to the director or proceed knowing of the uncer-
tainty of the informational base. None of these alternatives, however,
can be viewed as efficient. Individualized negotiation of disclosure
obligations would impose substantial transaction costs, particularly
where a purchase offer is extended to many outside stockholders, as
where a controlling stockholder makes a public tender offer for minor-
ity-held shares. Insisting, in the absence of such individualized nego-
tiation, that stockholders refrain from trading with the fiduciary or
accept the risk of inadequate information could only result in de-
creased stock prices and increased costs of equity capital. 294
291. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (1933) (citing "an imposing
weight of authority in other jurisdictions" for the proposition that the stock purchaser's director
status creates no fiduciary relation to the selling stockholder). See also Finn, Fiduciary
Obligations at 65 (cited in note 250); Shepherd, Law of Fiduciaries at 355-56 (cited in note 49);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider
Trading Prohibition, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1189, 1219 (1995).
292. See, for example, Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7-8; Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802-03
(Minn. 1952); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 388 cmt. c, 395, 404 (1958). See also Conant,
46 Cornell L. Q. at 75 (cited in note 290). Bainbridge questions the reach of these agency princi-
ples, but ultimately acknowledges a "trend in the case law.., towards imposing fiduciary duties
on insiders." Bainbridge, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 1224-26 (cited in note 291). See also
Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Tradiig and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 5, 6 n.17 (1982).
293. See John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit? Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 919, 945-46 (1988); James
D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School" 1986
Duke L. J. 628, 637-38 (1986); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe At Any Price A Reply to Manne,
Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1425, 1438-41 (1967).
294. See note 290.
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In contrast, imposing a fiduciary duty of disclosure provides a
convenient, ready-made substitute for what selling stockholders
would want in any event-presentation of the material facts-and
what directors, by virtue of their role as centralized repositories of
corporate information, are well suited to provide efficiently.2 95 That
transaction cost-minimizing rationale for imposing a fiduciary disclo-
sure duty would not apply, of course, in the case of stock purchases by
directors in impersonal, market transactions, in which the seller is
unaware of the identity of the buyer. In that situation, there would
be no occasion for negotiation over the seller's disclosure. Perhaps
tacitly recognizing that no negotiation transaction costs would be
avoided in this setting by establishing a fiduciary duty to disclose
material facts to the selling outside stockholder, the case law has
generally prescribed none.296
295. See Cox, 1986 Duke L. J. at 656-59 (cited in note 293); Frankel, 71 Cal. L. Rev. at 833,
835 (cited in note 250).
Professor Dooley has argued that the absence of a fiduciary duty of disclosure when direc-
tors of public companies purchase stock from outside stockholders is "firmly based on efficiency
considerations." Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev.
1, 64 (1980). Insider trading profits, he argues, provide incentive to managers to develop infor-
mation useful to the wealth of the enterprise, and which will inure to the benefit of stockholders
as a whole, where the managers are unable to acquire any more than a small percentage of the
outstanding shares using their inside information. Id. at 66. In other words, some hapless
public stockholders must be allowed to sell their stock at an unfairly low price, without the
benefit of material inside information that the purchasing director may not have expended any
effort in acquiring, in order to provide some haphazard, fortuitous inducement to managers
generally to gather valuable information so that they and the fortunate non-selling public
stockholders can benefit-assuming, of course, that we are not dealing with a management
buyout in which all publicly held shares are acquired by insiders. This compensation theory for
rejecting a fiduciary disclosure duty has been criticized as "inefficient." Frank H. Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 11 S.
Ct. Rev. 309, 332 (1981). See also Cox, 1986 Duke L. J. at 651-52 (cited in note 293).
296. Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 659, is probably the leading authority in this context. Goodwin,
which involved a claim for damages by a stockholder who sold in an impersonal market trans-
action, must be distinguished, however, from cases in which the corporation, usually in a
derivative suit, seeks to recover the director's trading profits. See generally Frankel v. Slotkin,
984 F.2d 1328, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1993); National Westminster Bancorp NJ v. Leone, 702 F. Supp.
1132, 1139 (D.N.J. 1988); In re ORFA Securities Litigation, 654 F. Supp. at 1449 (D.N.J. 1987);
Coleco Securities Litigation, 591 F. Supp. 1488, 1494-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Ferris v. Polycast
Technology Corp., 429 A.2d 850, 853 (Conn. 1984); Katz Corp. v. T.H. Canty & Co., 362 A.2d 975,
980 (Conn. 1975); Brophy, 70 A.2d at 5; Diamond v. Oreamnuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
Research has not disclosed any case in which a stockholder selling in the market has
successfully invoked fiduciary disclosure duty, as opposed to Rule 10b-5, to recover
compensatory damages from a director who concurrently bought stock. In any event, the more
recent cases in the Oreamuno line, even while recognizing the existence of a derivative claim of
breach of fiduciary duty, have tended to limit recovery to losses sustained by the corporation, if
any such losses can be proven, and have declined to authorize recovery of the insider's trading
gains. See, for example, Frankel, 984 F.2d at 1336-37 (stating that the "[b]reach of fiduciary
obligation is a tort claim, and thus requires the showing of a duty, a breach, an injury, and
causation"); in re ORFA, 654 F. Supp. at 1457. See also Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739, 746
(Fla. 1975) (rejecting vicarious tippee liability). Moreover, not all courts even accept the
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There is a further basis in fiduciary principles to impose a duty
upon directors when they purchase stock directly from outside stock-
holders. The role of directors as corporate managers casts upon them
the function of gatherers and holders of material corporate informa-
tion, upon whom the outside stockholders reasonably, indeed neces-
sarily, rely when the directors seek to acquire their shares. 297 That
reliance on managers as a source of superior information is a tradi-
tional earmark of a fiduciary relationship of dependence, one that
independently supports the application of a fiduciary duty of disclo-
sure in the situation where an outside stockholder is approached by a
director seeking to purchase his shares. 98 The absence of such a
disclosure duty in arm's length relationships appropriately discour-
ages such reliance in the interest of rewarding diligence in the gather-
ing of information.299 That approach is counterproductive, however, in
the corporate setting, particularly where the number of stockholders
is large, because it discourages the specialization of function, includ-
ing information gathering, that the corporate structure usefully ex-
ploits.3 °° Hence, a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts appropri-
ately inheres in a director's purchase of stock directly from an outside
stockholder.
With that introduction to the application of fiduciary principles
in the stock purchase context,301 the character of the fiduciary disclo-
sure duty in that context can be sketched out, again using questions
and answers.
premise that insider trading in the market constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty to the
corporation. See, for example, Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978); Daisy Systems
Corp. v. Feingold, 1989 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 94,520, at 93,311 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
As Professor Bainbridge points out, "the American Law Institute's corporate governance
project opines that duty to refrain from self-dealing in confidential corporate information exists
in both face-to-face and stock exchange transactions." Bainbridge, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at
1226 (cited in note 291) (discussing ALI Principles § 5.04(a) (cited in note 32)). Bainbridge
quickly cautions, however, that "the only citation of support offered by the Reporter for the
proposition that this duty extends to secondary market transactions is a 'but see' cite to
Goodwin:' Id. at 1226 n.161 (citing ALI Principles § 5.04 at 377 (cited in note 32)).
297. See note 260.
298. See note 333.
299. See Seligman, 73 Geo. L. J. at 1091-93 (cited in note 124) (citing Anthony T. Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 11-12 (1978)).
300. See note 260.
301. One cannot proceed further with the analysis of the fiduciary disclosure duty of
directors in the stock purchase context without noting the potential significance of state law to
the reach of the federal insider trading laws. See, for example, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653
(1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980); United States v. Chestman, 947
F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991); Bainbridge, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 1268 (cited in note 291)
("[The fiduciary duty element required by the federal definition of insider trading should be
supplied solely by state corporate law.").
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1. Who Owes the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure?
This question is easily answered by reference to the circum-
stances giving rise to the fiduciary duty of disclosure in the stock
purchase context. As previously discussed, the fiduciary duty arises
because of the use by the fiduciary of information, learned through
the performance of the fiduciary management function, in acquiring
stock directly from outside stockholders. 3 2 Thus, the duty can rest
not only upon directors but upon corporate offlcers303 and controlling
stockholders 30 4 as well. Those who actively participate with such
corporate managers in the purchase of stock may take on indirect
responsibility for adequate disclosure, 3 5 but any direct fiduciary duty
of disclosure on their part seems unjustified in light of the rationales
of the fiduciary duty.36
2. In What Specific Circumstances is the Duty Owed?
The fiduciary duty of disclosure arises in the context of the
acquisition of stock by a director directly from an outside stockholder,
whether that acquisition occurs in a privately negotiated purchase,
through a public tender offer, or through a merger effected by means
of a vote of public stockholders.307 Of similar fiduciary substance is
the acquisition of outsider stock by the corporation itself, where
caused by managers who have a sufficient ownership interest in the
corporation so that their personal, albeit indirect, economic interest in
respect of the repurchase conflicts materially with the stockholder's
interest in receiving maximum value. The important aspect here is
that the transaction arises by virtue of a volitional act on the part of
the public stockholders affected by the purchase, whether that voli-
tional act is a sale agreement, a tender in response to a tender offer,
or the vote of the publicly held shares.
Where such volition on the part of the public stockholders
whose shares are purchased is lacking-as in the case of a squeeze-
302. See text accompanying notes 297-300.
303. See, for example, Mansfield Hardwood Lumber, 263 F.2d at 754.
304. See, for example, Shell, 606 A.2d at 114; Kahn, 591 A.2d at 171; Bershad v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 846 (Del. 1987); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711; Lynch, 383 A.2d at
279.
305. See note 276.
306. See note 277. See also Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53,
70 (Del. 1989); ALI Principles § 5.04 at 270-71 (cited in note 32).
307. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber, 263 F.2d at 748 (privately negotiated purchase); Joseph
v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335 (Del. Chanc. 1984) (tender offer by majority stockholder);
Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701 (merger conditioned upon vote of majority of minority shares voting).
1996] 1155
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
out merger effected solely by means of the vote of the shares of a
controlling stockholder-the fiduciary considerations are very differ-
ent. 08 Certainly, the transaction cost reduction rationale for the
fiduciary disclosure duty is absent where, as in the squeeze-out
merger, there is no opportunity for negotiation. 3 9 Nevertheless, the
element of reliance on the fiduciary's superior informational resources
may still be present, even when there is no stockholder agreement to,
or vote for, a sale. Stockholders usually must still choose whether to
exercise appraisal rights.310 For just such reasons, a fiduciary duty of
disclosure has been applied in mergers unilaterally effected by major-
ity stockholders. 31'
A more attenuated form of conflict-a conflict of roles rather
than of economic interest in the transaction--exists with respect to
corporate stock repurchases generally. Some courts have suggested
that where directors approve stock repurchases, even in the absence
of any personal stock interest, they take on fiduciary disclosure obli-
gations because they are serving the conflicting interests of those
persons who sell their shares and those stockholders who retain their
equity interest in the corporation.312 That suggestion was made in a
case in which the directors, representatives of holders of a controlling
block of common stock, did in fact have a potent personal interest in
achieving the lowest possible repurchase price for shares of preferred
stock. In the case of a stock repurchase in which the directors have
no such material conflicting interest, however, the central concern of
fiduciary law over abuse of position for self-aggrandizement is absent.
Only the fiduciary aspect of reliance upon directors on account of their
information-repository function remains.313 Accordingly, the fiduciary
disclosure duty in this disinterested circumstance should resemble
308. The Delaware Court of Chancery has held, in fact, that a stockholder who does not
tender shares in a self-tender offer lacks standing to challenge the sufficiency of disclosure on a
fiduciary duty theory, since no change of control or second-step squeeze-out transaction results
from the tender offer, and the stockholder otherwise suffers no cognizable effect. Abajian v.
Kennedy, 1992 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 6, *25-26 (Jan. 17, 1992).
309. See text accompanying note 296.
310. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. §§ 253(d), 262(b).
311. See note 193.
312. Eisenberg, 537 A.2d at 1057-58 (pointing out that in a stock repurchase, directors "are
acting both as the representatives of the corporate offeror and as fiduciaries for the shareholder
offerees... necessarily giv[ing] rise to a potential conflict of the directors" justifying an "onerous
disclosure standard") (citing Blanchette v. Providence & Worcester Co., 428 F. Supp. 347, 356 (D.
Del. 1977); Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
313. Where open market repurchases are concerned, even that element of fiduciary
principles is absent. The identity of the purchaser is unknown, and presumably irrelevant, to
the seller. No fiduciary duty of disclosure has ever been identified in that circumstance, and
none should be.
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the more limited duty, discussed in Part V.D, that exists generally
when disinterested managers present a proposal to stockholders for
voting or action that may affect the value of their stock, rather than
the more stringent version of the fiduciary duty that exists in regard
to self-interested stock purchases by corporate managers.
3. Is the Disclosure Duty Affirmative, or Does it Merely Require
Avoidance of Material Misrepresentation or Incompleteness?
In the context of publicly held companies, federal law makes
this question largely academic. Federal law prescribes mandatory
disclosures whenever directors or controlling stockholders seek to
acquire publicly held shares by means of a tender offer or merger.3 14
With open market stock repurchases approved by disinterested direc-
tors not subject to any fiduciary disclosure duty,315 and privately nego-
tiated purchases between directors and public stockholders relatively
rare, state fiduciary disclosure law in this area has largely addressed
questions of material omission in federally mandated disclosure
documents. 316
To the extent that the issue arises in the context of privately
held companies and is therefore not preempted as a practical matter
by the federal securities laws, the fiduciary duty of disclosure of a
director purchasing stock from an outside stockholder should be char-
acterized as a duty of affirmative disclosure, and not merely avoid-
ance of material misrepresentation or misleading incompleteness.
The fiduciary considerations are quite similar to those in the context
of ratification of self-dealing. The director's personal economic inter-
est in acquiring stock as cheaply as possible is adverse to the interest
of the selling stockholder. The director is enabled to pursue that
interest, to the detriment of the stockholder, by virtue of (1) access to
information gained while carrying out the management function; and
(2) the stockholder's necessary reliance on the director for material
information concerning the transaction. With all these considerations
present, the stockholder's consent to the director's stock purchase can
no more be considered valid in the absence of full disclosure of mate-
rial facts within the director's control than could the stockholder's
314. See, for example, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3 et seq., 240.14d-1 et seq.
315. See note 313.
316. See, for example, Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 733 (8th Cir. 1967); Mansfield, 263
F.2d at 752; Kahn, 591 A.2d at 170-71; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712; Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281.
But see Shell Petroleum, 606 A.2d at 113 (holding that the understatement of discounted future
net cash flows from oil and gas reserves was a material omission).
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consent to a self-dealing transaction between the director and the
corporation. Indeed, the stock purchase achieved without adequate
disclosure could be considered more suspect, since it cannot even
occur without the improperly secured volitional act of the selling
stockholder.
4. What Are the Appropriate Remedies for Breach of the Fiduciary
Duty of Disclosure in the Stock Purchase Context?
This question is one on which the case law, at least in
Delaware, is fairly well developed. And, as one might expect given
the equitable foundations of fiduciary law, 317 the range of potential
remedies is extensive-again evidencing the similarity of fiduciary
principles applicable in the stock purchase context and the more
traditional self-dealing context. Potentially available remedies for a
breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure in connection with a stock
purchase from an outside stockholder include rescission,318 injunctive
relief,319 compensatory damages, 320 and disgorgement of fiduciary
profit.321 Indeed, where problems of evaluating compensatory dam-
ages from disclosure shortcomings in stock purchases have proved
difficult, the Delaware courts have resorted to the use of somewhat
arbitrary monetary awards, which have been characterized, not alto-
gether accurately, as "nominal damages.322 These cases have led the
Delaware Supreme Court to state that "[in Delaware existing law
and policy have evolved into a virtual per se rule of damages for
breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure."323 That approach to rem-
edy-awarding damages in the absence of harm to the beneficiary-is
317. Harman v. Masoneilan International, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 497-98 (Del. 1982); Shepherd,
Law of Fiduciaries at 13 (cited in note 49); Finn, Fiduciary Obligations at 1 (cited in note 250).
318. Myzel, 386 F.2d at 742; Mansfield, 263 F.2d at 750; Joseph, 482 A.2d at 344-45.
319. Sealy Mattress Co. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1335 (Del. Chanc.
1987).
320. Shell Petroleum, 606 A.2d at 113; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701.
321. Myzel, 386 F.2d at 742; Mansfield, 263 F.2d at 750; Lynch, 429 A.2d at 503 n.5.
322. Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 475 (Del. 1992); Smith v. Shell Petroleum, Inc.,
606 A.2d 112 (Del. 1992); Weinberger, 497 A.2d at 792.
The sums awarded in these fiduciary duty of disclosure cases-$1 or $2 per share to a class
consisting of millions of shares-do not comport with generally accepted definitions of "nominal
damages." See, for example, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod,
Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 714 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967) ("Nominal damages are assessed in some trifling
or trivial amount, such as six cents or one dollar ... ."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 907
(1977) C(Nominal damages are a trivial sum of money awarded to a litigant who has established
a cause of action but has not established that he is entitled to compensatory damages."); Dan B.
Dobbs, Handbook On The Law Of Remedies § 3.8 at 191 (West, 1973) ("Nominal damages, as the
term implies, are damages in name only, that is, in trivial sums such as six cents or $1 or $10.").
323. Tri-Star Pictures, 634 A.2d at 333.
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well-grounded in precedent in cases in which fiduciaries act disloy-
ally, out of self-interest in conflict with those they are charged with
representing.32 4 As we see in Part V.D, however, it is hardly appro-
priate as a general approach to the treatment of fiduciary disclosure
problems where no conflicting personal interest is at stake.
D. Disinterested Recommendations of Stockholder Action
The next context of fiduciary disclosure obligations to consider
is the common situation in which disinterested directors ask stock-
holders to vote or otherwise take action on a matter as to which the
directors have made a recommendation. Usually by statute325 or im-
plementing regulation,326 the law has set up directors as the source of
an initial judgment about a proposed transaction, and thereby, effi-
ciently and appropriately, set up in stockholders a reasonable reliance
on the directors' recommendation.3 27 The disinterested aspect of the
matter, however, completely eliminates a central concern of fiduciary
doctrine, namely the handling of conflicts of interest.328
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that disclosure
obligations in this context are not even properly described as
"fiduciary," but rather as based on ordinary tort principles of deceit or
negligence. 329 This effort to differentiate the principles underlying
what are traditionally considered the duties of loyalty and care is
324. See, for example, Guth, 5 A.2d at 510; Scott and Fratcher, 3 Law of Trusts § 205 at 239
(cited in note 49); Bogert and Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 543(V) (cited in note 108).
325. See, for example, 8 Del. Code Ann. §§ 242 (charter amendments), 251 (mergers), 271
(sales of all or substantially all assets), 275 (dissolution). See also Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. §§
10.03(b)(1) (charter amendments), 11.03(b)(1) (mergers and share exchanges), 12.02(b)(1) (sales
of assets other than in regular course of business), and 14.02(b)(1) (voluntary dissolution).
326. Federal law requires directors of registered companies to issue a recommendation
with respect to a tender offer for the corporation's shares. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-e2.
327. See note 260. In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court underscored the impor-
tance of the duty of the board of directors, under a corporate merger statute, to make the initial
judgment whether to enter into a merger agreement: "Certainly in the merger context, a
director may not abdicate that duty by leaving to the shareholders alone the decision to approve
or disapprove the agreement." 488 A.2d at 873.
328. See DeMott, 1988 Duke L. J. at 908 (cited in note 250) (characterizing the "central
preoccupation of fiduciary obligation" as "minimizing potential or incipient conflicts in parties'
interests").
329. Shepherd, Law of Fiduciaries at 245-48 (cited in note 49) (CWhere it is proved that one
person reasonably relied on the advice or information of another, a fiduciary relationship may
arise.... Where the advice or information is unsound, and.., no bias has in fact been proved,
the fiduciary may be held liable for the tort of negligent misrepresentation under normal tort
principles."). Shepherd's rejection of a fiduciary underpinning of a disinterested disclosure duty
stems from his position that the "duty of care has no essential connection with the fiduciary
relationship," as it "arises not only in fiduciary situations, but also in contractual and tortious
situations." Id. at 48-49, 247.
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helpful, particularly since it exposes the close analogy between the
tort of negligent misrepresentation and the fiduciary disclosure duty
of disinterested directors when they recommend stockholder action. 330
It must be acknowledged, though, that there is simply too much
history to conclude that the duty of care in the management of trust
affairs lacks any fiduciary content.331  Moreover, to say that a
disinterested director's duty of disclosure to stockholders is not a
fiduciary duty could rule out the use of a charter provision to elimi-
nate damages liability for breach of that duty.332
In all events, reliance on a person possessed of superior infor-
mation and acting as an adviser has persistently been characterized
as one model of fiduciary relationship. 33 This model does not ordinar-
ily apply to corporate directors, who are not generally considered to be
agents for stockholders, discharging their ordinary management re-
sponsibilities subject to the direct control of stockholders as princi-
pals.334 The situation is different, however, where directors counsel
stockholders with respect to actions as to which stockholders do have
decisionmaking power. Where such power-approval of a merger, or
sale of stock in a tender offer, for example-is exercised by stockhold-
ers following a recommendation or advice by directors, the analogy to
330. See text accompanying notes 354-56.
331. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 ("A director's duty to inform himself in preparation for a
decision derives from the fiduciary capacity in which he serves the corporation and its stock-
holders."); Glinert v. Wickes Cos., 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 764, 780 (1991), affd, 586 A.2d 1201 (Del.
1990) (stating that the law of fiduciaries subjects managers' conduct "to review when a claim of
disloyalty or lack of due attention is made") (emphasis added)); Francis v. United Jersey Bank,
87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J. 1981) (finding a director in breach of the duty of care, noting
that "the relationship of a corporate director to the corporation and its stockholders is that of a
fiduciary"); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporations 465 (3d ed. 1992) (identifying the duty of care
within "the scope of fiduciary duties owed by directors").
Moreover, trustees owe a duty to exercise care under ordinary trust law. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 174 (1959); Bogert and Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 541 at 167 (cited in
note 108); Scott and Fratcher, 2A Law of Trusts § 174 (cited in note 49); Langbein, 105 Yale L. J.
at 656 (cited in note 250).
332. See Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1286-88. The relevant Delaware statute permits limitation of
liability only for "breach of fiduciary duty as 4 director." 8 Del. Code Ann. § 102(b)(7) (emphasis
added).
333. An agent who gives advice to a principal who relies on that advice, at least where the
agent possesses superior knowledge, must disclose information material to the principal's
decision. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 381 at 182 (1958). This principle has been found
applicable in dealings between real estate brokers and their clients, Licari v. Blackwelder, 539
A.2d 609, 613 (Conn. App. 1988), Urban Investments Inc. v. Branham, 464 A.2d 93, 96 (D.C.
1983), Hurney v. Locke, 308 N.W.2d 764, 768 (S.D. 1981), Quechee Lakes Rental Corp. v.
Boggess, 608 A.2d 39, 41 (Vt. 1992); securities brokers and their clients, Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Perelle, 514 A.2d 552, 560-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); and lawyers and their
clients, Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 A.2d 459, 464 (N.J. 1993). See also Shepherd, Law of
Fiduciaries at 28-32 (cited in note 49); Finn, Fiduciary Obligations at 50-51 (cited in note 250).
334. See, for example, New York Dry Dock v. McCollom, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. Sup.
1939). See also note 260.
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the agency relationship and its concomitant fiduciary disclosure obli-
gations is more forceful. 335
Moreover, to the considerable extent that information gathered
in the management of the corporation can be considered a corporate
asset subject to the directors' management responsibilities,336 it can be
said that the directors' duty of care in presenting a recommendation
for-stockholder action requires management of that information for
the benefit of the stockholders. That is, directors should disseminate
such information where it is of material significance to the
stockholders' decision and the utility of the information to
stockholders is not outweighed by harm from disclosure.337
Attempting to describe the disinterested director's disclosure
duty as a subset of the traditional duty of care, however, reveals a
striking, although not necessarily grating, incongruity with tradi-
tional due care jurisprudence. A rational decision by disinterested,
duly informed directors in the management of the business affairs of
the corporation is ordinarily thought to be beyond the realm of judicial
intervention.38 In contrast, whether a fact is material and must be
disclosed to stockholders is not a matter on which the courts have
given any deference, presumptive or otherwise, to the business judg-
335. See text accompanying notes 19-21.
336. This perspective on corporate information is not at all novel. A particularly clear
articulation of the perspective is found in a 1903 opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court identify-
ing a duty on the part of a corporate director and officer to disclose to an outside stockholder a
proposed sale of corporate assets prior to acquiring the outsider's stock: "In a certain sense the
information is a quasi asset of the company, and the shareholder is as much entitled to the
advantage of that sort of an asset as to any other regularly entered on the list of the company's
holding." Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1903). See also Childs v. RIC Group,
331 F. Supp. 1078, 1082 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Shepherd, Law of Fiduciaries at 330-31 (cited in note
49).
The notion that corporate information is to be managed for the benefit of the stockholders
underlies judicial approval of the use of internal corporate data as an inducement to potential
bidders to accede to auction rules designed to secure the highest reasonably available price in a
sale of the company. See, for example, Alliance Gaming Corp. v. Bally Ganing Int'l., Inc., 1995
Del. Chanc. LEXIS 101 (Aug. 11, 1995); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation,
542 A.2d 770, 784 (Del. Chanc. 1988); Confidentiality and Standstill Agreements: Battleground
for Control of the Process, Corporate Control Alert (May 1988) (describing Delaware Court of
Chancery ruling denying injunction requiring target company to afford access to internal data to
a bidder unwilling to sign a standstill agreement, and quoting target company counsel's defense
of the company's position as "a plausible method of running the bidding process to maximize
shareholder value").
337. See note 187.
338. See, for example, Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). See also
Block, Business Judgment Rule at 11-19 (cited in note 30); S. Samuel Arsht, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 93, 111-12 (1979); Dooley, 47 Bus. Law. at 471-72
(cited in note 260).
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ment of management responsible for preparing proxy statements or
similar disclosure documents.339
Thus, although courts purport to disavow any role in second-
guessing disinterested business decisions, they do not shrink from
determining de novo whether a fact is significant enough to be consid-
ered material to a business decision by stockholders. 340 The judicial
role in evaluating whether directors have fulfilled a recommendation
duty of disclosure, then, is considerably more active than the role
adopted in reviewing, under the rubric of the duty of care, the
fulfillment of other management fiduciary responsibilities.341
To view the duty of disclosure of disinterested directors en-
tirely as the product of the duty of care, moreover, leaves one further
analytical loose end, best illustrated by a variation of the hypothetical
situation discussed in introducing this article.342 Assume that plain-
tiffs counsel discovers the arguably material omission in time to pre-
sent an application for a preliminary injunction. As Chancellor Allen
observed in Anderson Clayton,343 it seems most likely that a court
would enjoin the transaction, pending curative disclosure to stock-
holders, upon finding that existing disclosures are materially defi-
cient, even though the directors' failure to disclose was the product of
informed deliberation.344 Yet, in the absence of any director conflict of
interest, and given the exercise of due care in preparing the merger
proxy material, one would ordinarily conclude that there could be no
issue of breach of either the duty of loyalty or the duty of care.
On what theory of liability, then, would such a preliminary
injunction rest?345 The only intellectually satisfying answer is some
strict duty of disclosure, akin to that posited for trustees, 3 6 that can
339. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
340. See cases cited in notes 18, 167, 241, and 307. See also Mitchell, 43 Duke L. J. at 472-
73 (cited in note 99).
341. See Anderson Clayton, 519 A.2d at 676-78 (allowing that rejection of a hostile
competing offer could "be a rational choice," but enjoining consummation of a management-
sponsored recapitalization due to inaccurate characterization, in solicitation of stockholder votes
to approve the recapitalization, of management's intentions regarding further exploration of the
hostile bid); Oesterle and Palmiter, 79 Iowa L. Rev. at 565 (cited in note 30) C'State judges
(principally in Delaware) place themselves in the omnipotent position of the 'reasonable
shareholder' to review management disclosure under a common-law fiduciary standard of
'complete candor.' ").
342. Part I.B.
343. 519 A.2d at 669.
344. Id. at 675.
345. Proof of a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits is traditionally considered a
prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief. See, for example, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179
(Del. 1986).
346. See note 188.
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be breached despite good faith, disinterest and due care. As anyone
contemplating the contours of any such fiduciary duty must inevitably
observe, however, to say that there is a fiduciary duty only begins the
analysis.3 47
To understand a fiduciary recommendation duty of disclosure,
one must at the outset consider the limited scope of that duty. The
duty is an obligation to use reasonable care in presenting a recom-
mendation for stockholder action and in gathering and disseminating
corporate information in connection with that recommendation. The
tort doctrine of negligent misrepresentation is powerfully analogous;
it prescribes that one who "in the course of his business" negligently
supplies false information "for the guidance of others" is liable for
pecuniary loss caused by justifiable reliance upon that information.348
The information supplier's duty extends, however, only to the "limited
group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply
the information," and engenders liability only "in a transaction that
he intends the information to influence."' 49 Just so, a director, when
he recommends stockholder action, is acting "in the course of his
business" to supply information "for the guidance of others," namely
the "limited group" consisting of the stockholders, with respect to "a
transaction that he intends the information to influence.."350
Accordingly, the director's duty in the recommendation context
is not discharged merely by presenting the facts known to her person-
ally. As under the negligent misrepresentation formulation requiring
that the provider of information "exercise reasonable care or compe-
tence in obtaining or communicating the information,"351 the presenta-
tion of corporate information accompanying a recommendation to
stockholders is a management function which must be discharged
through reasonable steps to assure that material information is gath-
ered from the corporate officers and employees reasonably likely to
347. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.) ("To say that a man
is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduci-
ary? What obligation does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge
these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty').
348. As stated by the Second Restatement of Torts:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment ... supplies false in-
formation for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability
for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the in-
formation.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) (1977).
349. Id. § 552(2).
350. Id.
351. Id.
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possess such information.352 As a corollary, of course, a director does
not fail to discharge his recommendation disclosure duty if, after
taking such steps, a material fact fails to come to light because of
neglect or mistake on the part of an employee or agent to whom some
portion of the information gathering task has been reasonably
delegated.353
These considerations of fiduciary doctrine, and the doctrine of
negligent misrepresentation they parallel, also shed light on the ques-
tions of who owes the recommendation disclosure duty, when it is
owed, what disclosure it mandates, and what remedies exist for its
violation. The balance of this section addresses those now familiar
questions.
1. Who Owes the Recommendation Duty of Disclosure?
As with the ratification and stock purchase disclosure duties
discussed in previous sections,3 54 identifying the fiduciary rationale for
the duty identifies those who owe the duty. Since the exercise of the
management function of making a recommendation of an action, or
inaction, to stockholders activates fiduciary responsibilities, those
who are responsible for and make the recommendation-the directors
of the corporation-owe the duty of disclosure. 355
352. In reviewing this article, Professor Langevoort commented perceptively that a negli-
gent misrepresentation model of the recommendation disclosure duty of directors might afford
stockholders a remedy for director inattention not amounting to "gross negligence." This is
contrary to established Delaware law requiring proof of "gross negligence" as a predicate to a
breach of the fiduciary duty of care. See note 267 and accompanying text. The concern is that a
director's failure to take note of a material fact might become actionable because of its
nondisclosure to stockholders in connection with recommending a transaction, while that same
failure might not be so negligent as to constitute a breach of the duty of care.
This concern may be more troubling in theory than in practice. Despite any superficial
variance in the language of the standards of culpability-that is, between the substantive due
care test and the negligent misrepresentation model-it seems unlikely that a court would
validate a director's decision despite a failure to ascertain a material fact but nevertheless hold
that same director personally liable for a failure to disclose that fact in recommending
stockholder action. Perhaps the line between ordinary negligence and "gross negligence" is
overdrawn. See, for example, Quillen, 10 Del. J. Corp. L. at 500 (cited in note 153) (']n
information gathering, a negligence standard without the superlatives may be appropriate so
long as courts recognize that 'circumstances' vary. Such a standard would not be materially
different in result than the 'gross negligence' standard of Trans Union ...."); Arsht, 8 Hofstra
L. Rev. at 101-11 (cited in note 338). In any event, there is no intent to suggest here a more
stringent rule of director liability for inattention in gathering material information.
353. See, for example, Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 943; ALI Principles § 4.01(b) cmt. b at 170-72
(cited in note 32).
354. Parts V.A and B.
355. Thus, there is some merit in the suggestion by Professor Solomon that "[s]tate regula-
tion of proxy solicitations is a logical outgrowth of state statutes governing notice to sharehold-
ers of shareholder meetings." Corporations Law at 841 (cited in note 30). Contrary to one
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2. When Does the Recommendation Disclosure Duty Arise?
Again, the fiduciary rationale answers the question. As stated
repeatedly in the Delaware cases, "the obligation attaches to proxy
statements and any other disclosures in contemplation of stockholder
action"35 6-that is, when the directors make a recommendation that
the stockholders vote, sell, not sell, or otherwise take action in regard
to their shares. The disclosure obligation may thus attach in the
context of the election of directors, at least where the directors
recommend and solicit stockholder action-voting for their
nominees-that importantly affects the management of the corpora-
tion.
Fiduciary analysis, however, suggests several limitations on
the scope of the recommendation disclosure duty. First, there is a
legitimate management role to be played by directors in determining
whether disclosure of even material information should be limited or
dispensed with altogether in connection with a recommendation to
stockholders, where public disclosure of such information might cause
harm to the interests of the corporation and its stockholders that
would outweigh the benefits of disclosure. Confidential information
about a mineral discovery, to take a familiar example, 357 might be
highly material to a board of directors' recommendation of a merger in
which stockholders receive the acquiring firm's stock. Yet a disinter-
ested board must have some authority to make a judgment that public
disclosure of the discovery would be inadvisable in light of the poten-
tial benefits of secrecy. In a closely held company, there may be prac-
tical ways, such as the execution of confidentiality agreements, to
resolve the competing interests of disclosure to stockholders and
avoidance of injurious publicity.38 Where such accommodation is
impossible as a practical matter, an informed director determination
that the likely harm from disclosure outweighs the benefit should
possible reading of Stroud, the existence of a duty of disclosure is dependent upon the fiduciary
recommendation, and can exist as Stroud itself suggested, see text accompanying notes 217-19,
even in the absence of management solicitation of proxies. Nevertheless, as the Delaware
Supreme Court has now made clear, the disclosure duty is that of the directors making the
recommendation, and not that of the corporation itself. Arnold, 678 A.2d at 539.
356. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1277.
357. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
358. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 89 (discussing the need to "balance the board's duty to disclose
all available material information in connection with the contemplated shareholder vote against
its concomitant duty to protect the corporate enterprise," and holding that a board might
permissibly withhold "material confidential information from shareholders, who having been
given notice and opportunity, failed to execute a reasonable confidentiality agreement!).
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preclude director damages liability for nondisclosure of even material
information.
Fiduciary analysis suggests another potential limit to the rec-
ommendation duty of disclosure. Since that duty is premised upon
the recommendation by directors who have an informational advan-
tage over dispersed, disaggregated stockholders who necessarily rely
on the directors' superior informational resources, it is necessary to
examine, particularly in the case of a closely held company, whether
and to what extent that informational advantage truly exists. A
stockholder may at times have information, or at least access to in-
formation, equivalent to that of the board of directors. 359 Where the
informational advantage does not exist, the rationale for application
of a fiduciary recommendation disclosure duty vanishes.
Finally, fiduciary analysis suggests why the recommendation
disclosure duty should not have been considered applicable to the
directors in Stroud at all. What sets up the fiduciary duty is the reli-
ance by stockholders upon the directors in regard to the latter's rec-
ommendation of an act that ultimately rests on the volition of the
stockholders. Where that potential for stockholder volition is absent
or necessarily irrelevant to determining the outcome of events-as in
Stroud, where the challenged charter amendments would have been
adopted in any event on the strength of the majority block of stock
owned by the directors-there is simply no occasion for reliance by
stockholders on the directors' recommendation, and no reason to
apply a fiduciary recommendation disclosure duty.3 60
359. Such access may be derived not only from an active management role, but also from
exercised contractual rights to information, such as a right under a stockholders' agreement to
attend board meetings, consult with officers, or the like.
360. See Abajian v. Kennedy, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 179, 191-92 (Del. Chanc. 1992); In re USA
Cafes, L.P. Litigation, 600 A.2d 43, 54 (Del. Chanc. 1991) (dismissing "state law breach of duty
of candor claims" because "[n]either plaintiffs nor any class member could have been injured by
the alleged [disclosure] defect as they had neither a right to vote nor a right to dissent and seek
appraisal"); Glinert, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. at 784 ('Warrant holders who have no role in approving
[a] transaction have no right arising from fiduciary duties to demand disclosure, complete or
otherwise [relating to that transaction]."). See also Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1099-1108
(holding that where votes of minority stockholders were not necessary to effect a freeze-out
merger, the proxy statement was not an "essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction," so no private right of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), was available) (citing Mills, 396 U.S. at 385 n.7); Thouret v. Hudner,
1995-1996 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 99,037 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1996) (holding that there is no
private right of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, where minority stockholder
votes were "totally unnecessary and irrelevant to the passage of the directors' proposal for the
election of directors at the annual shareholders' meeting," and distinguishing cases where
"1minority shareholders have given up state law remedies, such as appraisal rights, as a result of
false and misleading statements contained in a proxy statement'); Christopher Money, Note,
Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg: Should Minority Approval Be Required By Law or Corporate
Bylaw?, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 913, 923-25 (1995). But see Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Potential
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3. Does the Recommendation Disclosure Duty Affirmatively Require
Disclosure of Material Facts, or Merely Avoidance of Material
Misrepresentation or Omission?
One must observe preliminarily, again, that this question is
largely academic in regard to publicly held companies, since federal
law prescribes extensive affirmative disclosure obligations when
directors make recommendations in the form of proxy statements or
responses to tender offers.361 As observed in regard to duty of loyalty
cases involving public companies, 62 then, the claims in the recom-
mendation disclosure duty area have involved questions of material
omission.363 In this regard, at least, the law of fiduciary duty does
little more than what the law of torts accomplishes. It imposes upon
the director, when making a recommendation for stockholder action, a
duty to use reasonable care to avoid the disclosure of false informa-
tion and to disclose to the stockholders information necessary to
prevent a partial or ambiguous statement from being materially mis-
leading.36 4
Implications of Virginia Bankshares for Delaware Law, in 6 Insights 28 (May 1992) (noting that
when a shareholder vote is sought although not required or needed, directors
"[a]rguably... may be bound to solicit stockholder approval consistent with the standards that
would apply had they been required to seek a vote").
Again, it must be observed that under Delaware law the adoption of charter amendments in
Stroud did not afford any appraisal remedy to the stockholders, and thus did not present them
with any choice of actions in regard to which they could have relied upon the information
supplied by the directors in relation to the charter amendment proposals. Where an efficacious
choice exists-where there is an appraisal remedy, or where the controlling stockholder group
structures the transaction to require the separate approval of a majority of the minority stock-
holders--the rationale for the recommendation disclosure duty reappears and justifies imposi-
tion of the duty. See note 193.
361. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, .14e-2.
362. See notes 279, 316.
363. See, for example, Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1270; Zirn, 621 A.2d at 773; Weinberger u. Rio
Grande Industries, 519 A.2d at 116.
364. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(b) (1977) provides in relevant part:
One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated ....
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or
ambiguous statement from being misleading.
In addition, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) provides:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
The fiduciary recommendation disclosure duty simply extends the obligation prescribed in
section 551(2)(b) by applying it to directors who are not a party to the business transaction to
which their recommendation relates. The "pecuniary interest' element of section 552(1) should
be considered applicable to director recommendations of stockholder action. 'The fact that the
information is given in the course of the defendant's business, profession or employment is a
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The academically-and on rare occasion, as in Stroud, practi-
cally-more interesting question is whether the fiduciary recommen-
dation disclosure duty is inherently affirmative as well, requiring
directors to disclose information material to the recommendation
regardless of whether some independent body of law, like the federal
securities laws, requires such disclosure. Fiduciary theory suggests
that the duty is indeed affirmative. The fiduciary duty and relation-
ship exist because the directors, entrusted with authority over and
responsibility for the handling of material corporate information,
recommend a course of action or inaction to stockholders who as a
result reasonably rely on the directors in making their decision. A
rule that eliminated affirmative fiduciary disclosure obligations alto-
gether would, in the absence of some independently derived affirma-
tive disclosure duty, leave disaggregated and non-managing stock-
holders with the responsibility either to vote or otherwise act in the
dark, or gather pertinent information themselves. The outcome of
either choice could not be considered efficient. Clearly, the efficient
approach is for those who are charged with management responsibil-
ity and who make the recommendation in question to provide what
material information they reasonably can to the stockholders in con-
nection with their decision. 365
4. What Are the Remedies for Breach of the Disclosure Duty?
If there is an area in which the developing law of fiduciary
disclosure duty is in particular need of restraint, it is in regard to the
identification of remedies available for failure to fulfill the recommen-
dation disclosure duty. In Arnold, the Delaware Supreme Court made
great progress in clarifying that exculpatory charter provisions can
preclude an award of monetary damages as a remedy for disinterested
sufficient indication that he has a pecuniary interest in it, even though he receives no consid-
eration for it at the time." Id. § 552 cmt. d.
Although the Restatements formulation of negligent misrepresentation doctrine literally
addresses only a person who "supplies false information," id. § 552(1), the doctrine has been
extended to reach misleading omissions of material facts. See University of Illinois v. First
American National Bank of Nashville, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9525, *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1989);
Gale v. Value Line, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 967, 971 n.5 (D.R.I. 1986); Aintruck Factors v.
International Forest Products, 59 Wash. App. 8, 795 P.2d 742, 747 (1990). But see Ames v.
Uranus, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12639, *49 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1994) (false statement
required); In re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation, 721 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 n.4 (N.D.
Cal. 1988), affd, 948 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1991); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 12 Cal. App. 4th 927, 937
n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
365. See note 260.
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breach of the recommendation disclosure duty.366 More progress,
however, should be made.
The analysis of remedies should proceed flexibly and with
attention to variation in the social interests at stake in the diverse
contexts in which directors' disclosure duties have been identified.367
It may be useful to place upon directors, as central repositories and
managers of corporate information, the duty to gather and present
material information when they recommend action to the stockhold-
ers. To impose too high a cost and risk upon directors discharging
that responsibility, however, would be counterproductive. 368 A disin-
terested director cannot be an insurer that all material information is
presented, any more than a disinterested director can be expected to
insure that a managerial decision will not lead to loss to the corpora-
tion.369
Holding a disinterested director strictly liable in damages for a
failure, revealed as such only with hindsight, to disclose a material
fact in connection with a recommendation to stockholders has but one
conceivable precedential underpinning: Smith v. Van Gorkom.370 This
Article argues, however, that if Van Gorkom is construed to impose
upon disinterested directors personal liability for damages for a non-
negligent failure to disclose material facts, it is an "outlier,"3 '1 and
that such liability is insupportable in fiduciary theory. Indeed, under
the federal proxy regulations, adopted to promote disclosure of mate-
rial facts as an independent legislative objective,372 damages liability
must be predicated upon some showing of culpability.37 3 Even under
the law of trusts-which is surely at least, if not more, demanding
than the law of corporate director fiduciary duties374-a trustee, even
if he ought to perform a certain function in acting as trustee, is not
366. Arnold, 650 A.2d at 1286-88.
367. weinrib, 25 U. Toronto L. J. at 20 (cited in note 250).
368. Frankel, Fiduciary Relationships at 833 (cited in note 250) (citing Goodwin, 186 N.E.
at 659).
369. See, for example, Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (N.Y.
1912) (directors' exercise of their powers over "[q]uestions of policy and management.., for the
common and general interests of the corporation may not be questioned, although the results
show that what they did was unwise or inexpedient"); Block, Business Judgement Rule at 5-11
(cited in note 30) (citing cases).
370. 488 A.2d at 858.
371. Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure at 107 (cited in note 3) (suggesting, in
discussing the duty of care aspect of the case, that "[i]f Van Gorkoin is a more traditional busi-
ness judgment case, it is an outlier").
372. See note 15.
373. See note 16.
374. See, for example, Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1148 ("[The corporate liability rule should
certainly be less stringent than that of the trust law.").
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liable in damages or subject to surcharge if his failure to perform that
function is not the result of lack of reasonable care.375 Hence, a view
that any failure to disclose a material fact necessarily requires a rem-
edy in damages is simply too dogmatic and inflexible to be sus-
tained.376
These introductory thoughts suggest what remedies can be
considered appropriate for a failure to fulfill the fiduciary recommen-
dation disclosure duty. First, proof of such a failure before the stock-
holder action is taken may justify a preliminary injunction, subject to
ordinary equitable considerations such as the threat of countervailing
harm from granting the injunction, and narrowly tailored to secure
corrective disclosure. 377 Second, if equitable considerations warrant,
proof of such a failure even after the stockholder action is taken could
justify rescission of that action-although intervening rights, particu-
larly in the case of sales of stock to a third party or the mingling of
assets following a merger, may frequently make rescission impossible
as a practical matter.3 78 Indeed, in an appropriate case, rescission of
375. In re New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 567 F.2d 166, 179 (2d Cir. 1977) ("A
basic tenet of trust law is that '[o]rdinarily a trustee does not commit a breach of trust if he does
not intentionally or negligently do what he ought not to do or fail to do what he ought to
do'.... The element of voluntariness is critical.") (citation omitted); Jennings v. Murdock, 220
Kan. 182, 553 P.2d 846, 871 (Kan. 1976); Scott and Fratcher, Law of Trusts § 201 at 219 (cited
in note 49) (same).
The duty of a trustee to disclose material information to the beneficiary has been discussed
in quite a few cases, but in none of those cases has a disinterested trustee been surcharged, or
held liable in damages, for a non-negligent failure to make disclosure. See note 188.
376. It has been suggested that "[i]n Delaware existing law and policy have evolved into a
virtual per se rule of damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure." Tri-Star, 634 AL2d
at 333. See also Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1176. This suggestion is untenably broad if only
because liability in damages for disinterested directors is unjustified in the absence of lack of
due care in providing material information to stockholders. *It is untenably broad for the
additional reason, discussed below, that even upon proof of lack of such care, disinterested
director liability in damages depends upon proof of actual loss by the stockholder (or the
corporation) seeking to impose such liability. See note 389.
377. This is the approach taken in several of the Delaware cases in which a breach of the
fiduciary disclosure duty by disinterested directors has been identified. Gilnartin, 18 Del. J.
Corp. L. at 281; Anderson, Clayton, 519 A.2d at 669; Lacos Land, 517 A.2d at 271. See also
cases cited in note 152. The Delaware Supreme Court's recent opinion in Arnold endorses this
approach, noting that stockholders subject to breach of a fiduciary disclosure duty "remain
protected by the availablity of injunctive relief," even where money damages cannot be assessed
against the breaching directors due to an exculpatory provision in the certificate of
incorporation. Arnold, 678 A.2d at 542.
378. See Edelnan, 559 F. Supp. at 1184 (nullifying charter amendment eliminating
cumulative voting, due to violations of both federal law (SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9)
and director fiduciary duty of disclosure). For cases in which the courts have declined to grant
rescission due to intervening events rendering the remedy impracticable, see, for example, Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 1972 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 1 93,354 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.); Lynch, 429 A.2d at 501; Sinith v. Shell Petroleum,
1990 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) T 95,316, at 96,497-98 (Del. Chanc. June 19, 1990).
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an election of directors might be warranted, although experience with
common law regulation of proxy contests 379 suggests that such relief is
likely to be rare indeed. Courts are likely to demand a greater than
usual showing of materiality, i.e., proof of a likelihood that the elec-
tion was affected by the nondisclosures at issue,30 since (1) election
contestants presumably identify and point out their opponent's most
significant misstatements or omissions;38' and (2) there is usually only
a relatively short time before the stockholders will have another
opportunity, at the following annual meeting of stockholders, to vote
again. 382
A third potential remedy, money damages, may be appropriate
post hoc, but only where the disclosure shortcoming is attributable to
the requisite director negligence, and subject further to preclusion by
charter provision, where authorized.38 3 Moreover, since the fiduciary
theory upon which the recommendation duty of disclosure rests is
equivalent in substance to the basis for liability in tort for negligent
misrepresentation, two further limitations on the reach of any poten-
tial damages claim emerge: (1) damages are limited to loss actually
suffered, and do not extend, in this disinterested context, to
"rescissory" damages; and (2) damages can be awarded only upon a
showing of reliance, that is, that the nondisclosure proximately
caused the action giving rise to the stockholders' loss. 384 This Article
379. See Part II.B.
380. See cases cited in note 90. See also Loudon, 1996 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 12 at *8-11
(refusing to employ the Delaware election review statute (8 Del. Code Ann. § 225) to invalidate
an election of directors, in the absence of any competing claimants to the directorships at issue,
based solely on alleged omissions in proxy solicitation materials).
381. Bresnick, 175 F. Supp. at 725; In re Seminole Oil & Gas Corp., 150 A.2d 20, 23 (Del.
Chanc. 1959) CWhere, as here, the conflicting claims and answers were presented to the
stockholders at length, I think that is a factor which militates against the ordering of a complete
resolicitation."); Goldfield Corp., 327 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
382. Even so, courts have on rare occasions invoked state law disclosure duties to require a
new election of directors or other stockholder vote. See, for example, American Hide, 127 A. at
659; In re Scheuer, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 500; Wyatt, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 502; Lieferant v. Bartell, 232
N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
383. See Arnold, 650 A-2d at 1286-88 (construing a charter provision adopted pursuant to 8
Del. Code Ann., § 102(b)(7)).
384. This two-part proposition follows from the analogy to principles of negligent misrepre-
sentation, discussed in text accompanying notes 350-52. See, for example, Wolf v. Magness
Construction Co., 1995 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 122, *4 (Sep. 11, 1995), affd, 676 A-2d 905 (Del. 1996)
(requiring "pecuniary loss caused by justifiable reliance upon the false information"); Glosser v.
Cellcor Inc., 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 341, 380-81 (1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
(1977)). With respect to the causation requirement, see also McNair v. Capital Electric Power
Assoc., 324 So.2d 234 (Miss. 1975) (finding no showing that nondisclosure by trustees affected
the vote of nonprofit cooperative members on a merger proposal).
The concepts of reliance and causation in the disinterested recommendation context bear
further explanation. They are relatively easy to grasp where the stockholder action alleged to
have been harmful is the sale of shares, as in response to a tender offer. In that situation,
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contends, therefore, that any "virtual per se rule of damages for
breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure" must be limited to the
context where it was first identified, namely a transaction assumed to
involve self-dealing by a controlling stockholder.38 5 No such rule can
plausibly be said to exist for breach of a disinterested
recommendation duty of disclosure. Any view that tort principles
requiring proof of pecuniary loss do not apply to claims of breach of
fiduciary duty by disinterested directors must be viewed as out of step
with fundamental fiduciary principles.386
This outline of potential remedies inevitably prompts resort to
the maxim that equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.387 It
might be argued, after all, even acknowledging director disinterest
and due care, that a failure to disclose a material fact, as required by
the fiduciary recommendation disclosure duty, cannot go unremedied
simply because that failure is only identified by the court after it has
become too late to grant preliminary injunctive relief or rescission. 388
This argument, however, misconceives the nature of the fiduciary
duty in question. The "wrong" does not exist solely by virtue of a
failure to disclose a material fact. In the absence of lack of care in
gathering and presenting material information, there simply is no
stockholders who do not sell are in no position to complain that they relied on a nondisclosure
by directors in their Schedule 14D-9; only stockholders who do sell can make that claim.
Abajian v. Kennedy, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 191-92.
The issues are more complex where reliance is collective, as where all shares are converted
in a merger but not all stockholders vote in favor of the merger. In that context, even a stock-
holder who did not vote in favor of the merger, but whose shares are claimed to be underpaid for
in the merger, can claim his harm to have been caused by the disclosure failure, if that failure
can be shown to have brought about the necessary vote of the other stockholders. Id. (citing
Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc., 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 1462, 1476-77 (1991)).
See also Edelman, 559 F. Supp. at 1185 (plaintiff stockholder has standing to seek invalidation
of charter amendment eliminating right to cumulative voting, even though plaintiff did not vote
in favor of the amendment).
385. Tri-Star, 634 A.2d at 333.
386. Compare Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 370-71 ("The tort principles of Barnes [v. Andrews,
298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.)], have no place in a business judgment rule standard of
review analysis.") with Frankel v. Slotkin, 984 F.2d at 1336-37 ("Breach of fiduciary obligation is
a tort claim, and thus requires the showing of a duty, a breach, an injury, and causation."); ALI
Principles §§ 4.01(d), 7.18 (cited in note 32).
387. See, for example, John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence as
Administered in the United States of America § 423 (Bancroft-Whitney, Spencer W. Symons, ed.,
5th ed. 1941).
388. Precisely this plea was made by plaintiff on remand in Arnold v. Society for Savings,
1995 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 86, *4, *25 (June 15, 1995), affd, 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1995).
Acknowledging that "it is often thought to be axiomatic that a wrong must have a correlative
remedy," the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that "this is not always the case." 678 A.2d
at 541. The court reasoned that loss of potential remedies, due either to passage of time or
stockholder action approving elimination of director monetary liability, cannot force the creation
of some unprecedented damages remedy against the corporation itself.
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fiduciary "wrong" in this context at all.389 If it seems incongruous,
then, that a preliminary injunction could be granted to permit cura-
tive disclosure despite director disinterest and due care, one can look
at the case law to see that federal courts have long acknowledged that
a plaintiff may seek injunctive relief to cure a disclosure failure, while
denying to that same plaintiff a damages remedy for the same
disclosure failure. 390 Any superficial lack of logic in this approach is
amply offset by a practical appreciation of the relative intrusiveness
of the preliminary injunction remedy as compared to the post hoc
damages remedy.
E. Other Public Statements by Corporate Fiduciaries
Finally, fiduciary theory illuminates the last area in which a
fiduciary disclosure duty has been suggested: public statements not
intended on their face to elicit or counsel stockholder action. In this
context, this Article contends, there is no fiduciary relation at stake at
all. At most, directors and officers who issue press releases or other
public corporate statements have the market generally, and not the
stockholders, as ordinarily intended objects or beneficiaries of the
information. 391 The directors have no recognized function under state
389. Thus, it is not merely the stockholders' adoption of an exculpatory charter provision
that left them without a remedy in Arnold, as the court there suggested. 678 A.2d at 542. In
fact, that suggestion unnecessarily intimates that the stockholders would have had a damages
remedy against the disinterested directors of Society for Savings but for the exculpatory
provision.
390. For example, in evaluating issues of standing or the existence of a private right of ac-
tion under the federal securities laws, the courts have considered the policies of those laws to
confer standing upon a tender offeror to seek injunctive relief to cure a disclosure violation,
while denying the offeror standing to pursue a claim for damages based upon such a violation.
Compare Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42 n.33 (1977) (denying offeror
standing to seek damages in respect of a violation of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)), with Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 371-73 (6th
Cir. 1981) (allowing a tender offeror standing to seek injunctive relief against conduct in
violation of section 14(e)).
Similarly, and even more to the present point, federal courts interpreting implied rights of
action under the proxy rules have differentiated the culpability requirements for relief, depend-
ing upon whether the relief sought is an injunction or damages. See Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d
215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Vhatever may be the rule with respect to scienter where other reme-
dies such as damages or rescission of a sale are sought, we have no hesitancy in recognizing that
for prospective relief looking to the protection of the franchise the test for the purposes of Rule
14a-9 is the objective sufficiency of the disclosure."); Calumet Industries, Inc. v. MaeClure, 464
F. Supp. 19, 28 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
391. Stock exchange rules require that listed companies publicly disseminate current
information of material significance to investors. See, for example, NYSE Listed Company
Manual 202.05, reprinted in 3 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 23,519 at 17,214:
A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or information
which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its securities.
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corporate law to manage information so that one segment of the
market, existing stockholders, can make buy/sell or other stock-
related decisions more intelligently than nonstockholders. Nothing in
the law sets up directors as objects of stockholder reliance or sources
of recommendations to stockholders, from which an all-encompassing
fiduciary duty of continuous disclosure might be inferred. To the
contrary, to the extent that law or stock exchange rules require public
disclosure where stockholder action is not sought, the regulatory goal
is market regulation and enhancement, not oversight of the direc-
tor/stockholder relationship. 392
There is certainly no basis to quarrel with the application of
conventional tort doctrine to public statements made by directors, or
by anyone else for that matter. A knowingly incorrect statement or
misrepresentation by omission constitutes an actionable wrong where
it is detrimentally relied upon by a stockholder or anyone else fore-
seeably affected by it. 393 To create a fiduciary duty to stockholders in
this context, however-and it would be creating one394-would signifi-
This is one of the most important and fundamental purposes of the listing agreement
which the company enters into with the Exchange.
See also American Stock Exchange Guide § 402(a), reprinted in 3 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH)
23,124A, at 17,098; NASD Manual, By-Laws Schedule D, Part 2, § (c)(15) (CCH) 1803 at 1566
(1991).
To be sure, there may be occasions on which the directors do intend to influence stockholder
action by the content of a press release. Marhart clearly involved a suggestion of such behavior,
and as that case shows, dissemination of false information intended to induce existing stock-
holders, to their detriment, to retain their stock, will support a claim of common law fraud.
Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 337.
392. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (conditioning stock exchange registration upon adoption of
exchange rules "designed to... perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national
market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest... "); Brown,
Corporate Disclosures § 3.06[1] at 3-64 (cited in note 22).
393. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 526, 529, 534 & cmt. c, 537, 548 (1977).
394. In its July 25, 1996 opinion in Kahn v. Roberts, the Delaware Supreme Court declined
to adopt the court of chancery's ruling that no such fiduciary disclosure duty exists, and it
cautioned that "this court has never stated that full disclosure is required only when seeking
shareholder action." 1996 Del. LEXIS 275, *20 (emphasis in original). The court noted that the
"court of chancery has not spoken with a unified voice on this question." Id. at n.7. The court's
observation of disunity was correct. The balance of precedent, however, weighs against the
creation of a fiduciary disclosure duty universally acceptable to all public corporate disclosures
regardless of context, scope of dissemination, or purpose. See First Eastern Corp. v.
Mainwaring, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16979, *20-21 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1992) (granting partial
dismissal, finding no director fiduciary "duty of candor" under Pennsylvania law in respect of
allegedly false or misleading statements in periodic reports); Uni-Marts, Inc. v. Stein, 1996 Del.
Chanc. LEXIS 95, *21 (Aug. 9, 1996) ("[F]iduciary liability for misdisclosure requires that the
material misstatement or omission by a fiduciary be in connection with the soliciation of
shareholder action, such as tender, a vote, a consent or a withholding of the same."); Kahn v.
Roberts, 1995 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 151, *21 (Dec. 6, 1995) ("Delaware law does not require a
Board to divulge material developments with respect to the company's business if the board
does not seek the vote of the shareholders."), affd on other grounds, 1996 Del. LEXIS 275 (July
25, 1996); Bragger v. Budacz, 1994 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 202, *14 (Dec. 7, 1994) (since spin-off
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cantly rewrite the corporate contract, effectively substituting state
law for what is historically and far more properly a federal matter:
the regulation of disclosure in the interest of facilitating interstate
markets for securities. 395
information statement "did not seek any shareholder action... a fiduciary obligation of full
disclosure is not implicated"); Herd v. Major Realty Corp., 1990-1991 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH)
95,772, at 98,718 n.2 (dismissing claims based on press releases and a Form 10K because "the
duty of candor requires disclosure of all material facts only in connection with a transaction on
which stockholders are asked to vote"). See also Levy v. Stern, 1996 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 25, *1
(Mar. 12, 1996) (noting the inconsistency between Marhart and Kahn, but granting summary
judgment to defendants instead based on exculpatory charter provision).
Of the cases cited by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn, Marhart is clearly the only
direct source of precedent for the establishment of a fiduciary duty of disclosure outside the
transaction context. The earlier suggestion of such a duty in In re Rexene Corp. Shareholders
Litigation, 1991 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. (CCH) 96,010, at 90,059 n.1 (Del. Chanc. May 8, 1991),
affd, 604 A.2d 416 (Del. 1991), and the subsequent reiteration of Marhart's holding in Ciro, Inc.
v. Gold, 816 F. Supp. at 266, were both dictum. An earlier order in Levy v. Stern denied a
motion to dismiss a claim of material omissions of adverse information where no stockholder
action was sought and plaintiffs sold no shares, but it too relied on Marhart. 1996 Del. Chanc.
LEXIS 25 at *3-4. Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc., 1990-1991 Fed. Secur. L.
Rptr. (CCH) 95,617, at 97,882 (Del. Chanc. Sept. 19, 1990, revised Sept. 21, 1990), involved a
tender offer by a management group, a circumstance in which fiduciary duties are commonly
recognized. See Part III.A. The irrelevance of Kelly v. Bell has already been noted. See notes
69 and 85. In Kahn v. Roberts, 1994 WL 70118 (Del. Chanc. Feb. 28, 1994), the court denied a
motion to dismiss a putative class claim of material omission in a letter to stockholders
describing the reasons for a repurchase of stock. That ruling rested on the broad proposition
that "directors who decide voluntarily to disclose information to stockholders are subject to the
duty of full and frank disclosure of all material facts," and relied solely on Marhart and Kelly.
At least in Kahn, the communication at issue was one specifically directed to the stockholders,
rather than to the market generally, and could more plausibly engender reliance by the
stockholders as a distinct group. In all events, the subsequent opinion in Kahn, granting a
defense motion for summary judgment, follows the reasoning of Raskin and Herd. See also
Capital Real Estate Investors Tax Exempt Fund Limited Partnership v. Schwartzberg, 929 F.
Supp. 105, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting, only for purposes of evaluating defendants' propensity to
violate the securities laws in the future, that the failure of press releases to disclose general
partners' conflict of interest in proposed mergers of limited partnerships "almost certainly
violated state fiduciary duties requiring full disclosure," even if the press releases were not
deemed to have been a "solicitation" under SEC Rule 14a-1).
395. See Arnold, 678 A.2d at 539 (declining to "replicate, by state decisional law, the
provisions of section 14 of the 1934 Act," since "[s]uch a result would represent a significant
change to the existing matrix of duties which governs the relationship among stockholders,
directors and corporations"). See also Uni-Marts, 1996 Del. Chanc. LEXIS 95 at *22 (stating
that the rule in Marhart "would open state courts under the fiduciary duty rubric to the
regulation of all market transactions in an issuer's stock by public shareholders whenever a
shareholder traded after a public announcement (or failure to announce?) by a corporate officer.
A respect for the evolved roles of state regulation of internal corporate affairs and federal
regulation of securities markets counsels against such a radical result'); Roger J. Dennis and
Patrick J. Ryan, State Corporate and Federal Securities Law: Dual Regulation in a Federal
System, 22 Publius: The J. of Federalism 21 (Winter 1992) (urging continuity of the roles
historically played by both state and federal law in regulating corporate governance and
disclosure). Indeed, given Marharts falsity, scienter, reliance, and loss requirements, the only
real consequence of its characterizing the disclosure duty as fiduciary in nature is to permit the
Delaware state courts to entertain, as assertions of breach of fiduciary duty, claims that would
otherwise be brought as Rule 10b-5 claims or common law fraud claims in other courts. See
Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 336; notes 396-97.
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This approach in no way leaves stockholders unprotected
against public misrepresentations by management; it simply leaves
such protection a matter addressed by other bodies of law. A viable
claim under the knowing misrepresentation fiduciary theory sug-
gested in Marhart would ordinarily support a damages claim under
Rule 10b-5,396 and for a class that included all purchasers or sellers,
and not just stockholders at the time of the challenged nondisclo-
sure.3 7 The only persons for whom the Marhart fiduciary duty theory
could afford a basis for recovery not available under Rule 10b-5 are
those who were stockholders at the time of the material nondisclosure
and who claim that they would have bought more shares, or sold their
shares, but for the material nondisclosure. Yet to allow recovery of
damages by such persons would run squarely afoul of the problems of
speculative proof that persuaded the United States Supreme Court to
impose a purchaser/seller requirement in damages actions under Rule
10b-5.398
It is only partly reassuring that Marhart only applies a duty of
completeness, and does not purport to create an affirmative duty of
disclosure. 399 Limiting the fiduciary duty identified in Marhart to a
duty of completeness, however, seems artificial. If a fiduciary duty
exists to ensure that disclosures made by management to the general
public are sufficient to inform the stockholders fully in their decisions
to buy or sell shares in the market, then, as has been suggested with
some force, it "does not follow analytically" to limit that duty to one of
completeness, rather than extend it to require affirmative disclo-
sures. 40 Yet to require affirmative disclosures in lieu of silence would
take the courts into areas of state law into which, at least thus far,
they have consistently declined to go.40 1 At the very least, such a step
should proceed from a firm basis in fiduciary principles. No such
basis, however, has been suggested.
396. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. See, for example, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976). State securities statutes may also support such a claim. See, for example, Rosenthal v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 908 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1995).
397. See Arnold S. Jacobs, 5B Litigation and Practice Under Rule 1Ob-5 § 62 at 3-304
(Clark Boardman, 2d ed. rev. ed. 1992).
398. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745-47 (1975).
399. Marhart, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. at 335.
400. Brown, Corporate Disclosure § 9.04 at 9-29 (cited in note 22).
401. See, for example, Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1271 (D.D.C.
1993); First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16979 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1992);
Raskin, 1990-1991 Fed. Secur. L. Rptr. T 95,668; Herd, 1990-1991 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,772;
Lindner Fund, Inc. v. Waldbaum, Inc., 604 N.Y.S. 2d 32, 624 N.E.2d 160, 161 (N.Y. 1993)
(dismissing a claim that fiduciary duty to stockholders required disclosure of a takeover agree-
ment in principle).
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Marhart, then, was a toe unnecessarily dipped in very deep,
murky legal waters in which state fiduciary doctrine had never previ-
ously swum. Enthusiasm for the moral obligations of corporate fidu-
ciaries should not obscure the radical character of that jurisprudential
step. This Article contends that the law of fiduciary disclosure duty
should remain solidly footed in its traditional contexts outlined above.
VI. RECAPITULATION
Scattered judicial and scholarly treatment has left the disclo-
sure obligations of corporate fiduciaries unsettled, the occasional
victim of a judicial willingness to follow the exhortations of fiduciary
rhetoric into contexts in which the rationales of fiduciary obligation do
not support the existence of such a duty or the remedies suggested for
breach of such a duty. A reconsideration of the historical and varied
contexts of fiduciary disclosure duties and an examination of how
those contexts largely dovetail with generally accepted rationales of
fiduciary doctrine should contribute to a more precise and justifiable
development and application of fiduciary disclosure duties in future
cases.
Where the fiduciary rationales operate most vigorously and
appropriately-that is, where corporate directors seek stockholder
action approving or effecting transactions in which the directors'
conflicting personal interests are served-the courts have appropri-
ately imposed affirmative fiduciary disclosure obligations and backed
them up with the broadest range of equitable remedies. Where direc-
tors are disinterested and merely serve a recommendation function,
an affirmative disclosure duty akin to the duty of care and the tort of
negligent misrepresentation exists to help assure that stockholders
are provided with corporate information material to the recommenda-
tion. The remedies for breach of that duty, however, are constrained
in the same way as the remedies for breach of the traditional duty of
care, or the analytically equivalent tort duty to avoid negligent mis-
representation. The damages remedy is limited to cases of director
neglect and to losses actually incurred by stockholders in reliance on
the disclosure failure. Finally, where disinterested directors fail to
disclose information that is material to the market generally, but not
to any recommendation made to the stockholders by the directors,
there is no fiduciary rationale that warrants imposition of a fiduciary
disclosure duty for the benefit of the portion of the market that hap-
pens to own stock already.
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From these considerations, future development of the case law,
particularly in Delaware, could be clarified and improved by:
* Clear recognition of the context-self-dealing versus
disinterested; recommending stockholder action or merely providing
information to the market generally-in which the fiduciary disclo-
sure duty is invoked;
* Recognition that when disinterested directors recom-
mend stockholder action, they can be held personally liable in dam-
ages for a failure to disclose a material fact to stockholders only where
that failure is the product of culpable negligence in gathering and
presenting information to stockholders;
• Recognition that, as under the doctrine of negligent
misrepresentation, stockholders may not recover damages from disin-
terested directors, based on a claimed nondisclosure in connection
with a director recommendation of stockholder action, unless the
stockholders can establish reliance upon the claimed nondisclosure;
and
* Recognition that in claims against disinterested direc-
tors of a material nondisclosure in connection with a recommendation
of stockholder action, there is no per se rule of damages, and recovery
of damages depends upon proof of actual loss.
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